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The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

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Three Forgotten Accessions: Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar

DOI: 10.1080/03086530903538269

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pages 117-143

Available online: 16 Feb 2010

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Volume 38, Issue 1, 2010

Abstract

The August 1947 transfer of power in India brought to the fore questions regarding the future of the areas which had long been leased by the government of India from certain princely states. Focusing on the Gilgit Agency, parts of which were leased from the state of Jammu and Kashmir, this article traces the nature of the agency and the manner in which it ultimately became a de facto part of Pakistan while Kashmir acceded to India. Conflicting accounts exist as to who was actually responsible for the revolution in Gilgit which led it towards Pakistan. This article uses all available sources to relate clearly and analyse the actual course of events during the tumultuous months of October and

November 1947. The article also assesses the status and then formal accession of the two small states of Hunza and Nagar, adjacent to Gilgit, which had been erroneously treated as being under the complete suzerainty of Kashmir.

Introduction

In November 1947, there was only one flagpole in South Asia where the Union Flag still fluttered. This was at the mountainous post of Kalandarchi in the Gilgit Agency where Subedar Jamshed Khan, an ardent imperialist, could not bear the transfer of the agency to Kashmiri hands and refused to obey the orders of his superiors to replace the Union Flag with the Jammu and Kashmir state flag. The flag was eventually replaced by that of Pakistan only in the first week of November 1947. This almost trivial incident was an important example of the intimate connection the British had formed with this ‘roof of the world’. It is also noteworthy because the government of Jammu and Kashmir state never did have complete control over this region, and was never going to either. Significant also is the coincidence that the agency's change of administration—from British to Pakistani hands—happened under a British officer.

This article traces the critical events from 1 August 1947 to 16 November 1947—from the day on which the Gilgit Agency (Figure 1) was handed over to the Kashmir Darbar to the date when the first Pakistani political agent arrived in Gilgit town. The summer of 1947 was a time of great trepidation for the people of Gilgit as well as the small states of Hunza and Nagar. The British had administered this whole region since the establishment of the agency in 1889, while since 1935 the Gilgit Wazarat area had also been leased to the government of India for a period of sixty years. All this came to an abrupt and premature end

by the setting of the transfer of power date of 15 August 1947. As a result, two weeks before the transfer of power, on 1 August 1947 the British political agent handed over control of the agency to the Kashmir Darbar. This action raised the level of anxiety among the people of Gilgit, and especially the Gilgit Scouts—the agency's para-military force—who did not welcome back Dogra Raj. The ruling mirs of Hunza and Nagar also became very wary of their status and well-being since their states were intricately linked to the agency, which was now under Srinagar's control. The advent of the transfer of power date of 15 August 1947 and its uneventful passing also increased tensions in the region, as the fate of its people became all the more uncertain.

In these bewildering times rumours of a revolt in Gilgit and accession to Pakistan by Hunza and Nagar became progressively vociferous. The 27 October 1947 the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India furthered heightened tensions and brought to the fore a revolt which within a week saw this whole region move decidedly in favour of Pakistan. Baffling however was the reaction of the Pakistan establishment which did not take any keen interest in the affairs of the Gilgit Agency and the two states and sent in its representative, a political agent, only on 16

November 1947—two weeks after the agency and the states had announced their accession to Pakistan.

In writing narratives on either the accession of states to Pakistan or the beginning of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, historians often overlook the accession of Hunza and Nagar states, as well as the local revolt in Gilgit, which brought this whole area under the control of Pakistan. The strategic importance of the Gilgit region, so important to theorists of the ‘Great Game’ in imperial India and its borders with China and the Soviet Union, seems to have been overshadowed by the frantic attempts of both Pakistan and India to take control of the vale of Kashmir. Hence the quiet change of power in Gilgit, and the accession of Hunza and Nagar, almost happened unnoticed both in Karachi and in New Delhi. Also, the role of the protagonists in Gilgit's rebellion is still disputed: some give credit to Major William Brown, the British commandant of the Gilgit Scouts for the revolt, while others relate Gilgit's declaration for Pakistan to be the work of local Kashmir state forces’ Muslim officers and/or the Muslim officers of the Gilgit Scouts. Still others argue that the role of the civilians was critical in impressing upon the administration that incorporation into Pakistan was best. Concerning Hunza and Nagar, their legal status and capacity to accede to either India or Pakistan without the concurrence of the Kashmir Darbar is hotly debated. The attitude of the Hunza and Nagar princes as well as their people towards both Kashmir and Pakistan still remains unclear.

The events from August to November 1947 are even now fiercely disputed. On the one hand, there is the account of Major Brown, which claims that it was mainly his initiative, with the help of his second in command, Captain Jock Mathieson in Chilas, that Gilgit was able to declare itself for Pakistan. On the other hand, there is the account of Captain Mirza Hassan of the Jammu and Kashmir 6th Infantry who claims that it was all his plan and that the move to accede to Pakistan was undertaken under his leadership.1 He also contends that, in fact, Major Brown was arrested just before the ‘revolution’. Then there is the account of Subedar Major Babar Khan of the Gilgit Scouts which asserts that it was mainly the Indian officers of the scouts who initiated and led the movement towards Pakistan and that both Brown and Hassan had

little to do with it.2 Dr Sokefeld, writing on the Gilgit affair, commented: ‘The accounts of that revolt, which include testimonies of many of its protagonists themselves (mainly military officers), are both numerous and bewildering in their number of contradictions. A major force behind the composition of quite a number of these stories seems to be competition for personal honour because many writers/authors strive to enhance their own position and contribution to the revolt.’3 Sokefeld, while having access to nearly all the local accounts, does not seem to have consulted Major Brown's detailed account of the affair (although he had access to the précis of events in the British Library), and so accepted the local accounts of what happened to be mainly true without really explaining why. His narrative of the events surrounding the revolt scarcely even mentions the existence of Major Brown, and his main concern seems to be establishing the exact role of the scouts and the state forces’ Muslim officers in the revolt.4 Similarly, Dr Ahmed Hasan Dani, writing the history of the northern areas of Pakistan, simply dismissed the role of Major Brown, noting that, as there was an underground movement to ally Gilgit with Pakistan, Brown was not ‘the leader of the independence of Gilgit’.5 Dani, whose account is also almost uncritical in its acceptance of the local accounts, is also handicapped by the unavailability of Brown's detailed diary. Mirzada Shah Khan's history of the Gilgit Scouts, written in Urdu, is a very interesting read, since it tries to ascribe roles to the local scouts and the state forces’ officers as well as Major Brown and Captain Matheison. In assigning roles, Mirzada Shah Khan credits Subedar Major Babar Khan with inciting the local revolt in Gilgit and for planning the takeover of the administration. He does not give Captain Mirza Hassan a role in Gilgit during the revolt, but assigns him a prominent position in the immediate aftermath and during the operations in Skardu. Concerning Major Brown, he does not mention any plans by Major Brown to accede to Pakistan but notes that Brown did help the local scouts once they informed him of their plans to take over the administration during the night of 31 October 1947.6 Even though Mirzada Shah Khan does try to habilitate everyone in narrative, serious questions still remain. For example, the immediate acquiescence of Major Brown and Captain Matheison is taken almost for granted. Also, there is no explanation given as to why Major Brown was sent to Karachi as commandant of the scouts to liaise with the Pakistan government, rather than one of the so-called leaders of the revolt, if they

had more authority and control than Brown. Further, as most of the local accounts of the events were written in the 1970s and 1980s when a lot of the material was used to gain domestic popularity, the account of Major Brown, written only a short time after the events in 1948 has a larger degree of credibility. With information available from nearly all sides, with the exception of the Pakistani government, where only scant information is available from the political agent, a much clearer picture of what happened in the lead up to the Gilgit revolt as well as during it can now be ascertained.

To assess these issues fully this paper is divided into two sections. The first section traces the events from the time of the handover of the Gilgit Agency to the Kashmir Darbar by the British on 1 August 1947 to the revolt and its aftermath till 16 November 1947. This section sheds critical light on the structure of the Gilgit Agency, the role and influence of the Gilgit Scouts, and the attempts of the Kashmir governor to assert his authority in the region. The role of the major players is also assessed, especially with regard to the controversial role of Major Brown and his second in command Captain Mathieson. The second section then examines the situation of the states of Hunza and Nagar, beginning with the debate over their legal status and hence capability to accede to any country. The manoeuvrings of the mirs of Hunza and Nagar in the days before their accession to Pakistan in trying to chalk out a future for their people is also discussed.

The British came in direct contact with the area that eventually formed the Gilgit Agency in the aftermath of the Anglo-Sikh wars of the 1840s and the creation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. At that time the northern frontier of the Indian Empire was at the forefront of the so-called ‘Great Game’ between the British Indian Empire and Czarist Russia.[7] Ever since the steady advance of Russia into central Asia, the British had been wary that eventually the Russians would reach Afghanistan and then ultimately attack India—something which was not without precedence. Therefore, the British tried to establish Afghanistan as a buffer state, within its sphere of influence, so that the Russian threat could be contained. The three Anglo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were clear attempts to counter Russian

influence and install friendly regimes in Afghanistan. As Gilgit, and the states of Hunza and Nagar, lay strategically near the border with Afghanistan, Russia and China, it was imperative for the British to have at least political and military control of the region so as to facilitate intelligence gathering, border control and the expansion of trade across Chinese Turkestan and Central Asia.

As the region of Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar lay beyond the direct control of the Kashmir Darbar under the Treaty of Amritsar 1846,[8] it took a long time for Maharajas Ghulab Singh and Ranbir Singh to expand into and assert their authority in Gilgit, and over Hunza and Nagar, and it was only in 1870 that they were finally able to hold Gilgit town. With the grip of the government of Jammu and Kashmir being of a very tenuous nature in this area, the government of India deputed Col. John Biddulph as an officer on special duty in 1877 for 'protecting trade and watching over political events'.[9] Col. Biddulph, while failing to rein in the Dogra forces in their mistreatment of the Muslim residents of the Gilgit region, did manage to unify and strengthen the state of Chitral as an important buffer against Afghanistan and Russia. However, nothing much could be achieved to fully control and demarcate the region till the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh in 1885, when the government of India instituted some administrative changes in the state and created the Gilgit Agency in 1889 with a permanent political agent under the supervision of the Kashmir resident.

After the establishment of a permanent agency in 1889, the British embarked upon securing the territory. The pacification of Hunza and Nagar in 1892 and the subordination and demarcation of Chitral in 1895 helped greatly in consolidating much of this unmarked mountainous territory. Two agreements—the 1893 Anglo-Afghan Agreement establishing the Durand Line as the boundary between British India and Afghanistan and the 1895 Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary Commission delimiting the boundary between Russia and British India—further demarcated spheres of influence in the 'roof of the world'. Both these agreements clarified the limits of the Gilgit Agency, except the boundary with China. Thereafter, in 1899, Sir C. MacDonald, the British minister in Peking, sent a note to the Chinese court proposing a border with

British India. The note stated that the border should extend beyond the Karakorum watershed, to mount Povalo Shveikovski, where all the three empires—British, Russian, and Chinese—met at the tip of the Wakhan corridor.10 But, since the Manchu dynasty was in political turmoil at the time, no reply was sent from the Chinese side and the government of India interpreted this inaction as an indication of its acceptance of the boundary proposal. Lord Curzon modified this proposal in 1905 when he sent another note to the Chinese court arguing for a boundary beyond the Karakorum watershed, for which he wished to relinquish India's claim to the Taghdumbash Pamir, which brought them in direct contact with the Czarist empire.11 Apparently this change was undertaken to prevent British India coming in direct contact with Russia, and also because it gave vital grazing ground to Hunza whose relations with the Chinese the government of India was keen on severing. However, this 1905 note was not sent to the Chinese and therefore the issue of the agency's border with China remained unsettled.

The Gilgit Agency was expanded in 1935 by leasing the Gilgit Wazarat from the maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir Sir Hari Singh for a period of sixty years, giving the British political agent complete control over its administration, communications and defence. Hitherto the agency had been administered under a form of dyarchy under which the British political agent was responsible for the defence, foreign relations and communications, while the Kashmir government wazir (governor) was in charge of the civil government. This process had not worked that well and there were perpetual tensions between the political agent and the governor as to who exercised more authority and control. Already the British, in continuation of the ‘Great Game’ syndrome of the late nineteenth century, had been quite alarmed by the increased Soviet activity in Chinese Sinkiang, on the border with the agency, and some of its officers had long argued for a complete takeover of the affairs of the agency so as to ensure full defence capability. The resulting treaty, signed on 26 March 1935 and ratified by the viceroy, Lord Willingdon, on 3 April 1935, leased the Gilgit Wazarat to the government of India for a period of sixty years. It was made very clear in the treaty that this was only a limited lease and not a cessation of land, and the maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir would continue to enjoy certain statutory rights in the leased territories.12 Subsequently, effective control was transferred to

Major G. Kirkbride, the political agent in Gilgit on 1 August 1935 by the Kashmir Darbar. Hence now the British were in control of the whole region which included:

the subdivision of Gilgit (already under British political and administrative control);

the Punial Jagir;

the states of Hunza and Nagar;

the ‘governorships’ of Yasin, Koh Ghizr and Ishkoman;

the republican communities of Chilas; and

the independent territory on the north bank of the Indian river occupied by the Dardis and Tangiris.[13]

The creation of the new Gilgit Agency was significant since it not only took away the remnants of direct Kashmir Darbar presence in these remote regions but also further weakened the already questionable tributary relationship of the Darbar with Hunza and Nagar. From 1935 onwards, therefore, the immediate rulers of the people in this region were the British, and especially the political agent and the commandant of the Gilgit Scouts. The Gilgit Scouts were the mainstay of the day-to-day defence needs of the agency. They were raised in 1913 from among the people of the agency and were commanded by British officers. The scouts were not only cheaper to maintain but their being lightly armed and locally recruited provided for their stealth, mobility and resilience. Even though initially half of their maintenance was paid for by the Kashmir Darbar, the fact that they had been raised by the British agency and were wholly Muslim meant that their ultimate loyalty lay with their British officers.

The outbreak of the Second World War brought the Gilgit Agency into focus, with the threat of Soviet intervention ominous once more. However, these fears were soon allayed by the German attack on the USSR in 1941, which made Britain, and by extension British India, an ally of Stalinist Russia. By the end of December 1941, the British were

also in alliance with the Chinese and hence all threats to the northern frontier seemed to have been laid to rest for a while. The India Office commented to Lord Linlithgow in a telegram on 25 June 1941 that the German invasion ‘has introduced [an] entirely new element into the situation which affects our whole policy in Central Asia’.14 Soon the agency was being used to shuttle useful supplies to both China and Russia in their efforts to defeat the Nazis. Nevertheless, by the end of the war problems over the undemarcated border between the agency and Sinking was creating transit troubles, and as the Chinese had never officially accepted the government of India's note of 1899 and the amendments of Lord Curzon in 1905. This situation remained unresolved by the time of the transfer of power in 1947, and was only partially resolved by the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement of 1963.

The Gilgit Agency again came into focus in the aftermath of the declaration of a definitive transfer of power by the government of India to two successor dominions of India and Pakistan by the viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. In 1947 there were three main areas in the subcontinent that had been leased out to the government of India: Berar was leased from Hyderabad; Quetta, Bolan and Nushki were leased from Kalat; and Gilgit was leased from Kashmir. These territories were leased from their respective princely states for strategic (Gilgit and Quetta regions) and economic (Berar was a cotton-growing area) reasons as annexations after the Crown took over the administration in 1858 were specifically ruled out.15 Therefore long-term and indefinite leases were a legal way in which the government of India could administer territories with complete authority while allaying the fears of the princes concerning annexation. Interestingly, Mountbatten was interested in terminating only the lease of Gilgit from Kashmir, while being strongly opposed to the termination of the other two leases. He wrote to Secretary of State Lord Listowell on 29 April 1947 arguing that, keeping in mind the logistical problems relating to a withdrawal of administration, the termination of the Gilgit lease should be before the transfer of power date of June 1948 and by October 1947 at the latest.16 Listowell concurred, but curiously Nehru asked for a postponement of the termination till ‘the nature of Kashmir's relationship to the Union of India [is] much clearer’.17 At this stage it is clear that Mountbatten hoped that Kashmir would finally accede to either of the two dominions,

since transferring such a strategic agency to the Kashmir Darbar presumably rested on such a premise. After all, the area was leased from the Kashmir Darbar for the specific purpose of keeping it away from the maharaja and firmly in British hands.

It is unclear what Mountbatten's motives were in the termination of the lease, but what is certain is that Mountbatten did not want Kashmir to remain independent, even though theoretically it could.[18] Further, Lord and Lady Mountbatten made a week-long trip to Kashmir in mid-June 1947 where Mountbatten impressed upon the maharaja not to declare independence. This visit might seem impartial, but it was undertaken in response to Nehru's urge to go to Kashmir (where his entry had been banned).[19] Also, the main document which briefed Mountbatten on the situation in Kashmir state had been written by Nehru. Thus it is quite possible that Mountbatten was inadvertently asking the maharaja to accede to India. Nehru made it very clear in the 17 June 1947 letter that '[i]f any attempt is made to push Kashmir into Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble…[the] obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India'.[20] Further evidence can also be gleaned from the Radcliffe Boundary Award where the retention of the three sub-districts of Gurdaspur District in East Punjab had given India complete land access to Kashmir state. Already, Mountbatten had remarked to the nawab of Bhopal and the maharaja of Indore on 4 August 1947 that Kashmir was 'so placed geographically that it could join either dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur were put into East Punjab by the Boundary Commission'.[21] This statement was made long before the official result of the Boundary Commission was made and at a time when it was generally thought that most of Gurdaspur, owing to its Muslim majority, would go to Pakistan as under the first schedule of the Indian Independence Act 1947.[22] It is no surprise then that Liaquat Ali Khan, the prime minister designate of Pakistan, stated to Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's chief of staff, that he considered this to be a 'political' rather than a 'judicial' decision and, as such, a 'grave injustice which will amount to a breach of faith on part of the British'.[23]

In Gilgit the handover to the Kashmir Darbar was now imminent and Major William Brown was chosen as the new commandant of the Gilgit Scouts. Interestingly, while Brown himself gave a rather flowery account of his choice, Charles Trench, when writing a history of the scouts, mainly related it to be the best of what could be done. Trench noted: 'In the early summer of 1947 the military authorities and the Kashmir Government were looking for a British officer to see the Gilgit Scouts through the difficult period of independence and partition. They might have preferred someone older, but it was not easy to find anyone at that time, so the job was offered to Major W A Brown.'24 Whatever the real circumstances involving the appointment of Brown, it is clear that a number of British officers who had served on the frontier wanted to stay on, and most did in Pakistan, and so Brown's appointment might not have been a desperate last resort, especially given his several years' experience in the northern areas.

The mood in Gilgit regarding the transfer to Kashmir was of bitterness, as a huge majority of the population did not want a return to Dogra rule. The agency had never actually been under direct Kashmir rule. Shortly after Maharaja Ranbir Singh established his control in Gilgit in the 1870s the British political agent had been always a watchful eye on Dogra rule. As such, the region was ruled relatively benignly even though the hatred towards the Dogra troops, stemming from their mistreatment of Gilgit's Muslim inhabitants, remained a strong memory. In 1947, the religious configuration had changed little: the population was still overwhelmingly Shia Muslim and the few non-Muslims were Sikh and Hindu traders and shopkeepers. These non-Muslims were treated with displeasure owing to trade rivalries and their relative prosperity *vis-à-vis* the local Muslims. The people of Gilgit also thought themselves ethnically distinct from the Kashmiris and thus felt few bonds to the state. These differences of political history and ethnic as well as religious dissimilarities resulted in the people of the Gilgit Agency feeling resentful for being placed under Kashmir state rule. Brown also noted that, when he met the scouts, he 'tried as far as possible to evade any reference to the obvious question at that stage, but they indirectly made it clear how they despised and hated Kashmir and everything connected with it, how happy and content they had been under the British rule, and how they considered they had been betrayed by the British in the unconditional handing over of their country

to Kashmir'.25 The area of Gilgit was also one of the most backward areas of the Kashmir state. As noted by Mirzada Shah Khan in his history of the Gilgit Scouts, in the whole region 'there were only three middle schools and eighty five primary schools. For medical care there were only two hospitals comprising of forty nine beds, which were not enough for the needs of far away places.'26 Access to information was also extremely limited with only the very rich able to afford radios. However, by the middle of 1947 news of communal tensions had reached Gilgit and in a place where Hindu Dogras were despised for their heavy handedness during the conflicts to subdue Gilgit, stories of Muslims being slaughtered by Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab inflamed passions against the small minorities of Hindus and Sikhs in Gilgit.

On 30 July 1947, when the new governor of Kashmir, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, arrived with the chief of the Kashmir general staff, General Scott, it was very clear that there would be friction between the governor and the commandant of the scouts—the two power brokers in the region. Already, Ghansara Singh had objected to the presence of British soldiers in the scouts. He wrote in his memoir that he protested to the Kashmir prime minister, Pandit Kak, at 'the retention of British officers in Gilgit Scouts as this would unnecessarily create problems and hamper in the independent disposal of my cases'.27 The prime minister, however, refuted the idea and even made Ghansara Singh proceed to Gilgit without proper briefings and support staff.28 His views on the motives of the British officers (obviously rethought after the whole debacle) are also telling. He wrote that 'naturally the British officers had planned a scheme to discredit the State administration and to bring about Pakistan'.29 Major Brown's assessment of Ghansara Singh is also not very complimentary and is evidence of the strained relationship they had from day one. Brown wrote: 'He was a typical Dogra—quiet, steady, loyal and brave soldiery, but lacking brain, tact, imagination and personal initiative … a worse choice could not have been made for the person who was to steer the ship of Gilgit over the stormy transition period. The qualities required for the job were exactly those he did not possess.'30

The official handover ceremony on 31 July 1947 was also one where the disappointment of the locals over the change of administration was clear,

as well as the disappointment of Major Brown who thought the handover to be a folly. He noted:

for me it was a deeply emotional moment and I do not doubt that the other British officers present were also profoundly moved. In that short period the stories and triumphs of Durand, Hayward, Younghusband, Manners Smith, flashed through my mind; and now the symbol of peace, prosperity and security, which has so proudly flown over the Agency since first raised by Durand and his gallant band in 1881, was being lowered for the last time; a glorious epoch cut short through stupidity and ignorance.[31]

Hence it was already clear to Brown that the handover to Kashmir was a huge mistake on the part of the British, and he did not want to support the continuation of the Kashmir regime in Gilgit. The report on the handover ceremony from Chilas is also clear about the dismay of the local population. It noted:

The Guard of Honour again presented arms to the Union Jack and the thousands of tribesmen present broke into great cheers for the British Raj. Many of these hardy warriors, accustomed to acts of unparalleled cruelty, broke down. … The Guard of Honour again presented arms—this time to the green and yellow emblem of Kashmir. The Hindus present called for three cheers for the Maharaja. But no answer shout greeted them. Only the noise of a distant thunder was heard as the mighty tribesmen turned their backs and, cursing and threatening, returned to their mountain valleys.[32]

Later at the official banquet for the Kashmir delegation by the departing British political agent, Col. Bacon, Brown noted that ‘there was a tense embarrassing silence, and the expression on the faces of those loyal folk of the Agency was one of sadness mingled with hurt at the abandonment by the British on whom they had learnt to rely and trust. The Kashmir contingent were obviously ill at ease.’[33] The departing comment of Col. Bacon to Brown is also significant in that it presaged what happened afterwards and is evidence that already things were brewing up against

the Kashmir rule in the Agency. Col. Bacon had commented to Brown: ‘I give the Kashmir administration three months in Gilgit. Then something will happen.’34

The Indian officers in the Gilgit Scouts and the local civil servants were quick to confront the governor with a list of demands if they were going to serve any longer in the state machinery. This list of demands, which was presented to Ghansara Singh on his first day, and in front of General Scott, took the new governor by surprise and he surmised that some of them were just obstructionist and outrageous.35 However, General Scott promised to look into them positively. Since most of these demands were long term, relating to an increase of pay, pensions and the like, it does suggest that the local scouts were in fact planning on serving the maharaja long term should the status quo be maintained. Sokefeld maintains that the main reason for the scouts’ refusal to take an oath to the maharaja was that their demands had not been fulfilled.36 This then casts doubt over the claim made by Subedar Major Babar Khan, the person who actually presented these demands to the governor, that he had been thinking of independence since the beginning of 1947. Babar's further claim that after 14 August 1947 he sent telegrams to Muslim leaders in Pakistan asking for help, and especially to Jinnah who ostensibly wrote him a comforting but unhelpful reply, is also problematic in being unconfirmed from the other side.37

Major Brown's trips to Chilas, Punial and Gupis to administer the oath to the maharaja of Kashmir to the scouts and other officials were tours as much to ascertain the views of the local populace concerning the future of the region as to conduct the oath-taking ceremonies. At a tea party in Chilas, Brown's conversation with Muzzaffar, the raja orderly in Chilas, was representative of the mood of the people. Muzaffar said: ‘the whole of Gilgit Agency is pro-Pakistan … we could never swear allegiance to Hindustan. Apart from religion, the Gilgit Agency is really a part of the NWFP and is therefore a part of Pakistan. If Kashmir remains independent, well and good….But if the Maharaja through pig headedness and bad advice, political pressure or attractive remunerations accedes to Hindustan, then there will be trouble here!’38 Muzaffar also warned Brown that, in the event of Kashmir's accession to India, he

would have to take some hard and careful decisions. He said: ‘If you mismanage the scouts in any way now or more especially if Kashmir accedes to Hindustan, then you'll fire a powder barrel which will cause a catastrophe such as there never has been in Central Asia.’39 What is of note here is that Muzaffar suggested that the people would be equally happy with either independence or accession to Pakistan; it was only incorporation into India which was unacceptable. This further corroborates the reasoning behind the long-term demands made by the scouts, since independence seemed a very plausible option at that time.

The oath-taking ceremonies, conducted in Chilas, Gilgit, Punial and Gupis, were more or less a farce. After Major Brown had ascertained that there was not an imminent threat of a rebellion among the scouts and that still he commanded their unfailing loyalty, he carried out these ceremonies in order to placate the now dormant governor who would scarcely leave his plush bungalow. Further, the fact that the ceremony in Chilas was undertaken with an old book, rather than the Quran, and the one in Gilgit with a copy of the *Oxford Dictionary* exemplifies that Brown was not too keen on ensuring that the scouts declare their allegiance to the Kashmir state and was already thinking of alternative plans for Gilgit. His very revealing thoughts after the ceremonies show his move from being indignant at the British abandonment of Gilgit to the Dogras to being committed to make Gilgit a part of Pakistan. He wrote:

I shuddered at the thought of the havoc which would follow a decision by the ruler of Kashmir to join India. The blame for the widespread destruction of life and property would lie directly on the British government. I therefore felt it was my duty, as the only Britisher left, to follow a course which would prevent this … partisan, traitor, revolutionary, I may have been, but that evening my sentiments dictated that if the Maharaja acceded to India, that I would forego [*sic*] all allegiance to him and I would not rest content until I had done the utmost in my power to ensure that not only the Gilgit province joined Pakistan, but the whole of Kashmir also. The Rubicon was crossed, and in the future all my actions were formed by these ideas.40

Brown also made known to Ghansara Singh his observations about the whole population being pro-Pakistan but no further actions were taken. Ghansara Singh for his part wrote to the authorities in Srinagar that something was brewing in Gilgit but received no response. He wrote to the prime minister of Kashmir: 'in case the State accedes to the Indian Union, the Gilgit province will go to Pakistan', but no action was taken on it, and in fact Srinagar never replied to any of his messages.41

Concurrently, the native scout officers were also planning a challenge to the administration in case the maharaja went over to India. Shah Khan, a local scout officer noted that a meeting took place in the last week of September 1947 and that 'this was the first ever meeting in which a decision to liberate Gilgit was taken. The leading spirits of this movement were two figures: namely, Subedar Major Mohammad Babar Khan and myself. Had we two not been there or had either one of us backed out the movement would have died there and then.'42 What they really meant by 'liberate' is very unclear, since it appears that, at least at this moment, they were not considering accession to Pakistan as their ultimate goal and were just thinking of seceding from Kashmir. Captain Hassan of the Jammu and Kashmir state forces however presents a different picture, noting that it was only at the mid-October *Jalsa* in Gilgit that both the dissenting scouts and the state forces personnel came together and decided to take over the administration, with Hassan as their leader.43 It is very hard to pinpoint who was the actual leader of the dissident group, but what is significant is that by the middle of October 1947 there had emerged two clear parties in both the scouts and the state forces posted at Bunji, some miles from Gilgit, with an almost overwhelming majority of the Indians in the scouts up for revolt, and the Muslim company in the 6th Kashmir Rifles on the verge of mutiny. Captain Hassan, though, does make some unsubstantiated claims which lead one to believe that he was basically trying to portray himself as the sole leader in the secession of Gilgit. For example, he claimed that when the mirs of Hunza and Nagar had visited the maharaja of Kashmir in July 1947 they had pledged their full allegiance to him,44 whereas this claim was both refuted by the mirs' conversation with Major Brown on their return,45 by their own statements, and by the fact that they signed Instruments of Accession (which they themselves wrote) in favour of Pakistan in the first week of November 1947.

Meanwhile, Major Brown and Captain Mathieson had devised a plan of action code named ‘Datta Khel’ (after a town in Waziristan, on the border with Afghanistan). According to the plan, on D-day, which was supposed to be determined by Brown, Mathieson's duty would be to keep Chilas under control and take care of the Kashmir state forces stationed at Bunji, with or without the help of the Muslim contingent, which they were hoping would mutiny. Brown, on the other hand, would put Ghansara Singh under arrest, round up all the Hindus and Sikhs in a refugee shelter, cut all lines of communication with Srinagar and immediately wire Pakistan for assistance. They were unaware that the native officers had been planning something already, but their plan did depend on their acquiescence and cooperation.46

Memoirs written in the 1990s by an eyewitness, Hafeez ur Rahman Sheikh, concerning the events of November 1947 add another twist to the narrative by mentioning the presence of a Muslim League-related woman, Ms Nasira Kiyani, who was apparently present in Gilgit trying to make it accede to Pakistan. Sheikh noted that she met Captain Mirza Hassan of the Jammu and Kashmir 6th infantry and Subedar Major Babar Khan of the Gilgit Scouts secretly in a village called ‘mayion’ on the outskirts of Gilgit. She asked them to write a statement offering the accession of the northern areas to Pakistan. However, they did not agree to writing a statement due to some ‘unknown danger’ and, keeping in mind their personal advantage, asked her if in the event of their accession to Pakistan they would be kept established in their current employment and posts and whether they would get promotions based on the current assignments.47 Sheikh then goes on to note that, even though Ms Kiyani assured them of future benefits in Pakistan, both officers still hesitated and did not sign anything. Sheikh further notes the existence of Operation ‘Datta Khel’ by Major Brown and is convinced that the six local officers were sure that, ‘in case of their accession to India and with the coming of the 6th JK infantry to Gilgit, Gilgit Scouts will be dissolved and as a result they will lose their jobs. Therefore if the Gilgit Scouts want to remain at their current positions and achieve future promotions, they must work for the accession of the northern areas to Pakistan.’48 This report lends further credibility to the claims made by Major Brown that, even though the local officers in the scouts and the

state forces were pro-Pakistan, their aims and objectives concerning Gilgit were unclear and that it was he who mainly led the move towards Pakistan.

Tensions rose in the whole Gilgit region with the reported accession of Jammu and Kashmir state to India on 26 October 1947, and the landing of Indian troops in the state the next morning. Ghansara Singh had been biding his time till then but knew that the moment had come to take action. Until his confrontation with Major Brown on the morning of 30 October 1947, Ghansara Singh had been depending on the Gilgit Scouts as his mainstay for defence. He later recorded in his memoirs that he chose the scouts over the regular troops because, should things get out of hand, there was a better chance of the scouts remaining loyal than the state forces, which had been more aware of the communal bloodshed in the Punjab and were split along communal lines (there were separate Muslim, Hindu and Sikh units at Bunji). Major Brown had also told the governor in very simple terms that he should immediately call for a referendum on the accession issue and go on temporary leave or else he (Brown) would not be responsible for whatever happened afterwards. This confrontation changed the governor's mind and he immediately called on Col. Majid, commanding officer of the state forces at Bunji, to move towards Gilgit.[49]

Major Brown in the interim received a telegram from the Mehtar of Chitral, who had maintained a very obscure and tense treaty relationship with Kashmir, stating: ‘Chitral breaking off all relations with the Kashmir Government. Neither my state nor Gilgit can accept accession of Kashmir to Hindustan.’[50] Brown took this telegram as a clear indication of the Mehtar's intention of attacking Gilgit and securing it for Pakistan.

The actual *coup d’état* took place on the night between 31 October and 1 November 1947, and this is where the accounts of all the protagonists violently contradict each other. Major Brown's claim is that on the night of 31 October 1947 he had a meeting with all the scout officers where he asked them to take an oath for Pakistan and to help him carry out Datta Khel. With the full support of the scouts he then sent a message to Capt.

Mathieson to put Datta Khel into operation by midnight, and himself embarked on securing Gilgit. According to Brown, he directed Subedar Major Babar Khan to proceed towards the governor's residence and put Ghansara Singh under arrest. Brown explained that he chose Babar Khan since he had already been summoned by the governor earlier in the day and so was the person who could arouse the least suspicion from the governor and his men.51 Second, he directed one section to secure the post office, two sections to protect the wireless and one platoon to meet the state forces on their way to Gilgit. Brown also set up a refugee camp where he collected all the Hindus and Sikhs with most of their belongings so that no harm could be done to them should the people take to the streets.

All of the above is accurate as to what happened and is corroborated by all sides, except the question as to who was in charge and giving orders. Subedar Major Babar Khan of the Gilgit Scouts, in his memoirs, takes full credit for the revolt in Gilgit, noting that he was the person who spearheaded the move to arrest the governor. Babar also maintains that it was he who sent the platoon to Bunji so that it could counter the state forces—and that he had actually arrested Major Brown on the night of 31 October 1947.52 On the other hand, Captain Hassan asserts that it was actually him who was guiding Babar and Lt. Ghulam Haider in arresting the governor, and that the governor gave himself up only after he knew that it was Hassan, not Col. Majid, who had come up to Gilgit from Bunji.53 Hassan also credits himself with the arrest of Major Brown on the morning of 1 November 1947.54

Without any independent confirmation of events, it is next to impossible to attest the leadership of any of the above mentioned military officers. However, a number of discrepancies do point to major flaws in the claim to fame by both Babar and Hassan. First, both claim to have arrested Major Brown, either on the night of 31 October or in the morning of 1 November 1947. Both these timings seem improbable. If Major Brown had been arrested on the night of 31 October he could not have sent a telegram to the premier of the North West Frontier Province, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, on 1 November 1947 stating: ‘Revolution. Night 31st to 1st in Gilgit Province. Entire pro-Pakistan populace has

overthrown Dogra regime. Owing imminent chaos and bloodshed Scouts and Muslim State Forces running administration temporarily. Request higher authority be approached immediately and reply through wireless. Can carry out meantime. Commandant Scouts.'55 According to Major Brown he did not want to write that it was he who headed the whole operation, keeping in mind his delicate position as a British officer.56 But, even if he were not leading the operation and was actually under arrest, it seems improbable the local scouts or the Muslim state forces' officers would send a telegram to Pakistan using Brown's name. Captain Hassan's urge to be in control of the region in later days makes it self-evident that, if he had in reality complete control of Gilgit, he would have sent a message to Pakistan in his own name, rather than that of Brown. Further, Major Brown's end note, which said: 'can carry out meantime', implies that he was in control of the situation and so could maintain peace for the time being. Brown's wire to Col. Bacon, who had now become political agent in the Khyber Agency, at the same time as the premier of the NWFP, also showed that he was the one sending these messages and was in ultimate control. He wrote to Col. Bacon, who was worried about his personal safety: 'Am in no personal danger.'57 Quite obviously, neither Hassan nor Babar would have sent Col. Bacon a telegram, since neither of them had any kind of personal friendship with Col Bacon. Later it was claimed again on the night of 2 November 1947 that the local scouts had arrested Brown, when Mr Limbuwala, the telegraph operator, sent a frantic message to Peshawar that Brown had been arrested and that the situation had become very serious. In fact, what had triggered Mr Limbuwala's frenzied reaction was an incident where a local man had grabbed the rein of Brown's horse, prior to getting punched by one of Brown's loyal scouts.58 In any case, Peshawar's disregard of Limbuwala's message (since presumably Brown did send a correcting wire), and sending of a message asking Brown 'for any support … in maintaining law and order' exhibits that Brown was still in control.59

The claim that Babar Khan single-handedly led the scouts to rebel against the Dogra governor also seems far-fetched. If this were the case, it would hardly have been natural for them to set up refugee camps for Hindus and Sikhs within scout lines in Gilgit and within the fort in Chilas. As attested by Ghansara Singh, while Major Brown was in

Pakistan, the sack of the Hindu and Sikh shops in Gilgit bazaar ‘was made by Scouts with a few other townsmen’.60 If the scouts were bent on robbing the Hindus and Sikhs, who were mostly non-resident shopkeepers, of most of their possessions it scarcely made sense for them to protect the Hindus and Sikhs in their own barracks for weeks before looting them. Captain Mirza Hassan's argument that it was actually him who was guiding Babar and Haider through telephone contact during the events in Gilgit town is embellished since, if it were true, then it would not have made sense for Babar, or Brown for that matter, to have sent a platoon towards Bunji to confront the state forces as they should already have known that those troops were being led by Captain Hassan. Also, Hassan's repeated attempts to thwart communication between Brown and Mathieson in Chilas showed that he was trying to get control of a situation he was clearly not in control of. Hafeez ur Rahman Sheikh also contends that Captain Hassan's coming to Gilgit was seen by the scouts as a threat rather than a help since they thought the governor would use his excuse to disarm them.61

On 1 November 1947, a number of local leaders, mainly Shias, gathered at Babar Khan's residence and asked Brown to join them and form some sort of a provisional administration. They impressed upon Brown that they could not let him lead the ‘jehad’ and that he must step aside. Brown's personal diary tells us that Captain Hassan stepped up and said: ‘We know of course that you are loyal to Pakistan, all Britishers are, but it is not our intention to join Pakistan. We intend to set up an independent Islamic State called the United States of Gilgit, and although we shall keep the friendliest relations with Pakistan we shall in no way owe allegiance to that dominion.’ However, after Brown intimated to them that he had already informed Peshawar of the coup and that an independent Gilgit would almost certainly invite an attack by the Indian army, the resolve of the gathered dissipated for the time being.

On the morning of 2 November 1947, after the Pakistan flag had been raised in scout lines by Major Brown at 09.30 hours, an *Aburi Hakoomat* (provisional government) was set up with Shah Rais Khan, a relative of the Raja of Gilgit, as president, Captain Hassan as commander in chief (he spent no time changing his clothes), Lt. Haider as commissioner, and

Major Brown the chief military advisor to the C-in-C with the rank of major general and Captain Mathieson as Brown's deputy. Brown was told that he could not hold any other post in the government as he was a non-Muslim.62 Major Brown was quite amused at the creation of this government and even chuckled to Captain Hassan about the obvious rise in his pay from that of a major to major general.63 What is certain from the creation of this government and the meeting the previous night is that the native officers were not all out in Pakistan's favour and wanted to control Gilgit themselves—at least for the near future.

The creation of the provisional government begs two main questions: one, who was in control of it and, two, did it really have any authority? Ostensibly the provisional government had Shah Rais Khan as its president, a respected local leader. It is, however, unclear whether this was in response to local popular pressure or whether Shah Rais was just used as a facade while the real power lay in the commander in chief, Mirza Hassan. The existence of a popular movement to oust the Kashmir government too remains contested. Almost all the military leaders of the rebellion are unanimous in their stance that there was no popular movement in Gilgit. Hassan argued that it simply could not have been possible to have civilian leaders involved since none of them were trustworthy.64 To this Dani adds: ‘there was certainly no peoples’ [*sic*] movement in the region as no political party was allowed here. Hence there was no organised public expression but public sentiment and public morale for Pakistan was very intense.’65 This comment is on the mark, for, despite the lack of any organised political activity, the sentiments of the people were really charged up against the Dogra rulers. Reports from both Brown and Mathieson attest that local mullahs were vociferously preaching Jihad against Kashmir, and that even on the eve of the arrest of the governor a mob had gathered outside his residence trying to get through to him. Also, a huge crowd armed with various weapons later assembled in the polo ground and had to be pacified before it went away. There had, though, been mention of an organisation called *Tanzim e Sarfaroshan* whose main aim was to spread pro-Pakistani propaganda and to act as a liaison between anti-Dogra elements in the province's administration.66 Shah Rais and Babar Khan were perhaps members or leaders of it, and that might explain the leadership role given to Shah Rais, even though he had earlier been denied the rajaship of Gilgit by the

Kashmir Darbar.67 Dani has commented on the obscure nature of the organisation and noted that his 'personal inquiring in Gilgit and interview with Mohammad Ali Barbari in Karachi yielded conflicting information'.68 Thus, even though the anti-Kashmir sentiments of the Gilgit population were clear, no sense of political organisation seems to have been present among the populace.

On the question of whether the provisional government held any authority and sway over the population and over Major Brown, its manoeuvrings in the aftermath of the arrival of the first Pakistani political agent, Khan Mohammad Alam Khan, on 16 November 1947 are informative. But before the arrival of the Pakistani political agent, Major Brown had already secured all the province by successfully neutralising the Kashmir state forces stationed at Bunji with the help of Captains Mathieson and Hassan and had prepared strong defences in case of an Indian attack. Therefore, when the political agent arrived on November 16, and Major Brown took him on a tour of Gilgit town, Alam was astonished to see that the treasury was still intact, with over 800,000 rupees, and that most of the people in the markets, including Hindus and Sikhs, were going about their business as usual. Alam said: 'This is incredible, Major Brown. I arrived here expecting to find a war torn ravaged country and instead of that it seems as though nothing had happened at all. Incredible, incredible!'69 After that, on 17 November 1947, the Pakistan flag was again hoisted on Agency House where the political agent and Major Brown inspected the guard of honour.

On 18 November 1947, the provisional government asked to see the political agent and impressed upon him that in fact they were the real power and that he, Alam, should take all decisions in consultation with them. Led by Captain Hassan and Captain Mohammad Said, they demanded that both British officers be sacked and that they should be appointed in their stead. Alam replied, as recorded by Brown: 'you are a crowd of fools led astray by a madman. I shall not tolerate this nonsense for one instance. Another squeak out of you, and Major Brown and myself will pack up … it will not be long before the country [will be] plunged into civil war. And when the Indian Army starts invading you there will be no use screaming to Pakistan for help, because you won't

get it.’70 After this Hassan was appointed military governor of the Bunji sector and ordered to focus on that mission only. The provisional government soon faded away after this encounter with Alam Khan, clearly reflecting the flimsy and opportunistic nature of its basis and support.

After handing over effective control of the agency to Alam Khan, Major Brown flew to Peshawar and then to Rawalpindi to report what had happened and to ask the prime minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, to raise the strength of the scouts from 600 to 1500. At a meeting on 3 December 1947 Liaquat concurred with Brown's suggestion but voiced his dismay that Brown would not stay long enough to see this expansion through.71 The reason for this was that Sir George Cunningham, governor of the NWFP, was quite insistent that both Brown and Mathieson be withdrawn as soon as possible. Since they were British soldiers their actions might seem an underhanded attempt by Britain to aid Pakistan. Even though no account from the political agent has survived, the note by Sir George Cunningham in his dairy about the whole incident is quite useful in gauging the reaction and understanding of the government of Pakistan. He wrote on 27 November 1947:

Brown, commanding Gilgit scouts, whom we have fetched down by aeroplane, told me last night about the coup détat there on Oct 31st. About 2000 of the surrounding tribes, etc, came into Gilgit intending to kill the Dogra Governor and all other Hindus. The Gilgit Scouts drove them off and took the Governor and his staff into custody and put them under their protection. The only casualty was one Gilgit scout sepoy shot by the governor when they went to bring him in. Within two days all the Hindu and Sikh shops were open as usual, and Brown (aged 24) and his adjutant Matheison (aged 23) have been running the whole Gilgit Agency since then—a rather remarkable feat for 2 boys. Brown is a quiet, self confident Scot from Melrose, who quite sees the humour of his situation. We are sending him back again, but I want to get him and Matheison out as soon as possible, as they are not really in the position of commanding a corps which has mutinied against the Kashmir govt., and it is a dangerous position to be in. We have now sent up some Muslim officials to try and keep order.’72

Thus on 10 January 1948 both Brown and Mathieson handed over charge to Major Mohammad Aslam and Captain Mohammad Khan and returned to Peshawar.

II

The two tiny states of Hunza and Nagar situated on the northernmost tip of the British Indian Empire had always been an anomaly of sorts. Their status had been contested not only by the Kashmir Darbar but also by the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang who claimed them to be a part of their empire as both states offered tribute to Peking. As a matter of fact, their status was so obscure that *The Kashmir Times*, without thinking twice, published a piece in its 25 February 1936 issue noting: 'We admit that Hunza and Nagar are not included in the lease. According to our information these two states pay tribute to four governments—British, Chinese, Russian and Kashmiri and situated as they are derive benefit from all of them.'73 Even though the Kashmir prime minister quickly rebuked the editor of the newspaper, the newspaper was not far off the mark. The two states, which still had quite undefined territories, were simply out to make use of any agreement they could get out of any government so that they could get benefits far outstripping the tribute they were supposed to give. Hence their status remained a bone of contention at the time of the transfer of power and theoretically still remains so, since Pakistan has never formally incorporated them into its territory following their accession.74

The question of the status of Hunza and Nagar arose in the aftermath of the discussions with Kashmir over its entry into the federal arrangement under the Government of India Act 1935. The Kashmir government maintained that, as these were vassal states, they would automatically be a part of the federal arrangement if Kashmir opted for it. The government of India was quite unclear about the issue and the issue remained under examination for over three years.75 In a lengthy note to the government of India, the Kashmir government argued that Hunza and Nagar had

always been under the suzerainty of the Kashmir Darbar and so should be considered vassals of Maharaja Sir Hari Singh. Its main arguments were:

a) The Sikh government of Lahore exercised some influence and control over Hunza, Nagar and the adjacent territory through their military commander at Gilgit.

b) Whatever the rights the Sikhs had … [they] were transferred to Maharaja Ghulabsinghji by the Treaty of Amritsar … .

d) The extension and consolidation of the authority of the State was done without reference to or assistance of the British Government who were bound by treaty to assist the state only in repelling *external* enemies.

h) … .The rebellion of Hunza and Nagar, which followed the tightening up of the control of the frontier, was put down by State forces … .

k) From 1885 upto 1935 the State paid up to three crores of rupees towards the maintenance of the Agency … because it always considered and treated the Agency districts as its territory … .

n) Whatever the rights of administration which the Government of India exercise or have ever exercised over the Chiefships and territories comprising the Agency are derived directly or indirectly from and through the Jammu and Kashmir State … the State having already been in effective possession of those rights prior to the establishment of the Agency.[76]

The government of India was not convinced by the long note of the Kashmir government, though it took time to arrive at a definite pronouncement. However, Col. Fraser, the resident, while commenting on the note made it very clear that the Kashmir Darbar had no historical right to Hunza and Nagar deriving from the Sikh Empire. He quoted the

earliest political agent, Captain Biddulph in 1881, noting: ‘Since 1869 Ghanzan Khan [of Hunza] has been in receipt of a yearly subsidy of Rs. 2000 from Jammu, nominally in return for allegiance but it is really paid as blackmail to prevent him making raids into Gilgit territory … owing to the defiant nature of their country they have successfully resisted every attempt to subdue them by the Kashmir Government.’77 Fraser further contended that the three crore figure mentioned by the Kashmir government was not all spent on Hunza, Nagar and the other tribal areas, but also on its own Gilgit Wazarat and that much of it went for the maintenance of its troops in the area. So it could not be used to justify control over the aforementioned areas. He did acknowledge, though, that the last sanad granted to the Hunza and Nagar mirs did give the Kashmir maharaja wide-ranging powers. He concluded: ‘it is true that the wording of the Sanads granted to the two Mirs after the 1891 war were very comprehensive and gave the State the right to supervise … since then, however, State control has evaporated rapidly and steadily and for very many years these districts have been under the complete charge of the Political Agent.’78 The Foreign Department also noted that Kashmir's relations with these states were not independent of the British but that ‘the control … was political acquired with the concurrence, encouragement or aid of the British Government, and involved external relations with these territories.’79 The Kashmir government also overlooked that Hunza gave tribute too to the Chinese authorities in Kashgar, and was claimed by them as well. The British government was quite concerned by this dual relationship, especially since a lot of communist activity was being reported in Sinkiang, and so asked Hunza not to give tribute to the Chinese in return for a Rs 3000 subsidy and a jagir in Gilgit to offset the loss of grazing rights in Chinese Sinkiang.80 The Chinese authorities were incensed at the cessation of tribute in 1937 and raided Hunza in 1938, but the matter soon dissipated with increasing political turmoil in China and the outbreak of the Second World War.

In 1940 the government of India finally decided on the issue of Hunza and Nagar, as well as the adjoining territories, by refuting the arguments of Kashmir. Interestingly, while the decision was made in May 1940, with the concurrence of both the Crown Representative and the secretary of state, it was not relayed to the Kashmir state government till the summer of 1941 due to fears that it might jeopardise the war effort.81

Finally, on 5 June 1941, Col. Fraser intimated to the prime minister of the government of Jammu and Kashmir the decision of the crown representative which read:

The Crown Representative regrets that he is unable to agree with all the conclusions reached in the note of the Kashmir Government forwarded with your letter and has been pleased to decide as follows:1)Hunza and Nagar: though these are under the suzerainty of the Kashmir State, they are not part of Kashmir but are separate states.2)Chilas, Koh Ghizr, Ishkoman, and Yasin: Though these are under the suzerainty of Kashmir State they are not part of Kashmir but tribal areas.82

Theoretically, the above statement should have settled the issue, but the Kashmir Darbar did not ever stop treating Hunza and Nagar as part of its territory nor did the Hunza and Nagar mirs ever act independently of Kashmir.

With the announcement of the handover of the Gilgit Agency to the Kashmir government both the mirs of Hunza and Nagar became quite perturbed about the status of their states since their economies and people were inextricably linked with the Gilgit Agency, now under Srinagar's control. Thus, both mirs paid a visit to Maharaja Sir Hari Singh in Srinagar to discuss future arrangements in July 1947. According to Brown, on whom the mirs called on after their return, Mir Jamal of Hunza's version was:

the Maharaja agreed that Durand's treaty was now null and void as one of the joint contracting parties, namely the Crown Representative had withdrawn. The Maharaja therefore desired that we should enter into a new treaty agreement directly with him. We pointed out that although our intention was to remain on the friendliest of terms with him, and to cooperate with him as far as circumstances allowed, we were not at present prepared to come under treaty obligations … so … we are now completely independent.83

The maharaja's version was of course that the mirs reaffirmed their support for the Darbar, but in light of how they acted and due to the mere fact that they were in reality independent it seems unlikely that the mirs owed any sort of allegiance to the maharaja.

The attitudes of the mirs of Hunza and Nagar in the run up to the Gilgit affair were quite consistent with their above-mentioned ideas. They kept in constant touch with Major Brown in Gilgit and when Major Brown called the mir of Hunza to confirm if he had earlier in the day on 30 October 1947 affirmed his support for Hari Singh in his accession to India, Hunza clearly came out in favour of Pakistan and said: 'There is only one way for us to go and that is to Pakistan and we shall join Pakistan.'84 Further, even though Captain Hassan and others claimed that the mirs were on the side of the maharaja, both the mir of Hunza and the mir of Nagar sent their Instruments of Accession to Major Brown by 3 November 1947, which Brown later wired to Peshawar.85 Brown even mentioned that the raja of Punial, who was thought to be the most pro-Kashmiri of all the governors of the area, sent him his accession letter written in the vernacular through his son.86 Hence, without the mirs of Hunza and Nagar even having been contacted and provided with the prepared standard Instruments of Accession, both these states acceded to Pakistan. This was because, being nearly 100 per cent Muslim, the people of Hunza and Nagar were quite receptive to the idea of accession to Pakistan and also because their prospects looked much better with the Muslim majority state of Pakistan than the Hindu-dominated India, especially since their relations with Kashmir had not been the most cordial. Hafeez ur Rahman Sheikh noted of Hunza and Nagar that '[t]he people were of course were all for Pakistan, but due to the lack of political consciousness and a severe lack of education they were not able to voice their opinion and were completely under the thumb of their rulers'.87 Thus, both Hunza and Nagar acceded to Pakistan without any effort made by the Pakistani government.

Conclusion

It seems bewildering that even after more than sixty years since the Gilgit Agency, Hunza and Nagar declared their wish to join Pakistan, they still remain as territories ‘administered by Pakistan’ and are not a part of the country as described in Article 1 of the Constitution of Pakistan which does not even mention Gilgit as forming a part of the territory of Pakistan. More or less, the structure of the political agency still remains, and only recently has some form of limited self-government been introduced in the now renamed ‘Gilgit-Baltistan’. Evidently this is due to the continuing Kashmir dispute and the unclear nature of these regions and the means by which they opted for Pakistan.

The character of Major William Brown is critical in understanding the means by which Gilgit declared itself for Pakistan. Brown was a figure who considered himself one in the long line of British adventurers who came to this far-flung region and established the kind and benevolent rule of the Raj. After the public in Gilgit started to show its support for Pakistan in October 1947 and wrote ‘Pakistan Zinadabad’ (Long Live Pakistan) outside his gate, he very quickly went out and added ‘Major Brown sahib Bahadur Zindabad’ (Long Live Major Brown the Brave).88 Thus, his character was quite paternalistic and very imperialist, but he was careful enough to first be sure of what the people wanted before he set out his vision of what he thought was the ‘right thing’ to do. It is evident that early on in his career as the commandant of the scouts he became avowedly pro-Pakistan and had plans to bring about a secession of Gilgit to Pakistan if Kashmir acceded to India.

Major Brown's role in the actual takeover of the administration is strongly disputed, with the local scout and state officers refusing him even a minor role. Nevertheless, the facts that the situation did not get out of control, that the non-Muslims remained mostly safe and that he was able to move about freely and even plan the attack on the 6th Kashmir Rifles show that it was he, more than any other officer, who was at the helm of operations. Furthermore, he was the sole person in touch with the Pakistani government and was given quite a prominent position once the Pakistani political agent arrived on 16 November 1947 and even afterwards, when he was given the charge of recruiting more scouts. Brigadier Ghansara Singh is hence not wrong when he noted: ‘Major

Brown ruled Gilgit and Captain Hussain [Hassan] became the general at Bunji.’89 Skumar Mahajan also pointed out his role when he wrote: ‘But nobody thought of retiring the British officers of the Gilgit Scouts, the local militia. At the officer's behest, the Gilgit Scouts arrested the governor and a few Hindu and Sikh soldiers, and raised the Pakistan flag.’90 Lastly, *The Times* concluded in January 1948: ‘Fuller accounts of the recent revolution in Gilgit … make it amply clear that but for the initiative and wise leadership of two British army officers attached to the Gilgit Scouts, the people of the region would have suffered severely.’91

The role of the other officers, in both the scouts and the state forces, can also not be discounted. Had they not been a part of this scheme nothing could have actually been accomplished—Brown's plan was based on their cooperation. It is doubtful that they ever had great control over the whole operation, but some tactical initiatives, especially on the part of Captain Hassan and Lt Haider, did make Brown's work easier. If Hassan had not persuaded Col. Majid to let his company proceed to Gilgit rather than the Hindu or the Sikh company, the scouts would have faced a formidable fighting force and even reinforcements, as news could have very easily been transmitted to Srinagar. Similarly, Haider's success in keeping the peace in Gilgit town as the governor was being arrested and while Brown was trying to take stock of the situation was critical in keeping the governor safe—important since his death at the hands of the crowds would have brought an immediate response from Srinagar—and Major Brown protected from the whims of zealous mullahs. Therefore, Lamb's assertion that ‘[t]heir outlook was provincial in the extreme. Left to themselves they would have disintegrated into violently squabbling factions advocating a variety of improbable goals’92 is rather extreme. It is true that the provisional government was a sham, but it is unlikely that it was supposed to wield any real power from the beginning. With Hassan as commander in chief and Haider as commissioner, and therefore in control of the treasury, real power lay with these two military personnel who did have the ability to steer Gilgit in the short term. What Lamb also misses is the factor of the mirs of Hunza and Nagar who would have been very uneasy if Gilgit had asserted itself independently of Pakistan. Furthermore, the concentration of Swat and Chitral troops on the Gilgit border since late October 1947 indicated that these troops would march in should things get out of hand.

The case of Hunza and Nagar and their accession is the most interesting since, even after formally acceding to Pakistan, they were never legally made a part of Pakistan and still remain outside the constitution of Pakistan. As late as February 1948 the deputy British high commissioner in Peshawar wrote to his superior in Karachi: ‘I have been informed that the Pakistan Government are not taking any steps to recognise the separate accession to Pakistan of Gilgit and the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar. The territory is in fact being treated still as part of Kashmir.’93 The reason for the government of Pakistan's attitude might have been because they were unaware that the Crown Representative had already declared Hunza and Nagar independent of Kashmir in 1940, or that the Pakistanis were counting on the extra pro-Pakistan votes from these states in the case of a referendum relating the future of Jammu and Kashmir, or even both. It is amusing that even in the aftermath of the Kashmir government's forfeiting (at least on paper) the ‘jagirs’ of the mirs of Hunza and Nagar in April 1948, the government of Pakistan, according to C. B. Duke, the British deputy high commissioner, was only planning to send a message ‘to the Mirs, reassuring them of Pakistan's interest in their fate, and telling them, in effect, not to take the Kashmir Government's decision tragically’.94

The mirs of Hunza and Nagar also played the Russia card, threatening to join the Soviet Union unless their accessions were accepted by Karachi. This was not taken seriously by Liaquat Ali Khan and a telegram from the secretary of state for commonwealth relations to the UK high commissioner in Karachi noted:

Liaquat said that last November the two semi-independent Mirs of Hunza and Nagr in Gilgit Agency signed an application for accession to Pakistan. Liaquat stalled and sent an official to contact them. On 22 February he received a telegram to say they were disappointed not to have received an official answer from Pakistan and that if their accession were not accepted they would accede to Russia … Liaquat said that he replied to the Mirs that Pakistan was considering the matter and that they must wait for a reply and must not act hastily.95

This move on the part of the mirs did raise eyebrows in British circles which had tried to control Russian influence in the region for the last half century. Already the British deputy high commissioner had inquired about Russian infiltration from Major Brown who did not think it was taking place.96 The UK high commissioner to Pakistan, Sir Laurence Grafftey, then wrote back to the secretary of state noting that this Russian threat was ‘undoubtedly intended by them as blackmail. Reason given me for delay in accepting their accession has been Pakistan's anxiety to avoid aggravating difficulties of Kashmir problem by accepting accession of two states which have hitherto been under suzerainty of the Maharaja of Kashmir.’97 Interestingly enough even British diplomats seemed to be unaware of the legal status of Hunza and Nagar *vis-à-vis* Kashmir and simply assumed their subservience to the maharaja.

The accession of Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar to Pakistan took place without the government of Pakistan having ever taken any part in it, and in spite of Karachi's reluctance even to accept the region as part of Pakistan. The notion of a British officer leading the agency towards Pakistan, something a number of Indian scholars had dubbed part of a conspiracy by the British to gain Pakistan this strategic outpost, appears to have led the Pakistani authorities to undermine the initially lauded role of Major Brown and Captain Mathieson. Even the official history of the Frontier Corps regards Subedar Major Babar Khan as the real hero of the Gilgit revolt. This in effect created numerous conflicting accounts of the Gilgit affair to fill in the gap left by the banishment of Major Brown from the central role. It was only in March 1994 that this was slightly corrected when the government of Pakistan conferred the Sitara e Pakistan award on Major Brown posthumously. The status, and hence accession, of Hunza and Nagar is still held hostage to Pakistan's preoccupation with the Kashmir dispute, where it does not want to jeopardise its position by incorporating states over which Kashmir had a claim. This is because if and when a plebiscite, as demanded by UN resolutions, or negotiations concerning the final status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir take place, these wholly Muslim territories will play a crucial role in bolstering Pakistan's case in terms of both votes and the strength of the religious argument in favour of the state forming a part of Pakistan owing to its Muslim majority. However, it is absurd that, even with the extinction of the Dogra dynasty, Pakistan still believes in the old, mistaken notion that

these territories are ‘disputed’. In the end, the news story of *The Times* as late as June 1949 holds true: ‘this much is certain … the 100,000 inhabitants of this completely Muslim region are wholeheartedly with Pakistan. Ever since the bloodless revolution of October 1947 … the populace has been determined to throw in its lot with Islam as represented by Pakistan.’98

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Professor Ayesha Jalal and Mr Aneurin Ellis-Evans for their comments on the article.

Notes

Khan, *Shamsher se Zanjeer Tak*.

Khan, ‘Chauda Javanon ne Gilgit main Dogron Ke Iqtedar Ka Khatima Kar Diya’, 23–28, 82–83.

Sokefeld, ‘Jang Azadi’, 64.

See both ibid., 64–66, and Sokefeld, ‘From Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism’, 939–73.

Dani, *History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan*, 340.

Khan, *Shamsher se Zanjeer Tak*, 111–37.

For more details on the Great Game see, for example, Johnson, *Spying for Empire*.

The treaty read: ‘all the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus’ were to be a part of the new state of Jammu and Kashmir. Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar were westward of the river Indus. See ‘Treaty of Amritsar 1946’ in Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties*, 21–22.

Quoted in Haines ‘Colonial Routes, 545.

Note by Sir C MacDonald, March 14, 1899, India Office Records (henceforth IOR) L/PS/13/1860.

For details, see ‘Hunza's Relations with China’, IOR R/2/1080/257.

For details, see ‘Taking over by the Government of India of the civil administration of the Gilgit Wazarat, North of the Indus’, IOR, R/2/1085/294.

Note by Resident in Kashmir 1935, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

IOR L/PS/12/1336.

Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1 November 1858 read, in part: ‘We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions?…?we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of native Princes as our own’, as found in House of Commons (Sessional Papers), 296–97.

Telegram from Crown Representative to Secretary of State April 29, 1947, IOR L/PS/12/1860. The later date of June 1948 was still being used; the date of 15 Aug. 1947 came only with the 3 June plan.

Ibid.

Mansergh *et al.*, *Transfer of Power 1942–7*, vol. 12, no. 108.

Mountbatten himself asserts that his visit was undertaken to dissuade Nehru from going to Kashmir. See Mountbatten, *Report on the Last Viceroyalty*, Part D, 4 June–5 July, 114–19. Nehru was deeply attached to his ancestral state of Kashmir and a number of historians, such as Lamb, have contended that he influenced Mountbatten in securing access to Kashmir through the Radcliffe Boundary Commission and used Mountbatten, who was staunchly against princely independence, to impress upon the maharaja of Kashmir specifically to accede to India.

Gopal, ed., *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 229.

Mansergh *et al.*, *Transfer of Power*, vol. 12, no. 335.

For a detail of the Boundary Commission award, see Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 215–20. Only Pathankot tehsil had a Hindu majority, but, without Gurdaspur and Balata tehsils which had Muslim majorities, India could still not have unfettered access to Kashmir.

Mansergh *et al.*, *Transfer of Power*, vol. 12, no. 428.

Trench, *The Frontier Scouts*, 269.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 58.

Shah Khan, *Gilgit Scouts*, 111 (trans. from Urdu by author).

Singh, *Gilgit before 1947*, 23.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 25.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 62.

Ibid., 64–65.

IOR L/PS/13/1860, Gilgit Diaries, 58.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 66.

Ibid.

Singh, *Gilgit before 1947*, 25–26.

Sokefeld, ‘From Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism’, 958.

Khan, ‘Chauda Javanon ne Gilgit main Dogron Ke Iqtedar Ka Khatima Kar Diya’, 23–28, 82–83.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 86.

Ibid.

Ibid., 97–98.

Singh, *Gilgit before 1947*, 30.

Shah Khan, quoted in Dani, *History of the Northern Areas*, 340.

Khan, *Shamsher se Zanjeer Tak.*

Ibid.

See Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 73.

Details in ibid., 117.

Sheikh, *Inquilab e Azadi Gilgit ki Roedad*, 60-61 (trans. from Urdu by author).

Ibid., 63.

Singh, *Gilgit before 1947*, 32.

Ibid., 141.

Ibid., 148.

Khan, ‘Chauda Javanon ne Gilgit main Dogron Ke Iqtedar Ka Khatima Kar Diya’, 23–28.

Khan, *Shamsher se Zanjeer Tak*, 27–33.

Mentioned in Haider, ‘Inquilab e Gilgit Meri Nazar Mein’, 345–46.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, scanned copy of telegram inset, 178.

Ibid., 155.

Ibid., 169.

Ibid., 174.

Scanned text of message in ibid., 179.

Singh, *Gilgit before 1947*, 39.

Sheikh, *Iniquilab e Azadi Gilgit di Roedad*, 64.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 161.

Ibid., 181.

Khan, *Shamsher se Zanjeer Tak*, 8.

Dani, *History of the Northern Areas*, 327.

Khan, ‘Chauda Javanon ne Gilgit main Dogron Ke Iqtedar Ka Khatima Kar Diya’, 25.

On Shah Rais Khan and his role in Gilgit, see Question of the Rajaship of Gilgit, IOR R/2/1083/283.

Dani, *History of the Northern Areas*, 342.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 224.

Ibid., 226.

Ibid., 240.

Sir George Cunningham Papers, IOR, D670, 26.

The Kashmir Times 25 Feb.1936, IOR R/2/1085/294.

In Vol. 8, p. 114, of the Jinnah papers the editor notes that Jinnah accepted the accession of Nagar on 7 Dec. 1947. However, given the circumstances relating to the Kashmir issue and later reports of the British High Commission it is highly unlikely that Jinnah ever accepted the accession of either Hunza or Nagar. Even the accession of Chitral, a state which was clearly a salute state in its own right, was not accepted until Feb. 1948 due to Kashmir's claim of suzerainty over it.

See Appendix 1 to notes, summary, IOR R/2/1085/294.

Note of Prime Minster Jammu and Kashmir to Resident, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

Comments on Note by Col. Fraser, 31 Aug. 1939, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

Ibid.

Note by the Foreign Department on the States, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

For details, see Report on Mission to Chinese Turkestan, IOR L/PS/12/2371.

See numerous letters exchanged between the political and foreign departments and the resident, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

Letter from Lt. Col. Fraser, Resident, to Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 73.

Quoted in ibid., 140.

Brown had the originals of both the Hunza and Nagar accession letters, which were turned over to Pakistan by his wife only after his death in 1994.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 182.

Sheikh, *Iniquilab e Azadi Gilgit di Roedad*, 62.

Brown, ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’, 125.

Singh, *Gilgit before 1947*, 35.

Mahajan, *Debacle in Baltistan*, 15.

‘Revolution in Gilgit’, *The Times*, 2 Jan. 1948.

Lamb, *Incomplete Partition*, 193–94.

Letter of C. B. Duke, Deputy UK High Commissioner Peshawar to Sr. Laurence Grafftey Smith UK High Commissioner to Pakistan Karachi, 13 Feb. 1948, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

See telegram 1006 from UKHC Delhi, 18 April 1948, and letter UKHC to Sir Archibald Carter, Permanent Under Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

Telegram from Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to UK High Commissioner Karachi, 15 Mar. 1948, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

Letter from UK Deputy High Commissioner Peshawar to UK High Commissioner Karachi, 8 Dec. 1947, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from UK High Commissioner Karachi, 18 Mar. 1948, IOR L/PS/13/1860.

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The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

DOI: 10.1080/09592290903293837

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pages 494-514

Available online: 03 Nov 2009

Diplomacy & Statecraft

Volume 20, Issue 3, 2009

Abstract

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article

examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.

It is nearly a truism that the principal strategic objective of the American rapprochement with China initiated by President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, after 1969 was to formulate a tacit Sino–American alliance to counter-balance the growth of the Soviet military threat. Whilst promoting détente, namely the easing of tensions through the promotion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] with the Soviet Union, the United States pursued rapprochement with China to play the pivotal role of holding the balance in the deepening Sino–Soviet rift. At the regional level, the United States announced the Nixon Doctrine to reduce its unilateral military commitment in regional conflicts whilst putting pressure on its allies, including Japan, to increase their responsibilities for both national and regional security. The American opening to China, together with the Nixon Doctrine, was designed to put pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam War. In essence, Washington sought to promote diplomatic settlement with adversaries whilst seeking to coordinate its security relations with allies. Consequently, the rapprochement with China led to the development of an American–Soviet–Chinese global strategic triangle. In East Asia, there was the formulation of the United States–China–Japan regional strategic triangle against the Soviets, which also had multiple geopolitical implications for Japanese–American security arrangements.

Japan's geopolitical role in East Asia as a military-security issue in the American rapprochement with China is a matter which has been either overlooked or received relatively minor attention. [1] In his memoirs, without revealing any details, Kissinger points out Premier Zhou Enlai's concern about a “militaristic Japan” during the July 1971 talks in

Beijing. He went on to recall: “It took me some time to convince him that the US–Japan alliance was not directed against China.” [2] Zhou's criticism reflected China's long-term opposition to the US–Japan Security Treaty. Other writers suggested that Nixon and Kissinger privately exploited Chinese anxiety over Japan's defense build-up. Kissinger is reported to have stated to his staff, “[I]t is good to keep the Chinese concerned” regarding the growth of Japanese defense expenditures. [3] During the February 1972 talks, Zhou was still preoccupied with the danger of Japanese militarism, what he termed the “wild horse.” [4] Hence, Nixon explained that the US-Japan Security Treaty not only “protected” Japan, but also served to “police” Japan against its return to militarism. [5] Overall, the existing accounts suggested that Nixon and Kissinger used Japan's possible resurgence as a way to persuade Chinese leaders for continued Japanese–American security relations.

Based on recently available archival materials and oral history collections, this article advances the understanding of the evolution of the so-called “Japan Card”—the Nixon-Kissinger practice of putting pressure on Japan to increase its defense and regional responsibilities, whilst emphasising Japan's geopolitical aspirations to convince Chinese leaders of the need for continuing the American military presence in East Asia, especially the US–Japan Security Treaty. Analysis of the “Japan Card” has three major aspects. First, Nixon's leadership set the fundamental strategic framework of the American negotiating approach on Japan with Chinese leaders. Once setting the broad agenda, Nixon left policy planning for Kissinger and the National Security Council [NSC] staff. Due to Kissinger's skepticism of Japan's role in Asia, however, State Department officials provided the expertise on developing policy options. Second, from the mid-1940s to the late-1960s, Washington did not have an even-handed approach towards the two Asian rivals, China and Japan. During the same period with Japan, the United States pursued the policy of containment and isolation of China. Thus, the rapprochement process was the first major opportunity for Washington to develop normal diplomatic relations with both Beijing and Tokyo simultaneously. Thus, it is crucial to understand how American officials assessed the opportunity of creating a new balance between the United States, China, and Japan. Finally, to exploit the Chinese leaders' anxiety

based on historic Sino–Japanese rivalry, Nixon and Kissinger aggressively emphasised not only the Soviet military threat but also the danger of the revival of Japanese militarism. By using the “Japan Card,” Nixon and Kissinger sought to justify the continuing American military presence in Asia. Strategically, United States rapprochement with China and the playing of the “Japan Card” would give weight to American diplomacy within the triangle of Soviet–China–Japan interaction in East Asia.

When the Nixon Administration took office in January 1969, senior officials within it held a variety of perceptions regarding Japan's geopolitical role in East Asia. Since his time as the Vice President during the Eisenhower Administration, Nixon had been an advocate of Japanese rearmament, including the development of nuclear weapons in the long-term. [6] In his 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article, Nixon argued that Japanese constitutional restrictions should be modified and Japan's Self-Defense Forces should be strengthened for Japan to “play a greater role both diplomatically and militarily in maintaining the balance in Asia.” [7] As President, Nixon was therefore determined to pressure Japan to promote its defense build-up. On the other hand, the National Security Adviser, Kissinger, was originally neither familiar with nor interested in Japan. [8] The only consistent issue, in his view, was the possibility of Japan's rearmament—potentially with a nuclear arsenal—which he shared with Nixon. However, Kissinger had no particular interest in the formulation and implementation of American policy towards Japan. [9] Thus, Japan experts in the NSC staff like Morton Halperin and Richard Sneider drafted policy papers during the first year of Nixon's Administration. [10] And although excluded by the White House from the direct decision-making process, State Department officials, especially those in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, produced interdepartmental studies on Japan from early 1969 to mid 1971. [11]

On 21 January 1969, Kissinger issued the National Security Study Memorandum 5 [NSSM5] and requested that the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group [EAIG] examine alternative policies toward Japan. [12] Input to the new study came primarily from the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and International Security Affairs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On 25 April, most principles

put forth in the NSSM5 paper completed by EAIG were agreed upon at a NSC Review Group meeting. [13] There were two options regarding Japan's defense effort: “[p]ress Japan to develop substantially larger defense forces capable of taking over increased regional defense responsibilities”; or “[c]ontinue to encourage moderate increases and qualitative improvements in Japan's defense forces.” [14] NSSM5 asserted that a Japanese decision to make “substantial defense increases” was “highly unlikely.” However, if such a decision were made, Japan might choose to “acquire an independent nuclear capability.” The Treasury Department strongly argued that to meet its rapid economic development, Japan should carry a more “equitable share” of responsibility in US–Japan partnership. [15] Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird pressed for further involvement in his proposal to increase substantially Japan's defense capabilities through much closer security coordination and enhance Japan's military role in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, a State Department Japan specialist, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, cautioned that pressuring Japan to rearm would be undesirable. [16] In the end, Nixon approved NSSM5's main proposals at an NSC meeting on 30 April. As National Security Decision Memorandum 13 of 28 May 1969 [NSDM13] asserted, it was of vital American interest to encourage “moderate increases and qualitative improvement” in Japan's defense efforts “while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially large forces or to play a larger regional security role.” [17] The Nixon Doctrine of July 1969 demonstrated the principal decisions in NSDM13 in a broader strategic framework. It declared the United States intention to continue to provide nuclear protection and encourage its Asian allies, especially Japan, to make more active contributions in maintaining Asian stability in the post-Vietnam era.

The United States both publicly and privately sought to increase Japan's defense build-up. During the US–Japan summit in November 1969, Nixon privately expressed his hope to Prime Minister Eisaku Sato that whilst the US was to revert the administrative rights over Okinawa, Japan would “play a continuing greater role in the economic and defense areas.” [18] In confidential agreements, the Americans obtained Japanese understanding about the “maximum conventional free use” of their bases in Okinawa and Japan for regional contingencies in the major areas of

the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and Indochina—for the continuation of conventional military operations for the Vietnam War. [19] Nixon and Sato also exchanged a secret letter which allowed the United States, after prior consultations, to re-enter its nuclear weapons and secure nuclear transit rights in Okinawa “in the time of great emergency.” [20] The principal American objective was to preserve the effectiveness of their base functions in Japan, crucial to maintaining United States deterrent capabilities in East Asia. In a joint communiqué, Nixon and Sato agreed to preserve the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Reflecting the strategic outlook of the Nixon Doctrine, Sato expressed Japan's interest in the security of the Republic of Korea as “essential” and that of the Taiwan Strait area as “a most important factor.” [21]

Whilst developing security relations with its major Asian ally, Japan, the United States was simultaneously seeking to restore diplomatic relations with its principal Asian adversary, China. By announcing the Nixon Doctrine, the president attempted to signal to Chinese leaders that the threat posed to China by the United States would diminish significantly in the post-Vietnam era. [22] The November 1969 Nixon-Sato communiqué thus expressed hope that China “would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations.” [23] Beijing, however, charged that the Nixon-Sato summit would increase the US–Japan military collusion and further enhance the role of the Japanese military in Asia, including its design to “seize the Chinese territory of Taiwan Province.” [24]

Senior State Department officials such as Johnson and Marshal Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, meanwhile sought to calm Tokyo's increasing anxiety over Washington's possible opening towards Beijing. Therefore, during preparation for and resumption of Sino–American ambassadorial talks at Warsaw from December 1969 to February 1970, State Department officials gave general briefings to Japanese officials. [25] Nixon and Kissinger, however, became highly concerned about the danger of leaks that could undermine a new China initiative. [26] They thus pursued a policy of strict secrecy by using backchannels—through Pakistan and Romania—to communicate with Chinese leaders. Defining the US–Japan alliance as the “foremost national interest in Asia,” NSSM124 paper of April 1971 emphasised the

significance of “close and frequent consultations” with Japan. [27] Minimising State Department involvement, however, Kissinger and the NSC staff used a geopolitical framework to assess the conceptual possibilities of Japan's potential role in Asia. As former NSC staff member Peter Rodman recalls, Kissinger and the NSC believed that: Japan would “move in a very nationalist direction if ever it loses confidence in the U.S.” [28] Accordingly, NSC staff sought to develop a policy alternative to the more restrained encouragement of Japan's defence build-up recommended by the State Department.

The “Japan Card” evolved as Nixon and Kissinger sought to formulate their negotiating approach to educate and persuade Chinese leaders about mutual Sino–American advantages of continuing the American military presence in East Asia. Only a small number of officials, including Nixon, Kissinger, and a handful of NSC staff, were involved in preparing for Kissinger's July 1971 trip to Beijing. In their briefing book, the NSC staff stressed an urgent need to respond to a long-standing Chinese theme that a “revival of Japanese militarism” was occurring “at the instigation of the American imperialists.” [29] NSC staff anticipated that the Chinese would raise the Japan issue by referring to the US–Japan Security Treaty as being “directed against China.” [30] The principal objective, therefore, was to persuade the Chinese that the US–Japan security arrangements had the particular effect of “containing” Japan. [31]

For Kissinger, the question of Japan's role in Asia was only a regional part of a much broader geopolitical picture, namely the development of a global strategic triangle composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. In a paper for Nixon, Kissinger wrote that Chinese demands for the American withdrawal from Asia might not serve China's interests as it would “leave areas of vacuum” into which the Soviets would “move quickly.” [32] He argued that there was a possibility of using the United States presence in Asia to “exercise restraints” on Japan, which was increasingly seen by China as a “potential threat.” Thus, Kissinger sought to exploit China's preoccupation with the Soviet threat along its borders as well as the revival Japanese aspirations. Nixon set the overall negotiating strategy toward the Chinese leaders, writing: “Put them in fear.” [33] In particular, Nixon wanted a “heavier emphasis” on the Soviet threat and directed Kissinger to stress “a resurgent and militaristic

Japan” in the case of American withdrawal from Asia. [34] Without the US–Japan Security Treaty, the president remarked, Japan would act independently, because of its “ability, resources, and know-how to rebuild their military in a precipitous fashion.”

In reality, however, Chinese preoccupation with the revival of Japanese aggressions of the 1930s and 1940s was far more deep-rooted than American policy-makers anticipated. During July 1971 secret meetings with Kissinger, Zhou accused the United States of rearming Japanese militarists, for an “economic” expansion would lead to “military” expansion. [35] It was a Chinese way to deter any American attempt to promote a Japanese defence build-up under the Nixon Doctrine. Following Nixon's instructions, Kissinger countered: “[O]ur defense relationship with Japan keeps Japan from pursuing aggressive policies.” [36] Kissinger warned Zhou that if Japan felt “forsaken” by the United States, it might build its own nuclear weapons leading to “expansionism.” Finally, therefore, Kissinger sought to assure Zhou that neither side wanted to see Japan heavily rearmed and that it would be “too dangerous” for the United States. to use Japan against China. [37]

Nevertheless, Kissinger's justifications were not sufficient to convince the Chinese premier, who had survived Japan's military aggressions. Zhou warned of Japanese ambitions not only in Korea, Taiwan [the Republic of China], and Vietnam, but also in “areas up to the Straits of Malacca.” [38] Kissinger assured him that the United States would “not encourage any military expansion” by Japan. [39] In essence, he saw the US–Japan alliance as a political device to restrain Japan's role in Asia. Regarding Japan's possible move toward Taiwan, Zhou further insisted that the Americans should “undertake not to let the Japanese armed forces into Taiwan” before their withdrawal. [40] Kissinger offered assurances that Washington would oppose the establishment of a Japanese military force on Taiwan. Moreover, he clarified that the United States would do nothing to encourage, support, or finance the so-called Taiwan Independence Movement. [41] However, Zhou expressed concern that after Washington's opening to Beijing, the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, might collude with Tokyo or Moscow. For Chinese Communist leaders, collusion by the Soviets, Japanese, and

Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan was one of the worst scenarios for China's national security.

Kissinger reported to Nixon that, overall, Zhou comprehended the role of restraint played by the United States on Japan, which would serve China's interests in Asia. [42] This evidence could be regarded as one of the origins of the “cork on the bottle” theme that emerged in the United States as a result of Japan's economic development during the 1980s. In short, it was the perception among American officials that one of the principal purposes of the US–Japan Security Treaty was to contain Japan's independent defence policy.

The Nixon-Kissinger secret diplomacy toward China included a serious flaw, namely the absence of any advance consultation with Japan about Nixon's announcement of his proposed trip to China in early 1972. The State Department reported that the Sato cabinet was “taken by surprise and embarrassed” by the announcement. [43] Since the early 1950s, the Japanese government had continuously been concerned about a sudden American tilt towards China that by-passed Japan. [44] After his secret trip, Kissinger explained to Nixon: “With Japan[,] our task will be to make clear that we are not shifting our allegiance in Asia from her to China.” [45] However, because of their personal distrust of Japanese leaders, Nixon and Kissinger were seriously concerned about the danger of leaks from Tokyo. [46]

Behind the scenes, the day before the 15 July announcement of Nixon's impending trip to China, following the recommendations from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Secretary of State William Rogers had planned to send Johnson to Tokyo to inform Japanese officials privately in advance. However, the trip never materialised: Kissinger vetoed the idea, telling Johnson that the president was too worried about a possible leak. [47] Alternatively, soon after leaving China, Kissinger could have sent NSC staff members to Tokyo. Although the Japanese would still have been upset, at least they “would not have been humiliated publicly.” [48] The White House Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, Rogers, and Kissinger discussed what the United States would need to do to reassure Pacific allies that “no secret deal” was made in Beijing. [49] Rogers thus attempted to reach the Japanese

Ambassador at Washington, Nobuhiko Ushiba, but was restrained by Nixon. [50] A Japan specialist at the American Embassy in Tokyo, Sneider, was “furious” after hearing about the Kissinger trip, considering that it would “foul up” US–Japan relations “very badly.” [51] Privately, Japanese officials were “astonished and outraged,” feeling that Kissinger had “betrayed them.” [52]

On 20 July 1971, Johnson briefed Ushida on the Nixon announcement. Although expressing understanding of the need for secrecy, the ambassador was seriously disturbed by America's quick opening to China—not only “without consulting,” but also “without any substantial prior notice.” [53] Ushiba argued further that Beijing's fundamental objective was to “split Japan off from the U.S.” and “neutralize” it. Johnson argued in response that if the US appeared to be “leaving Japan behind” again on the China issue, US–Japan relations would seriously worsen. [54] In the end, therefore, Johnson and Ushiba agreed that the two sides would consult more closely with each other. In his memoirs, however, Johnson reflected: “The damage had been done. After this ‘Nixon shokku [shock]’ as the Japanese called it, there has never again been the same trust and confidence between our two governments.” [55] Thereafter, policy toward China would become a highly complex and sensitive political issue between the American and Japanese governments.

In October 1971, the Nixon administration faced one more delicate problem: Chinese representation issue in the United Nations. In short, the United States adopted the so-called “dual position”: whilst endorsing Beijing's entry into the Security Council and General Assembly, it continued to support the representative of the Chinese Nationalists of Taiwan in the General Assembly. [56] United States Ambassador to the UN, George H.W. Bush, believed that the more help his delegation had in terms of co-sponsorship, especially between the United States and Japan, the better its chance of winning dual representation. In contrast, Nixon and Kissinger wanted “the maximum Japanese support, but not co-sponsoring,” given Chinese sensitivity to US–Japan collusion. [57] On 25 October 1971, as a consequence of a substantial majority vote, the General Assembly admitted the People's Republic of China and expelled the Republic of China. [58] Nixon and Kissinger privately regarded

Beijing's entry into the UN as a matter of inevitability. However, the UN vote had a significant influence on Tokyo, which had dutifully followed Washington's policy to vote against Beijing's entry for two decades. Hence, the combination of the Nixon Shock and the expelling of Taiwan from the UN forced Japanese officials to realise the need to pursue a more independent foreign policy.

In public, at least, it appeared that despite Kissinger's extensive assurances in the July talks, Chinese leaders remained sensitive to Japan's defence build-up. In the briefing book for Kissinger's official trip, NSC staff reckoned that Beijing was still attempting to “drive a wedge” between the United States and Japan. [59] On the other hand, senior American decision-makers were determined to increase their efforts to convince Chinese leaders of the need of the United States military presence in Asia. Nixon strongly believed the continuing Chinese demand for a total American withdrawal from Asia was “out of question.” [60] Therefore, Kissinger sought a “built-in restraint on Chinese activities in Asia.” [61]

In October talks in China, Zhou again warned Kissinger that once Japan took “the road of military expansion,” it would be difficult for it to stop. [62] Kissinger responded that Moscow was seeking influence over Tokyo, and that it would be “dangerous for others to use Japan against the United States.” [63] It was an unstated warning about Moscow–Tokyo collusion against Beijing. Moreover, Kissinger reiterated that with its nuclear umbrella—American protection of Japan by deploying nuclear weapons in East Asia—the United States would do its best to limit Japanese rearmament. In the end, despite all of Kissinger's assurances during the July and October talks, Chinese concern about the revival of Japanese expansionism remained strong. In reporting to Nixon, Kissinger estimated that the newly evolving United States–China–Japan triangular relationship could be “one of our most difficult problems” for the upcoming summit meetings. [64]

At San Clemente, California on 6–7 January 1972, before his trip to Beijing, Nixon had an occasion to brief the Japanese prime minister, Sato, about his China policy. The two leaders discussed new prospects for Washington–Tokyo–Beijing relations, including China's continuing

concern about Japan's role in Asia and terms of Sino–Japanese normalisation. During the talks, however, the widening gap between Washington and Tokyo over relations with Beijing became even more apparent. Regarding China's continuing criticism of reviving Japanese militarism, Sato emphasised that Japan adopted three non-nuclear principles—non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons—and therefore it must rely on the American "nuclear umbrella" under the Security Treaty. [65] In particular, Sato suggested that the President might respond to "any expression of fear in Beijing of Japanese militarism" by stating that the US would not provide Japan any nuclear weapons and, hence, Japan was "not going militaristic." [66] Sato was seeking to find a way to calm Zhou's continuing condemnation of a resurgent Japan.

Recognising the significance of calming Japan's sensitivity to the American tilt toward China, Nixon assured Sato that Washington would "consult with and inform" its friends before and after the China summit. [67] In doing so, he played on Japan's sentiment to remain the special ally of the United States in East Asia. However, Sato explained to Nixon that since July 1971, Tokyo's approach toward China had become "quite different" from that of Washington. [68] In particular, Japan did "not intend to abrogate" its 1952 Peace Treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan prior to any normalisation with Beijing. [69] Sato cautioned further that any attempt to create "two Chinas" or an independent Taiwan would cause a serious problem, because both Chiang and Mao argued that "China is one." Tokyo's search for normalisation with Beijing was causing political difficulty for Washington because of the remaining influence of a pro-Chinese Nationalist lobby in the Congress. In fact, Nixon was "strongly opposed" to the resolution of the Taiwan situation "by force." [70] It was a reiteration of the American pursuit of a peaceful settlement in Beijing–Taipei relations.

Nevertheless, the United States remained concerned about Japan's independent move toward China. Regarding the timing of normalisation, Nixon emphasised that Washington and Tokyo should "not engage in an obvious race" toward Beijing since only the Chinese would win. [71] Sato agreed but reminded Nixon that the 15 July announcement had come as a "great shock" because Tokyo had been "ahead" in its relations with

Beijing, particularly trade. Sato thus asked Nixon to inform the Chinese leaders that Japan wished to normalise its relations with China. Sato commented that it was ironic, however, that Japan previously sought an intermediate position to “serve as a bridge” between the United States and China—the roles had been reversed. [72] Nixon only reiterated that it would be essential for the United States and Japan to “move together.” Overall during the January 1972 talks, whilst Nixon made unsuccessful attempts to calm Japanese anxiety regarding the secrecy surrounding the new Sino–American relationship, Sato made clear the widening political difference between the United States. and Japan regarding their respective attitudes toward Taiwan's diplomatic status. Although Sato would be replaced by Kakuei Tanaka before Japan's normalisation with China, American and Japanese officials already recognised the emerging complexity in the Washington–Beijing–Tokyo triangular relationship.

The February 1972 summit provided opportunities for American and Chinese leaders to discuss a wide range of conceptual possibilities for Japan's role in East Asia. Nixon reviewed the NSC briefing book that explained because of their traditional hatred and fear of the Japanese, the Chinese would not want to “push Japan in the direction of a heavily-armed neutralism (including nuclear weapons) outside China's ability to control.” [73] Nixon thus sought to exploit China's long-standing fear of Japan's military build-up, writing specific instructions to Kissinger: “Don't say ‘we oppose rearmament of Japan.’ We oppose nuclear Japan.” [74] Japan's conventional build-up was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, whilst its nuclear development would be beyond the limits of Chinese acceptance. Nixon further outlined his negotiating position that retention of the American nuclear shield would restrain a resurgent Japan from “stretching its hands” to Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina. Regarding the anticipated Chinese position, Nixon was aware that the Chinese preferred Japanese neutrality and, therefore, discussions on Japan would be “very difficult.” [75]

During his historic meeting with Mao on 21 February 1972, therefore, Nixon raised a vital question: “[W]hat is the future of Japan? … is it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or is it better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States? … One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled… . The

question is which danger the People's Republic faces, whether it is danger of American aggression or Soviet aggression.” [76] In response, Mao outlined the reduction of direct threat between the two sides: “At the present time, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively small; that is, it could be said that this is not a major issue… . You want to withdraw some of your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.” Accordingly, Nixon and Mao agreed that each side “had no territorial designs” on its counterpart and that neither side wanted to “dominate the world.” In particular, Mao stated that: “Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.” “Nor any country. Nor do we,” replied Nixon. This mutual assurance, therefore, promoted the partial reduction of the American forces originally directed at containing China and, in turn, encouraged China's tacit admission of the United States military presence in Western Pacific.

During the talks with Zhou, Nixon attempted to justify the US–Japan Security Treaty by emphasising the danger of American withdrawal from East Asia: “The U.S. can get out of Japanese waters, but others will fish there … the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned. [77] To put it another way, as Nixon wrote before the talks, it was an American policy toward Japan “with a U.S. veto.” [78] On the other hand, as the NSC staff suggested, “[if] Japan feels abandoned, it could follow a much more dangerous course.” [79] Accordingly, there were a few conceptual directions for Japan, either toward China or toward the Soviet Union “for nuclear protection.” [80] Or, without the continuing American bases on its lands, Japan might develop its own nuclear weapons. Nixon explained the essential implications of the American role in Asia: the United States would use its influence with Japan through its defence relationship to “discourage policies which would be detrimental to China.” [81] In other words, Nixon sought to persuade Zhou of the need for a continued United States military presence: “Our friendship with Japan is in your interests—not against.” [82] Nixon reversed the implications of the US–Japan Security Treaty and United States bases in the Western Pacific, which functioned as a deterrent to China during the 1950s and the 1960s; they would function as a deterrent to an independent Japanese defence policy.

Zhou remained suspicious, estimating that as an emerging economic power, Japan was “at the crossroads.” He warned that once reaching “a certain point,” Japan would “cease listening” to the United States and pursue its own path toward foreign lands. [83] Here stood Zhou's diplomatic warning to discourage the Nixon Doctrine's attempt to pressure Japan to increase its defence build-up. In response, Nixon gave assurances that the US policy was as far as possible to “restrain the Japanese from going from economic expansion to military expansion.” [84] This is a striking point. As previously discussed, Sato pleaded with Nixon in January to calm Chinese leaders regarding their long-term concern about Japan's future role in Asia. At Beijing, Nixon moved in the opposite direction, seeking aggressively to exploit the perceived threat among Chinese leaders regarding the revival of Japanese militarism.

Regarding the possible linkage of United States withdrawal and Japan's move to its former colonies, Zhou expressed the view that the entry of the Japanese armed forces into the Korean Peninsula would “not be beneficial to the cause of peace” in East Asia. [85] Nixon suggested that both sides “exert influence to restrain” their own allies. In essence, the Korean Peninsula was “tied to Japan,” requiring United States forces to stay in both South Korea and Japan. [86] Regarding China's relations with Taiwan, Zhou assured Nixon that China did not intend to construct bases, including nuclear bases on Taiwan, “even after” it was returned to its motherland; nor did it intend to utilise Taiwan in opposition to Japan. [87] Nixon replied: “I will go further. We will try to keep Japanese forces from coming into Taiwan after our forces leave.” [88] Accordingly, as a pledge to the Chinese, whilst withdrawing from Taiwan, the United States would ensure that Japan did not replace it. In other words, Nixon clarified one of the special roles of the US–Japan Security Treaty: containing the revival of Japanese military expansionism.

Finally, regarding Beijing's diplomatic relations with Tokyo, Zhou emphasised the remaining historical antagonism, namely “a state of war” between China and Japan. [89] However, Zhou hinted that: “if China and Japan are able to restore diplomatic relations, Chinese–Japanese friendship should not hurt the relations between Japan and the United

States.” He implied that Sino–Japanese rapprochement could be achieved whilst US–Japan security relations were preserved. Due to his deep-held suspicions of Sato's pro-Taiwan attitude, however, Zhou did not make any substantial diplomatic moves until Kakuei Tanaka came to power on 7 July 1972.

On the basis of the above exchanges, each side expressed its attitude toward Japan in the joint communiqué. The United States declared that it “will continue to develop the existing bonds,” implying a broad partnership including the US–Japan Security Treaty. [90] The Chinese side maintained that it “firmly opposes the revival of and outward expansion of Japanese militarism,” reflecting its long-standing concern about a resurgent Japan. In short, whilst the United States gave the assurance that it would attempt to discourage Japan's autonomous nationalistic aspirations, China tacitly recognised the continued American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. For both sides, a Japan allied with the United States and diplomatically tied to China was preferable to its pursuit of an independent defence policy.

The conventional interpretation of the “anti-hegemony clause” in the communiqué that came out of the Sino–American summit focuses on its global implications: whilst China sought a stronger statement to counter the Soviet aspirations, the United States, which was simultaneously promoting *détente* with the Soviets, attempted to maintain an even-handed approach toward China and the Soviet Union. [91] New evidence reveals regional implications of the clause. To restore stability in Asia, Nixon wrote: “Neither seeks Hegemony.” [92] In their talks, Nixon and Zhou agreed: “[N]either of us should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region… . It also implies, to the extent that each of us can, that we will resist efforts of *others* to seek hegemony.” [93] In other words, Nixon and Zhou originally sought to apply privately the anti-hegemony clause not only to the United States and China but also to the Soviet Union—the principal threat—and to a lesser extent Japan and India to prevent any potential threat in the Asia-Pacific region. [94] Equally important, fully recognising Russian sensitivity to “an anti-Soviet alliance” between the United States and China, Zhou clarified that: “[N]either is prepared to negotiate on behalf of third countries or enter into agreements or understanding directed at other states.” [95] The United States and China

attempted together to impose restraints on the major powers in the region. Overall, on the basis of the anti-hegemony clause, two strategic triangles were emerging in the international system: a United States–Soviet Union–China balance of power at the global level; and a Washington–Beijing–Tokyo triangle against Moscow in the East Asian region.

American rapprochement with China paved the way for restoring formal Sino–Japanese relations. Meeting Zhou during a trip to Beijing in June 1972, Kissinger discussed Japan's future role in relation to the remaining public criticisms of the Nixon Shock—the United States practice of "China First" at the expense of Japan. [96] Zhou asked if the Americans opposed "China discussing normalisation of Sino–Japanese relations. [97] Kissinger first cautioned that the United States and China "both have to show restraint in dealing with Japan" because, if they were to compete, it would lead to "a nationalistic trend in Japan" in the long-term. [98] He then stated that the United States had "no objections" to better relations between China and Japan. However, Washington would oppose Japan's nuclear rearmament and an overseas role for Japanese military forces. Kissinger reiterated his belief: "a Japan without the Security Treaty will sooner or later rearm on a nationalist basis… . It may rearm even with a Security Treaty." [99] Zhou reckoned that Japan was "in a process of change." [100] It became a question of when rather than if there would be Sino–Japanese normalisation.

In reporting to Nixon, Kissinger commented that it was striking "how far" China moved from an adversarial role to a "tacit ally." [101] He asserted further that the Chinese were "trying to build walls around the Soviet Union" by opening to the United States, encouraging a "united Europe as a counterweight," moving toward Japan, and trying to "contain India"—a "tool of Soviet encirclement"—by supporting an "independent Pakistan." However, appreciating the remaining Chinese suspicions, Kissinger claimed that he was careful not to give Zhou "too much reassurance about Japan's future intentions."

Within the United States–China–Japan relationship, Taiwan's status comprised a major political disagreement. Since the October 1971 UN vote, Japan was prepared to give priority to normalisation with the

People's Republic rather than continue its existing relations with Taiwan. Zhou's three principles for Sino–Japanese normalisation were:

- recognition of the People's Republic as the sole legal government of China;
- recognition of Taiwan as an integral part of China;
- abrogation of the Japan–Republic of China peace treaty of 1952 [102]

NSC staff was concerned, however, that Japan's "unqualified" acceptance of these principles would result in several negative outcomes: the international status of Taiwan would be "seriously undercut"; the United States–Taiwan mutual defence treaty would become "more difficult to justify"; and from the Japanese standpoint, the American bases within Japan could no longer be used to defend Taiwan against a People's Republic effort to "liberate" it. [103] It was therefore essential for the United States to ensure that Japan's opening to China would "not inhibit" United States use of its bases in Japan to fulfil its defence commitments to Taiwan. [104] Nevertheless, Kissinger and the NSC staff were alarmed that the new Japanese prime minister's, Tanaka's, cabinet might be in a "haste" to normalise diplomatic relations with Beijing, which would result in Japan's official recognition of the Taiwan issue as China's internal problem. [105] Therefore, Kissinger recommended Nixon to "encourage Japan to preserve its economic and cultural ties with Taiwan." [106]

During a US–Japan summit at Hawaii on 31 August–1 September 1972, Nixon stressed to Tanaka the "overriding importance" of the United States and Japan "not get[ting] into a conflict over China policy." [107] He cautioned that although the two governments "need not have identical positions," "neither should we allow antagonism to develop between us." In particular, Nixon cautioned again that Sino–Japanese normalisation "should not be done at the expense of Japan's friends," implying Taiwan. [108] In the end, however, Washington was unsuccessfully attempting to slow down Tokyo's move toward Beijing. From 25 to 30 September 1972, Tanaka took an historic trip to China, held talks with Mao and

Zhou, and finally achieved Sino–Japanese normalisation ending the "abnormal state of relations" between the two old Asian rivals. [109] Establishing official diplomatic relations with China, Japan decided to close its embassy in Taiwan whilst preserving trade and cultural relations. [110] In a joint communiqué, Beijing and Tokyo declared their opposition to hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. The combination of Sino–Japanese normalisation and Sino–American rapprochement thus brought Japan into a broader triangular relationship with the United States and China to contain the Soviets in the Asia–Pacific region.

Meanwhile, the United States restored its central position in international affairs, the result of the signing of the SALT agreement with the Soviets in May 1972 and the negotiated peace settlement with North Vietnam in January 1973. During trips to Beijing in February and November 1973, Kissinger accordingly used both the "Japan Card" and the "Soviet Card" by emphasising that it would be "very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed closer political relations. [111] Chinese leaders understood Kissinger's intentions, encouraging him to visit Japan and spend more time with Japanese officials. In Mao's words: "Their first priority is to have good relations with the United States. We come second." [112] Kissinger agreed that Japan should "not feel isolated and left alone." Kissinger and Zhou sought therefore to outline a common Sino–US policy to "prevent" Japan from "moving too close to the Soviet Union" or Tokyo from being "taken in" by Moscow. Washington and Beijing would continue thereafter their joint effort to integrate Tokyo further into the United States–China–Japan strategic triangle against the Soviets.

Kissinger evaluated the nature of Sino–American relations in his report to Nixon after returning from Beijing in February 1973: "The Chinese leaders are among the very few in the world with a global and longer term perspective—and it now parallels ours in many important respects." [113] Hence, Kissinger concluded: "For in plain terms, we have now become tacit allies." [114] Consequently, in Kissinger's interpretation, Chinese leaders came to regard the US–Japan Security Treaty as a "brake on Japanese expansionism and militarism." [115] Likewise, they viewed Japan as an "incipient ally" to counter Soviet and Indian designs. From mid-1973 to late 1975, Chinese leaders also sought further reassurances whether the United States still considered the Soviets an adversary of the

first rank. Furthermore, Mao repeatedly stressed to Kissinger the importance of the strategic horizontal line—emphasising close United States co-operation not only with China but also with Western Europe, Japan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as barriers to Soviet expansion. [116] Accordingly, Kissinger and Zhou completed a new communiqué, which extended the joint opposition to hegemony beyond the Asia-Pacific region to anywhere in the world. After the collapse of American Indochina policy in mid-1975, plus Soviet military build-up in the late 1970s, United States policy toward the two communist giants shifted from an even-handed approach between Moscow and Beijing to a greater tilt toward China. China's focus meanwhile also moved from its long-term stance of anti-Japanese militarism and wedge policy between Washington and Tokyo toward a tacit approval of the contribution by the US–Japan security treaty to anti-Soviet hegemony. [117] In general, the Washington–Beijing–Tokyo strategic triangle against Moscow became a major element of the Cold War in Asia during the 1970s and the 1980s. [118]

Nixon and Kissinger utilised the “Japan Card” to preserve the American military presence in East Asia. On the one hand, by announcing the Nixon Doctrine, they pressured Japan to increase its responsibilities for its defence policy as well as regional security. Washington successfully preserved its deterrent capabilities in Asia, namely the free use of its bases in Japan for regional contingencies in Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina, as well as the re-entry of nuclear weapons into Japan in case of great emergencies. On the other hand, during their approach to China, Nixon and Kissinger tested the possibility of a more independent Japanese defence policy as a major security issue. The President gave his National Security Adviser personal instructions on the American negotiating position regarding Japan. Whilst initially suspicious of Japan's possible contribution to East Asian security, Kissinger came to comprehend the conceptual possibility of Japan's search for a more nationalistic foreign policy. New records reveal that Nixon and Kissinger rather over-exaggerated the danger of Japan reviving its military expansionism to exploit China's long-term anxiety. In particular, the American leaders sought to convince their Chinese opposites that Japan's independent defence policy, including a possible move towards the Soviets or the development of its own nuclear weapons, could be

contained only by the preservation of the US–Japan Security Treaty. New evidence further shows that Nixon and Kissinger gave assurance to Mao and Zhou that the US–Japan Security Treaty would also play multiple roles in preventing Japan from expanding its influence over Taiwan, Korea, and Indochina. Regarding Chinese concern about encirclement by hostile neighbours, the Americans sought to convince Beijing of the United States commitment to counterbalance not only the Soviet military threat, but also of Japan's potential aspirations in Northeast Asia and India's regional hegemonic aspiration in South Asia. Overall, Washington gave crucial assurances to Beijing that an American military presence would stabilise the Asia-Pacific region. In return, Nixon and Kissinger acquired the Chinese leaders' implied recognition of the continued US–Japan security relationship.

New evidence regarding the combination of the Nixon Doctrine and the Nixon Shock clarifies the Nixon-Kissinger secret diplomacy of maintaining double standard toward Japanese and Chinese leaders. On the one hand, whilst increasing pressure over Japan for greater defence burden-sharing, Nixon and Kissinger gave assurances to the Japanese that there would be no secret deals with Chinese leaders regarding Japan's future position in Asia. On the other, Nixon and Kissinger gave private assurance to the Chinese that the United States would contain Japanese expansionism. Consequently, the rapid development of the American single-handed initiative toward China acted to accelerate Japan's more independent diplomatic initiative to normalise relations with China. Tokyo's autonomous diplomatic posture toward Beijing ironically irritated Washington. Nixon and Kissinger calculated that the emergence of the divergent policies of both Washington and Tokyo toward Beijing could still be managed as a result of the United States restored credibility in the post-Vietnam era. Beneath the Cold War strains, however, a functional fragmentation within US–Japan relations remained a potential source of uncertainty for East Asian regional security, creating an imbalance in the American relations with both China and Japan in the long-term. The Japanese government remained suspicious of “Japan passing,” namely the United States passing by Japan on its way to China. Beijing, to date, has never overcome its fear of the revival of Japanese militarism.

As rapprochement materialised, the United States and China agreed not to resort to the threat or use of force in bilateral relations or in international relations. At the global level, Sino–American rapprochement marked the beginning of a strategic triangle between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, which restored equilibrium in the international system through a more multi-polar balance of power. At the regional level, American rapprochement with China led to the formulation of Washington–Beijing–Tokyo axis against Moscow, re-stabilising the Asia-Pacific region toward a competitive co-existence among the great powers. In reality, however, rapprochement fell short of full diplomatic normalisation, as it was essentially a pragmatic device to seek common ground in geo-strategic terms between two enemies. Thereafter, the United States and China attempted to strengthen political unity between themselves and Japan against the Soviet military threat. In the end, continuing political communication became an essential source of stability for each power.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express gratitude to the journal's anonymous review system for constructive and helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Professors Subarno Chatarrji, Scott Davies, Gordon Hands, Bern Mulvey, Mundoli Narayannan, Gerd Nonneman, Edward Rummel, and Amy Szarkowski for their thoughtful comments and suggestions in the course of preparing for this article.

Notes

1. Regarding the so-called “Nixon Shock”—the negative impact of Nixon's sudden announcement of his trip to China on July 15, 1971—on Japan, see Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), p. 348; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1994), p. 275.

2. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 334.

3. Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 382.

4. James Mann, *About Face* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), p. 43.

5. Michael Schaller, "Détente and Strategic Triangle Or, 'Drinking Your Mao Tai and Having Your Vodka, Too'" in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.–China Diplomacy, 1954–1973* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 366.

6. Richard Nixon, *RN* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 129–130.

7. Idem, "Asia After Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs*, 46 (1967), pp. 120–121.

8. Richard Solomon, Interview with the author, 24 September 2003.

9. Richard Ericson [Country Director for Japan, 1970–1973] Oral History, 27 March 1995, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training [hereafter ADST].

10. Neither Sneider nor Halperin got along well with Kissinger because of his excessive secrecy in policy planning; both resigned from the NSC staff. Sneider was assigned to Japan in late 1969.

11. Marshall Green [Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1969–1973] Oral History, 2 March 1995, pp. 60–61, ADST.

12. National Security Study Memorandum 5 [NSSM5], 21 January 1969, Box 365, Subject Files [SF], National Security Council Files [NSCF], Nixon Presidential Materials Staff [NPMS], National Archives II [NA], Maryland. The full range of US–Japan issues included Okinawa Reversion—returning the administrative rights of Okinawa to Japan—the realignment of American bases in Japan, and the continuation of the US–Japan Security Treaty beyond 1970. Due to space limitations, this article does not discuss US–Japan economic issues such as textile problems.

13. NSSM5: Japan, 28 April 1969, attached to Davis [NSC] memorandum, “U.S.–Japanese Relationship: Summary,” 29 April 1969, Records of National Security Council [RNSC], RG273, NA.

14. “U.S.–Japan Relationship: Summary,” p. 6.

15. “Treasury Comment: NSSM on Japan,” 24 March 1969, Box H-035, NSC Institutional Files.

16. Brown to Rogers and Johnson, “NSC Meeting April 30-Policy Toward Japan: Briefing Memorandum,” 29 April 1969, p. 4, RNSC, RG273, NA.

17. National Security Decision Memorandum 13: Policy Toward Japan, May 28, 1969, Box 363, SF, NSCF. By the late 1960s, Mao estimated that the American forces were “too scattered” and its officials “overestimated” Japan's defense capabilities. Conversation between Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong; Beijing, November 17, 1968, Cold War International History Project [CWIHP], Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Moreover, Mao and Zhou believed that Japan had not achieved its “independence” because of the continual United States military “controls” and the existence of its bases. Document No. 2, Conversation between Mao Zedong and E.F. Hill, 28 November 1968 in Chen Jian and David Wilson, eds., “‘All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos’: Beijing, the Sino–Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino–American Rapprochement, 1968–69,” p. 158, CWIHP.

18. Memorandum of conversation [Memcon], Nixon-Sato, 21 November 1969, 10:15am, Box 924, VIP Visits, NSCF.

19. Sneider, “Current Status of Negotiations,” 30 August 1969, Box 834, Name Files, NSCF.

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21. *New York Times*, 21 November 1969.

22. Rogers to Nixon, “Next Moves in China Policy and Bargaining Moves Toward the Soviet Union,” 21 October 1969, POL Chicom-US, 1967–1969, Box 1973, Subject-Numeric Files [SNF], General Record of the Department of State, Record Group 59 [RG 59], NA.

23. *New York Times,* 21 November 1969.

24. Hong Kong telegram, “Japan as the ‘Backbone’ for U.S. ‘New Policy’ in Asia,” 3 December 1969, POL 7, JAPAN, Box 2245, SNF, 1967–1969, RG 59.

25. Rogers to Nixon, “Warsaw Talks,” 18 December 1969, POL Chicom-US 1967–69, Box 1973, SNF, RG59; and Eliot to Kissinger, “Discussing Warsaw Meeting with Other Governments,” 21 January 1970, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], NSCF.

26. Kissinger to Nixon, “Memorandum from Secretary Rogers on Handling of Warsaw talks,” 20 December 20, 1969, Ibid.

27. NSSM 124: Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China, Box 365, SF, NSCF.

28. Peter Rodman Oral History, 22 July and 22 August 1994, p. 52–54, ADST.

29. Review of US and PRC Views on Other Great Powers, Japan, Briefing book for HAK's July 1971 trip, POLO I, for the President's Files [Winston Lord] [FPF/Lord], Box 850, NSCF.

30. Ibid., pp. 1–2.

31. Ibid., p. 3.

32. Scope Paper, POLO I, Ibid.

33. Nixon's notations on the cover page, POLO I, Ibid.

34. “Meeting between President, Dr. Kissinger, and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, 1971, Oval Office,” FPF, Box1036, NSCF.

35. Memcon, Kissinger-Zhou, 9 July 1971 (4:35pm–11:20pm), FPF, Box 1033, Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 42.

37. Ibid.; and Japan, POLO I.

38. Memcon, 10 July 1971 (12:10pm–6:00pm).

39. Ibid., p. 27; and Japan, POLO I.

40. Memcon, 11 July 1971 (10:35 am–11:55 am). Taiwan was under Japanese colonial control from 1895 to 1945. In May 1971, at the Central Political Committee of the Party, Chinese leaders declared that: "Taiwan is a territory of China. The liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affairs, and therefore no foreigners are allowed to make a commitment … any activity of the Japanese militarism in Taiwan must be strictly prevented." Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 264–265.

41. Ibid., p. 11.

42. Kissinger to Nixon, "My Talks with Chou En-lai," 14 July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF.

43. Eliot to Kissinger, "Reactions to the President's Announcement on July 15, 1971," 22 July 1971, Box 499, President's Trip Files [PTF], NSCF.

44. Minoru Kusuda [former chief secretary for Sato] Oral History, 16 November 1995, National Security Archive [NSA].

45. Kissinger to Nixon, "My Talks with Chou En-lai," 14 July 1971, FPF, Box 1033, NSCF.

46. Solomon, Interview with the author, 24 September 2003. Nixon later told British Prime Minister Heath that the Japanese had "the leakiest government in the world, so we couldn't afford to give them advance

word.” Memcon Nixon-Heath, 20 December 1971, Memoranda for the President, Records of Meetings, Box 87, President's Office Files [POF], White House Central Files [WHCF].

47. Johnson found out about the cancellation from Lord on the airplane on the way to California. “The Nixon Administration National SecurityCouncil,” National Security Council Project, Oral History Roundtables, Brookings Institute and Center for International and Security Studies, p. 45.

48. Winston Lord, Interview with the author, 15 October 2003. Secretary of Defense Laird, who was in Tokyo, knew what was happening through his own sources and privately told Japanese counterparts about the Kissinger trip six hours before it was announced. See Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p. 348.

49. Meetings of H.R. Haldeman with William Rogers and Henry Kissinger at San Clemente, 12 pm, 15 July 1971, File 5-54-18, Papers of the Nixon White House, Part 5. H.R. Haldeman: Notes of White House Meetings, 1969–1973, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

50. Assistant Secretary Green and Japan Desk Director Erickson drafted a message of explanation from Nixon to Sato, Green Oral History, 2 March 1995, pp. 58, 60–61, ADST.

51. Solomon, Interview with the author, 24 September 2003.

52. William Sherman [Consul General, Osaka-Kobe, 1968–1970, Political Counselor, 1970–1972] Oral History, 14, Japan, Volume II, ADST. Kissinger had been quoted: “Who cares if some civil servant is embarrassed? He could care less.” Robert Duemling [Head, Political-External Section, United States Embassy, Tokyo, 1970–1974) Oral History, 2, Japan, Ibid.

53. Johnson to Kissinger, 20 July 1971 with memorandum for record of talk with Ambassador Ushiba, POL Japan–US, 1970–1973, SNF, RG59, NA.

54. Ibid.

55. U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 552–54. Inverted commas in original. Regarding another "Nixon Shock" in August 1971—the end of gold currency to impose an import surcharge and suspend the dollar's convertibility into gold—see Schaller, "Détente and the Strategic Triangle," in Ross and Jiang, *Re-Examining the Cold War*, pp. 379–383. Sato, whose political credibility was seriously damaged by the two Nixon shocks, resigned in July 1972.

56. See Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power* (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 1995), Chapter 2.

57. Telcon, Kissinger-Bush, 10:25 am, September 7, 1971, Kissinger-Johnson, 11:47 am, September 7, 1971, Box 11, Kissinger-Telcons. Since Kissinger's October trip coincided with the UN General Assembly's annual debate on Chinese representation issue, Bush requested Nixon to delay Kissinger's schedule. Giving priority for the rapprochement with Beijing over Taipei's status in the UN, however, Nixon only advised Bush to "fight hard." Nixon White House Tapes, Conversation 581-1 and 582-2, NA. See also George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), pp. 90–91.

58. *New York Times*, October 26, 1971.

59. Japan, Briefing book for HAK's October 1971 trip POLO II [Part II], FPF/Lord, Box 851, NSCF.

60. Nixon's handwritten notations on the cover page of POLO II [Part I], FPF/Lord, Box 850, Ibid.

61. Kissinger to Nixon, "My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issue," 11 November 1971, FPF, Box 1035, Ibid.

62. Memcon, 22 October 1971, 4:15–8:28 pm.

63. Ibid., p. 24.

64. Kissinger to Nixon, "My October China Visit," 11 November 1971.

65. Memcon, Nixon-Sato, 6 January 6, 1972, Box 925, VIP Visits, NSCF.

66. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

67. Ibid., p. 8.

68. Ibid., p. 9.

69. Ibid., p. 11.

70. Ibid., p. 12.

71. Memcon, 7 January 1972.

72. Ibid., p. 6.

73. Japan, Underline by Nixon, Book V, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF.

74. Nixon's handwritten notations, 18 February 1972. Quotation marks in original, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box7, PPF, WHSF. NSC staff originally recommended the following point: “We oppose a rearmed Japan particularly with nuclear weapon. Nixon erased “particularly with nuclear weapon” and added “nuclear” in front of “rearmed.” Japan, Book V. Underline by Nixon in original.

75. Nixon's handwritten notations, 21 February 1972, China Notes, Ibid.

76. Memcon Nixon-Mao, 21 February 1972, 2:50–3:55 pm, p. 6, Box 91, Country Files[CF]-Far East, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files (HAKOF), NSCF.

77. Memcon Nixon-Zhou, 22 February 1972, 2:10–6:00 pm, Ibid.

78. Nixon's handwritten notations, 15 February 1972, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF.

79. Japan, Points to Emphasize, Underline by Nixon in original, Book V-a, The President, Briefing Papers for the China Trip, FPF/Lord, Box 847, NSCF.

80. Nixon's handwritten notations, 15 February 1972, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF.

81. Memcon 22 February 1972.

82. Nixon's handwritten notations, 21 February 1972, China Notes, Alpha/Subject File, Box 7, PPF, WHSF.

83. Memcon, 23 February 1972, 2:00–6.00 pm.

84. Ibid., pp. 19–20.

85. Ibid., p. 16.

86. Memcon 24 February 1972, p. 11.

87. Memcon 22 February 1972, p. 23.

88. Memcon 24 February 1972, p. 13.

89. Memcon 23 February 1972, pp. 19–20.

90. *New York Times*, 28 February 1972.

91. See Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, p. 235.

92. Nixon's handwritten notations, 24 February 1972, China, Speech Files, Box 73, China Trip, PPF, WHSF.

93. Memcon 24 February 1972. Italic added.

94. See also Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2008), p. 222.

95. Memcon 24 February, pp. 3–4.

96. Memcon, Kissinger-Zhou, 19 June 1972, 10:25–11:20pm, CF-Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF.

97. Ibid., p. 7.

98. Ibid., p. 8.

99. Ibid., p. 10.

100. Ibid., p. 11.

101. Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to Peking, June 19–23, 1972,” 27 June 1972, CF-Far East, Box 97, HAKOF, NSCF. The June 1972 trip was significant as it was the first by Kissinger to Beijing since the February 1972 Beijing Summit and the May 1972 Moscow summit. Regarding the promotion of the so-called “tacit alliance” in Sino–American relations from the mid-1970s, see Mann, *About Face*, pp. 56–60.

102. Holdridge to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Tanaka and Ohira,” 10 August 1972, China Policy, Box 926, VIP Visits, NSCF.

103. Ibid. Underline in original.

104. Kissinger to Nixon “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in Honolulu on August 31 and September 1,” 29 August 1972. Underline by Nixon, Ibid. In their briefing paper to Nixon, State Department officials also recommended that the effective area of the US–Japan Security Treaty to “maintain peace and stability” in East Asia “must continue to encompass Taiwan.” Rogers to Nixon, “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira,” 18 August 1972, Issues and Talking Points, Briefing Paper, Department of State, Ibid

105. Ibid. Underline by Nixon.

106. Ibid. Underline by Nixon.

107. Memcon Nixon-Tanaka, 31 August 1972, 1:00 pm, p.9, Box 926, VIP Visit, NSCF. The State Department's memorandum for the President recommended that the President stress that the United States did not regard itself “in a race or competition” with Japan to improve its relations with China. Rogers to Nixon, “Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira,” 18 August 18, 1972, Issues and Talking Points, Briefing Paper, Department of State, Ibid.

108. Ibid., p. 12.

109. Telegram, Tokyo 10416, “Normalization GOJ–PRC Relations,” 29 September 1972, POL Japan, Box 2405, SNF, 1970–73, RG 59.

110. The so-called “Japan formula” set a restrictive frameworkfor the United States in normalising with China.

111. Memcon Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou, 18 February 1973, 1:20 am, Memcon 12 November 1973, 5:40 pm–8:25 pm, Box 572, Records of Policy Planning Staff [PPS], Director's Files [Winston Lord], 1969–1977, RG59.

112. Memcon, 12 November 1973, 5:40 pm–8:25 pm, Box 572, PPS, RG59.

113. Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to China,” 2 March 1973, Box 98, HAK Trip Files, HAKOF, NSCF.

114. Ibid., p. 2, Underline in original.

115. Ibid., p. 1.

116. Kissinger to Nixon, “My Visit to China,” 19 November 1973, Box 374, PPS, RG59.

117. Japan was still reluctant to play any significant security role in East Asian geopolitical terms. During Sino–Japanese negotiations for the 1978 Peace Treaty, Japan insisted that a statement be included that the

anti-hegemony clause was not aimed at any particular third country. Tokyo sought to avoid being entrapped in China's anti-Soviet policy and preserve its diplomatic dialogue with Moscow. See Sadako Ogata, *Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Process* (Berkley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, Univ. of California, 1988), Chapter 6.

118. On Sino–American normalisation, see Rosemary Foot, “Prize Won, Opportunities Lost: The U.S. Normalization of relations with China, 1972–1979,” in William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li, eds., *Normalization of U.S.–China Relations: An International History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

Sharing Water, Preventing War—Hydrodiplomacy in South Asia

Diplomacy & Statecraft

Volume 20, Issue 3, 2009

DOI: 10.1080/09592290903293852

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pages 515-530

Available online: 03 Nov 2009

Abstract

Over the past decade, scholars have closely examined the linkage between environmental change, security, and conflict. Severe deforestation, soil erosion, soil salinisation and water-logging, toxic contamination, drought and flooding, and air and water pollution are some of the environmental calamities that can increase international tension and even lead to conflict. What is perhaps more interesting,

however, is that reversing the equation is also true. Environmental conservation and cooperative governance between neighbouring states can contribute to regional stability and conflict avoidance. This article suggests the international trans-boundary river agreement between India and Pakistan to manage the Indus River reduces tension and prevents war between the nuclear-armed rivals. During the Kargil crisis in 2001, for example, the trans-boundary river management regime was the most functional bilateral relationship between the two South Asian powers.

Over the past decade, scholars have closely examined the linkage between environmental change and conflict and security. [1] Severe deforestation, soil erosion, soil salinisation and water-logging, toxic contamination, drought and flooding, and air and water pollution are some of the environmental calamities that can increase regional international tension and even lead to war. Reversing the equation is also true, but this approach so far has received scant attention. Environmental conservation and co-operation can have a reverse effect and lead to improved regional stability and generate greater security. [2] Complementing the broad research linking environmental degradation to military insecurity, the international trans-boundary agreement between India and Pakistan to manage the Indus River tends to reduce tension and help to prevent war throughout the subcontinent. [3] The positive security effects have gone unrecognised largely because the study of trans-boundary river agreements remains the domain of resource economists, water technicians and specialists, and environmental scholars, rather than those with a focus on arms control, defence policy, and international security. This article identifies and captures the international security benefits of the Indus river agreement in South Asia.

The India–Pakistan relationship is one of the few remaining wide-ranging and globally significant security complexes. [4] The late American political scientist, Samuel Huntington, who placed India and Pakistan at the centre of his “clash of civilizations” thesis, contended that the

historic competition between Hindu and Muslim in South Asia makes the region one of the most vulnerable in the world. [5] Compounding the political dynamics, the region is wracked with over-population and environmental stress. [6] Environmental degradation contributes to instability and increases the possibility of war on the subcontinent. [7]

Pressure on sustainable fresh water is particularly acute. As climate change threatens to place the region's glaciers at risk, the volume of ice melt that feeds the rivers could diminish. The Himalayan glaciers form the largest body of ice outside of the polar ice caps and are the source of water for the rivers of the Indian subcontinent. The 2007 Working Group II report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change revealed: “Glaciers in the Himalaya are receding faster than in any other part of the world and, if the present rate continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current rate.” [8] Today the problem is not that the subcontinent lacks enough fresh water, but that it is distributed unevenly. Bangladesh, for example, enjoys, and even suffers from, an abundance of fresh water, whereas parts of India and Pakistan face serious and chronic shortages. [9] Because of the escalating environmental strain and immense and growing human populations, environmental tragedy is unfolding on the subcontinent. These trends hamper economic development and make sustainable development an elusive goal. To prevent further environmental catastrophe, India and Pakistan will have to construct a more stable security regime that widens resource cooperation. [10] The trans-boundary river agreement governing the Indus can serve as a model.

River water disputes on the subcontinent are inextricably woven into the environmental and geopolitical structure of the region as a consequence of British colonialism. British colonial government institutionalised deforestation and sprawling and inefficient irrigation systems, and these developments degraded the land for more than a century. Soil erosion, water-logging, and flooding are among the serious problems that can be traced to the economic practices of the colonial era. [11] After the Second World War, British India was divided into its component states, producing a sub-continent geographically dominated by a hegemonic India surrounded by weaker states. War erupted between India and

Pakistan over Kashmir at the time of partition in 1947–1948, along the West Pakistan–India border in 1965, and once again in 1971, when East Pakistan seceded from Islamabad's control and became Bangladesh. Relations between India and Pakistan have been cause for concern for five decades, most recently during the alarming “nuclear crises” of Spring 2002 and the bold terrorist attacks in Mumbai in December 2008. [12]

Against this backdrop of geopolitical instability is an increasing demand for river water, driven by expanding populations and desperate requirements for economic development. The environmental and economic pressures of scarce fresh water serve as an important component of the greater military condition on the subcontinent. [13] Resource conflict is an unavoidable element of social interaction, and some measure of competition among social choices is efficient. [14] The challenge, of course, is in developing peaceful mechanisms for resolving acute as well as chronic conflict before it erupts into violence. Nowhere is the challenge more compelling than in South Asia, where management and apportionment of international river flow is a fulcrum for peace or war. [15]

To understand the efficacy of international river agreements on confidence-building for South Asian security, it is important to place the milieu of economic, environmental and security considerations in the context of freshwater politics and human geography. There are over 260 international river basins watersheds worldwide. [16] These international basins account for about 60 percent of the global river flow. [17] Catchment basins cover 45.3 percent of the land surface of the Earth and affect 40 percent of the world's population. [18] Immense rivers like the Indus and Ganges define the landscape, stretching for thousands of kilometres. These massive tributaries can form the spatial and functional core of a country or even a civilisation. [19]

Successful agricultural economies, effective public health, and industrial development are all severely undermined by a lack of access to international river water. International drainage basins naturally link riparian states into a common and interdependent fresh water system that connects the agriculture, industry, energy, and transportation sectors into

an integrated regional unit. Action by one riparian may affect the quantity and quality of river water available to neighbouring states, imposing direct costs on other states in the basin. Basin nations share not just a river, but an entire ecosphere. Consequently, the potential for conflict, and the possibility of compromise and cooperation, exist side by side.

Understanding the role of international rivers informs a more complete model of geopolitics by infusing traditional notions of national security with issues of environmental protection and sustainable economic development. Environmental stress, pressure from industrialisation and agriculture, increasing population rates, and ineffective resource management all contribute to the degradation of international river water. Typically, major environmental and economic interest groups have been most effective at promoting their agendas domestically and internationally. But these goals have tended to crowd out other elements of human security. A study by the Water and Sustainability Program of the Pacific Institute in Oakland, California concluded that a preoccupation with agricultural and economic development has ignored other equities, such as access to water for the poor, the health of the aquatic environment, and the integrity of waterside communities and cultures. [20]

Access to the waters of international river basins throughout the Third World has generated intense competition among riparian states, as well as yielded unsung success at international cooperation. [21] The paradox is that whilst promoting strife and gamesmanship, on the one hand, fresh water scarcity has proved to be one of humanity's most durable laboratories for building community. [22] Generally, competition over river water is only one component of regional instability that threatens to erupt into interstate conflict, and such rivalry exists in South Asia. [23]

Many believe that the immense environmental degradation and resource mismanagement is a contributing factor to regional violence and war. [24] Peter H. Gleick, for example, has built an effective model of fresh water-related conflicts derived from his exhaustive set of data on the contribution of water to international conflict. [25] This seminal effort promoted a deeper appreciation of the role of water as a critical

component of political, military, and strategic thought. His data suggest that water may be manipulated and factored into six conflict types, and any particular conflict may fall into more than one category.

There is a convincing case that long-term national security is not possible without stabilising environmental security. [26] Some scholars suggest that stress on the quality and quantity of fresh water, rising populations, and increasing levels of economic development are less important factors in contributing to fresh water-related conflict than the existence of uncoordinated river development and a general animosity among riparian states. [27] Lack of co-ordinated governance is important. In South Asia, these trends are coalescing, threatening sustainable use and development, and thrusting the issue of access to trans-boundary river water from the domain of environmental chic into a *bona fide* issue of regional, if not global, security. [28]

Some of the earliest agreements in modern international law reflected the inseparable linkage between river agreements, interstate politics, and international security. [29] The Treaty of Westphalia and the Treaty of Münster in 1648, which marked the end of the Thirty Years' War, affected much of the Rhine and Upper Danube. In addition to its well-known role as a catalyst for the formation of modern European nation-states, the Peace of Westphalia was a milestone in regional waterway governance. [30] Article 12 of the Treaty of Münster, for example, opened the lower Rhine to free navigation and trade, but closed the nearby Scheldt River in the Spanish Netherlands as a concession to the merchants of Amsterdam who sought a competitive advantage over their rivals in Antwerp. [31] These conflicting examples of the Rhine and the Scheldt Rivers represent competing legal and ideological principles of trans-boundary river management between natural law, in which rivers were held to be the property of everyone or no one, and Roman law, in which rivers were regarded as the property of the citizen and subject of the empire. [32] Surveying three hundred years of trans-boundary river agreements, one scholar concluded that a focus on regional peace and stability is the paramount feature of the geopolitical context of the treaties during the period 1648–1948. [33] Indeed, the history of trans-boundary river agreements is one of incremental but steady construction of institutional capacity-building among riparian nations; [34] the role of

such agreements as confidence building measures (CBM) is a logical enlargement of this trend.

The presence of general animosity among riparian states is more closely linked to water conflict than other factors, so the potential for trans-boundary river agreements to reduce tension is especially compelling. [35] In the case of the Indus Water Treaty, the introduction and management of a river agreement successfully broadens confidence and dampens military and political animosity between opposing states. This model appears to offer benefits that might be reflected in other river agreements in South Asia, and it is likely a phenomenon in South America, Asia, and Africa as well.

Instead of waiting for an overall political breakthrough prior to attempting progress on trans-boundary river issues, the procedural mechanisms that are employed in fashioning the agreements provide one element of a foundation on which to build greater regional political and strategic stability. The concept of integrating trans-boundary river agreements as one element of an overall peace process in regional conflict combines the issue of fresh water management to the greater security question. This paradigm, which is only now being recognised outside a boutique of environment security scholars, has not been widely appreciated. But the practical impact of trans-boundary water agreements as one component of building a more stable regional security framework, rather than as a centre-stage environmental treaty, augurs well for increasing cooperation along international tributaries. The environmental benefits are tertiary to the geo-political benefits. Since rivers often demarcate national borders, there is likely further opportunity to harvest the benefits of trans-boundary river co-operation in other regions.

Even without agreement on substantive issues—which generally involve water quality, water scarcity and river flow rates—areas of discussion often include regularising state practice and preventing surprise regarding damming and flow rates, introducing jointly sponsored programs to implement sustainable fishing and hunting practices, installing realistic environmental discharge controls and measures, and monitoring river traffic and non-navigational usage. There may be great progress made just by accepting the collateral benefit of non-binding

agreements regarding river management. This very modest but often more achievable success can begin to lay institutional groundwork that gently and slowly helps to ease geo-political turmoil. Rather than permitting distrust and suspicion over river resources to fuel geo-strategic conflict, trans-boundary river agreements fashion competition into workable solutions by factoring out uncertainty, surprise, and suspicion. Constructing CBMs among the parties can, over time, assist in propelling them to negotiate and implement a common river management project that builds security by producing a stability of expectations and mutual benefit.

Any type of agreement can build confidence among rivals if it serves to build common ground. This certainly does not mean that such an agreement will prevent war, but it often represents a respite from conflict with respect to one of a myriad of issues at stake. Confidence-building measures cordon off limited areas of agreement, however, thereby encouraging parties in conflict to continue to broaden these areas of commonality. But some suggest that political breakthrough has to come first:

The *sine qua non* of resolving transboundary water dispute in a protracted conflict setting is the prior resolution of the potential conflict. The history of water … in the Indus basin (between India and Pakistan) … instructs us that states involved in "high politics" conflicts that provoke wars and engage visceral issues of territorial sovereignty and the recognition of identities, are not inclined to collaborate in seemingly technical matters that concern economic development and human welfare. [36]

In reality, dramatic advances in negotiating international river basins, whilst welcome, are not necessary to bring two parties closer. Even cases in which riparian nations merely agree to share information and exchange data, whilst agreeing to disagree on vexing substantive issues, there is increased transparency and conditions are created for confidence to emerge. The transparency generated is not perishable; it tends to spread to other aspects of the relationship. The implementation of even modest agreements serves to diminish recalcitrance on both sides. Indeed, this model of confidence-building was successfully pursued by

the Super Powers during nearly five decades of the Cold War. It is interesting, then, that some scholars and practitioners would view agreements that merely build confidence but do not resolve pressing substantive issues as the “junk food” of international agreements. [37]

Lack of information about a rival's intentions, motives, and future plans tends to generate the greatest amount of suspicion and mistrust. [38] When foreign relations are evenly and liberally endowed with information among the concerned parties, the ensuing transparency tends to strengthen international relationships. Transparency builds confidence and mutual confidence reduces tension. Information that builds confidence may be produced by two strategies: verification or assurance. [39] Verification, also called monitoring, [40] involves the unilateral application of resources to seek out the information from others. [41] Verification has become a hallmark of arms control and other international agreements. In the past, nations implemented a variety of fact-finding methods to decipher other states' actions and intentions. [42]

Verification may involve overt mining of public data, submission of an informal diplomatic query, or even deliverance of a formal demarche, external observation of other state's activities, on-site reciprocal inspections, and covert intelligence and overhead imagery collection or other means of remote sensing. Partner nations may make agreements that greatly enhance the effectiveness of verification regimes by permitting aircraft over-flight, on-site inspection, and the broadcast of unencrypted missile telemetry for verifying ballistic missile agreements. Effective verification often requires intrusive measures, such as inspection. On-site inspection has become one of the most effective methods of verifying compliance of international agreements, but it has rarely been employed outside the context of conventional and nuclear military arms control due to state sensitivities regarding sovereignty. [43] With the attribution of trans-boundary river agreements to the political and military stability of the basin, however, there is greater promise to extend the benefits of traditional arms control verification mechanisms such as on-site inspection and remote sensing to environmental agreements. [44]

Assurance is a strategy whereby each nation gathers and provides information about itself to other states. [45] Under assurance, nations have an affirmative obligation to deliver to partner states useful, specific information. This information may include otherwise confidential internal documents, physical evidence, or simple or complex certifications. [46] Participating in assurance or acquiescing in active monitoring conveys to the other parties that one is complying with one's obligations. Assurance is interactive; states recognise their partner nations' legitimate information needs, and they manifest a clear willingness and capability to provide that information. In receiving assurances, regional states set forth the parameters of the scope and type of the information they are seeking to obtain. [47] This consultative element towards assurance tends to broaden and deepen the relationship between the parties because it generates unscripted interaction.

Procedures designed to produce assurance need not be elaborate and may consist merely of self-reporting. Self-reporting is a simple and widespread process in which a state gathers and presents evidence about its activities to other states. Reporting has become a common element of international treaties and environmental agreements. [48] Increasingly, such reporting in the context of an environmental treaty is subject to independent review or assessment of state compliance by an international organisation created under the agreement for that purpose. [49] Both verification and assurance strategies are designed to alleviate the information shortfall that is a constant feature of international tension. By filling the void in information, verification and assurance eases the fears harboured by perceived disadvantage whilst providing some measure of restraint to states that may have an advantage. Verification and assurance can be especially powerful along international rivers because they bring full disclosure of ecological, economic, and navigational uses of the river throughout the river basin. [50]

Procedural compliance concerns fulfilling one's obligation of process-oriented matters such as attending scheduled meetings, filing appropriate reports, and using established mechanisms for implementing the agreement. [51] Substantive compliance is focused on fulfilling specific physical obligations. These obligations go to the heart of the agreement, such as capturing or releasing river flow that has an impact on a lower

riparian. [52] Whilst the focus on most analysis regarding international agreements is quite correctly placed disproportionately on substantive compliance, procedural compliance produces considerable independent benefits. Procedural compliance, however, within the context of rival or hostile neighbours can begin to construct bilateral arrangements for peacefully working out differences. Successfully pursued and implemented, procedural compliance tends to feed on itself, leading to broader and deeper interaction between nations that are parties to an agreement. Both substantive compliance and procedural compliance are distinct from effectiveness, which concerns whether the agreement is achieving the goals it has established. One could assess an individual state's substantive and procedural compliance—whether the state is carrying out the obligations to which it agreed—independently from determining whether an agreement is meeting its objectives. [53]

From this vantage of geo-strategy, the tertiary benefit of the effective management of a river basin biosphere is collateral. The benefits of sustainable development and environmental management are real enough, but the greatest service to both economic development and the environment may be in the ability of international agreements to contribute to stability and divert energies away from war. This approach introduces a new tool for addressing persistent regional conflict in South Asia—and likely elsewhere—by applying a time-tested formula that has been effectively employed by the Super Powers and the United Nations. Regional conflicts often appear to be intractable, with a final resolution a distant and elusive goal.

The Indus treaty regime was intentionally designed to limit cooperation to narrowly defined areas. [54] India views itself under threat from one or another combination of Islamic, Chinese, or small regional Powers; and some Indians see their country surrounded by a sea of extremist Muslims. [55] Threat perceptions rotate among the United States–Pakistan counter-terrorism alliance, fear of a Sino–American condominium that sidelines India, and extremist Muslim infiltration of the Indian Muslim minority in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks. [56] Pakistan's central explanation for tensions on the sub-continent are simple: since its creation, Pakistan has been a bulwark to resist the concerted attempt by

India to use its overwhelming size, military capabilities, and economic power to dominate Pakistan and establish regional hegemony. [57]

The core cause of the Indo–Pakistan conflict is what Stephen Cohen described as a “paired minority” conflict in which both Indians and Pakistanis are driven by a fearful cognitive psychology. [58] In paired minority conflicts, each side sees itself as the vulnerable entity exposed to continuous attack from more powerful outsiders. [59] It is extraordinarily difficult for either side to make concessions in such a security environment, even on trivial matters, because doing so may be seen as confirming others perceptions of one's own weakness, inviting still further demands. Resistance to compromise sets in because compromise may be seen at home as a sign of weakness or, worse, of collaboration with the enemy. [60] The result is that the foreign ministries and diplomatic corps responsible for negotiations in each country atrophy, losing a creative capacity for solving bilateral problems. [61] The model of paired minority conflict also explains why India and Pakistan are willing to push relations to the brink of war over what outsiders might view as the irrational. Minority states feel that the rules of behaviour are relaxed for them because their very existence and identity are at stake. [62] “Their struggle is a form of total war, not limited conflict. Any means, fair or foul, may be used because the enemy has destruction in mind.” [63] As a consequence of a paired minority conflict, India and Pakistan do not have widespread opportunities to build co-operation and develop structures generating mutual confidence.

Both India and Pakistan experienced post-partition traumas that cemented their feeling of minority states under siege: for India, the defeat by China in 1962 was the watershed; for Pakistan, its 1971 humiliation by India. [64] By the early 1970s, when the United States and China began their strategic condominium to contain the Soviet Union, Pakistan gravitated towards China, heightening suspicion in New Delhi. Consequently, the diplomatic gains of earlier generations of Indian and Pakistani leaders—figures like Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Patel, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and Jawahlarlal Nehru—became impossible to extend. As early as the 1950s, India and Pakistan had reached agreements on trade, transit, hotlines, and other confidence building measures. [65] Since 1971, however, their animosity has become deeply

entrenched, highlighting a lack of progress in diplomacy and confidence-building over the past three decades. However, a new generation of more sophisticated and worldly military officers and diplomats in Pakistan and India is emerging. [66] Largely free of blaming their countries' misfortunes on the experiences shaped in the Cold War, these professionals are driven less by personal hatred of the other side. [67] Driven by realism, fresh approaches to economics, and an understanding of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, this new generation represents more fertile ground that could embrace and capitalise on new approaches to finding peace.

The first major international river conflict between the two states arose over bilateral competition for the waters of the Indus River. Derived from the Sanskrit word *sindhu*, meaning “river” or “stream,” “Indus” is the source of the name of the country of India. The Indus begins 17,000 feet above sea level in Tibet, winding 1,800 miles through the Himalayas in Jammu and Kashmir before emptying into the Arabian Sea. The waterway has a total drainage basin area of about 450,000 square miles, encompassing much of the territory in both Pakistan and India. The river's annual flow is about 272 billion cubic yards—207 billion cubic meters—twice that of the Nile and three times the Tigris and Euphrates combined. Under British rule, the largest irrigation system in the world was constructed throughout the Indus Basin. After Pakistan and India achieved independence, the unified approach to the basin brought conflict between the two nations, with headwaters belonging to India, and canals running to Pakistan.

Pakistan no doubt feels vulnerable to Indian mischief regarding the Indus, fuelled by a general obsession over fears of being dominated by Delhi. [68] Most analysts contend that Pakistan's exposure does not approach the desperately alarmist position described by David Lilienthal. A former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Lilienthal proclaimed fifty years ago that Pakistan's dependence on India's control of the Indus was absolute. “No army, with bombs and shellfire, could devastate a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and people of Pakistan alive.” [69] Following the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, a dispute arose over the

waters of the Indus when India cut off the flow to some Pakistani canals at the start of the summer irrigation season. [70] The disagreement simmered until it was successfully resolved in 1960. The conclusion of the Indus Water Treaty, made possible by funding and engaged diplomacy by the United States and the World Bank, re-ordered and stabilised hydro-politics throughout the basin. [71]

Under this the agreement, India was afforded control of the eastern rivers of Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas; Pakistan was granted control over the western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. Pakistan was allocated 81 percent of the Indus' waters. The treaty also established a system of conflict resolution by first having Indian and Pakistani Water Commissioners resolve emergent crises. Only when these bodies failed would a dispute be referred to an arbitral court or neutral expert. Such referral has never occurred. [72] After the agreement was signed, a period of transition followed in which each Power developed its irrigation infrastructure system to adhere to the treaty. [73] Thus as India was partitioned, so were the waters of the Indus divided. In addition to a simple division of river flow, the agreement calls on both parties to exchange flow data for rivers, canals, and streams and to submit disputes to the permanent Indus Water Commission and International Court of Arbitration. [74] As each Power complies with its water quotas, this system of checks and inspections ensures that no harm will come to the water quantity or quality of the rival nations.

The agreement permits India, the upper riparian Power, to use the flowing water, but any construction that facilitates storage or diversion of river water is prohibited. Pakistan has feared that India could disturb the flow of the Jhelum by building a dam in India that would disrupt the Pakistani irrigation pattern—flooding it when water was not required and withholding flow when water was most needed. Central and southern Punjabi agriculture depend both on the Jhelum's water. If India restricted flow, it could make a large part of the Punjab barren—but it would take at least 15 years for India to build such a dam. [75] Pakistan has also raised concern that India could divert the flow of the Chenab to Ravi to use the river as a weapon. The Chenab is only 50 kilometres from the Ravi River on the Indian plain; if India dug a canal to connect the two waterways, it could consume the entire flow of the Chenab to expand its irrigation

network into the Rajasthan desert. [76] Either action would unilaterally abrogate the treaty. As the economic and engineering costs would be exorbitant and the political costs unacceptably high, India has not been inclined to violate the treaty. Since many in Pakistan would view river diversion as an act of war, [77] India could expect Pakistan to retaliate against Indian dams. [78]

After forty years, the Indus Water Treaty has survived remarkably intact despite two wars—in 1965 and 1971—and the threat of numerous clashes and crises that make the sub-continent the most likely place in the world for a nuclear war. [79] The Indus Commission has successfully resolved controversies and disputes that surfaced over this period of time. Each Rival Power has respected the provisions of the agreement by fulfilling their responsibilities and, by being cautious, not politicising the arrangement or militarising the system of dams, hydroelectric facilities, canals, and water treatment and distribution facilities throughout the basin. [80] Although the original treaty foresaw an era of joint planning and cooperation for developing the river, the two Powers have not exploited the full potential for mutual or cooperative development. [81] Consequently, the provisions for basin-wide inspection and monitoring have become the most important sections of the treaty. Even though the agreement has not blossomed as was hoped, it has been able to serve as a stabilising mechanism between the two competitors.

The experience of reaching the agreement has nourished other bilateral talks, including two near-breakthroughs on the volatile issue of the Siachen glacier, which was spoiled each time at the last minute by political pusillanimity on both sides. [82] Adherence to the Indus treaty, as well as the role the agreement plays as a mechanism for building confidence between Pakistan and India, was tested in Spring 2002. Despite the threat of impending border conflict fuelled by Muslim terrorism and militancy in Kashmir, Indian and Pakistani representatives met in Delhi late May 2002 for the annual Indus Water Commission bilateral meeting. [83] Convening amid a charged political atmosphere and threat of war, the commission proceeded in a business-like fashion and discussed routine issues such as hydroelectric plans. [84] At a time when the two Powers were literally mobilising for what many viewed as an inevitable war in June 2002, the Indus Water Commission was

steadfastly ironing out practical differences along the river. The relationship between India and Pakistan in the Commission was the most functional element of the bilateral relationship.

Bringing together a network of middle-level regulators, resource and economic experts, educators and scientists, and diplomats and military officers develops a dense web of relationships across the border. These partnerships constitute a new bureaucratic trans-governmental order, a phenomenon that Anne-Marie Slaughter has termed "The Real New World Order." [85] In "The Real New World Order," *ad hoc* trans-governmental networks bypass the traditional state hierarchy to more closely integrate states by expanding horizontal co-operation amongst government officials from different nations, non-governmental organisations, and regional actors. Whilst serving to construct a "new" world order of civil relationships, the Indus agreement continues to spin-off substantive economic, environmental, and security benefits that promote sustainable development. The agreements influenced India, despite its vantage of political and military strength, to deal with its neighbours largely on the basis of equality. Situated both in the enviable position of upstream riparian as well as vulnerable downstream riparian, Delhi has had to simultaneously work agreements from both perspectives. In doing so, it has reduced regional suspicion and avoided inflaming regional insecurities.

In many areas of the world, water scarcity and conflict may be closely linked to a lack of co-operation between Powers over shared fresh water resources. [86] The strategic geography of the Indus basin, much like that of the Jordan, Nile, and Euphrates, tends to promote disputes over water scarcity. But along the Indus, bilateral co-operation on shared trans-boundary rivers effectively ameliorates water scarcity as a cause of conflict. [87] The Indus agreement has shown utility beyond merely dampening disputes over water scarcity; it has also served more generally as a confidence and security-building mechanism.

Notes

1. See generally, Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity and Violence* (Princeton, NJ, 1999), Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt,

eds., *Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population and Scarcity* (Lanham, MD, 1998), Gunther Baechler, "Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis," *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, Vol. 4 (1998), pp. 24–44; Nils Petter Gleditsch, ed., *Conflict and the Environment* (Dordrecht, 1997).

2. For one study that does acknowledge a correlation between improving the environment and enhancing regional security, see Richard A. Matthew with Asif Zaidi, "People, Scarcity and Violence in Pakistan," in Richard Matthew, Mark Halle and Jason Switzer, eds., *Conserving the Peace: Resources, Livelihoods and Security* (International Institute for Sustainable Development and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN], 2002), pp. 57–88 at 62.

3. The term CBM was first used in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's basket I of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, where states agreed to certain measures designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and miscalculation or misunderstanding of military activities which could give rise to apprehension. This article uses the traditional term "confidence building measure" [CBM] and the newer term "confidence and security building measure" [CSBM] synonymously.

4. See generally, Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, eds., *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (New York, 1986). The India–Pakistan relationship is best described as a "security complex" because it is long-lasting and multi-dimensional. Nuclear theorists can disagree on whether the introduction of nuclear capabilities on the subcontinent may serve to stabilise or destabilise the security situation. It is clear, however, that the potential for devastating consequences from war have increased greatly. The Natural Resources Defense Council estimates that a nuclear war between Pakistan and India would result in 12 million deaths. See, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp.

5. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", in Zakaria Fareed, ed., *The New Shape of World Politics* (New York, 1997), pp. 67–91, at 67 and 77.

6. Norman Myers, *Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability* (New York, 1993), pp. 101–103.

7. Hassan Shaukat, "Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia," *Adelphi Papers*, Vol. 262 (Autumn 1991).

8. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Impacts, Assessments and Vulnerability, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report* (2007), p. 493, available at www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.

9. Arun P. Elhance, *Hydropolitics in the Third World* (Washington, DC, 1999), p. 8.

10. Jerome Delli Priscoli, "Water and Civilization: Using History to Reframe Water Policy Debates and to Build a New Ecological Realism," *Water Policy,* Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 623–636 at 626.

11. Richard A. Matthew with Asif Zaidi, "People, Scarcity and Violence in Pakistan," in Richard Matthew, Mark Halle and Jason Switzer, eds., *Conserving the Peace: Resources, Livelihoods and Security* (World Conservation Union, 2002), pp. 57–88 at 68.

12. Thom Shanker, "12 Million Could Die at Once in an India–Pakistan Nuclear War," *New York Times*, 27 May 2002, www.nytimes.com/2002/05/27/international/asia/ 27NUKE.html; Luke Harding and Richard Norton Taylor, "India Alert as Nuclear War Looms," *Guardian*, 1 June 2002, www.guardian.co.uk/kashmir/Story/0,2763,725968,00.html.

13. See generally, Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," *International Security*, Vol. 18 (Summer 1993), pp. 79–112; Christopher L. Kukk and David A. Deese, "At the Water's Edge: Regional Conflict and Cooperation Over Fresh Water," *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 21–64.

14. Evita Schmieg, "Crises Prevention: Lessons for Developing Cooperation," in Bonn International Center for Conversion, Brief 16, *Practical Disarmament* (August 2000), pp. 10–15 at 10.

15. The terms “international river” and “transboundary river” are used interchangeably to mean rivers that border on or flow through two or more nations.

16. This study uses the terms “international river basin” and “international river watershed” interchangeably to mean the entire catchment and drainage basin of a river that is shared by two or more states. See, James L. Wescoat, Jr., “Beyond the River Basin: The Changing Geography of International Water Problems and International Water Law,” *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy*, Vol. 3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 301–332.

17. Aaron T. Wolf, *Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Lessons Learned*,” Thematic Background Paper, International Conference on Fresh water, Bonn, Germany, 2–7 December 2001, at p. 1. The number of international river basins has expanded from 214 listed in 1978, with the growth attributable to the reorganisation of the state system in Europe following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as to improved mapping technology. Ibid.

18. Aaron T. Wolf, *Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Lessons Learned,” Thematic Background Paper*, International Conference on Fresh water, Bonn, Germany, 2–7 December 2001, at p. 1.

19. Priscoli, “Water and Civilization,” p. 623.

20. P.H. Gleick, A. Singh, and H. Shi, *Emerging Threats to the World's Fresh water Resources. A Report to the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security* (Oakland, CA, 2001), pp. 2–3 and 51. In some areas of South Asia, more than three-fourths of the population lack access to clean drinking water or adequate water-related sanitation. Worldwide, such shortages lead to over three million deaths per year. Ibid., pp. 5–8. Waterborne disease invades international watersheds in Asia and Africa, with malaria alone afflicting 300–500 million people each year and killing more than 2 million. Tom Carter, “DDT: Malaria's Answer in Africa?”, *Washington Times*, 16 June 2002, p. A1.

21. This article focuses on nations throughout Central and South Asia, which may be described as part of the "Third World." The term "Third World"—"Tiers Monde" in French—was initially coined by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952 to draw an analogy from the "third estate." The third estate describes the commoners in France before and during the French Revolution, comprised of the priests and nobles, respectively. The term was adopted by the 29 African–Asian nations at the Conference in Bandung, Java, Indonesia in 1955 and came to denote those nations neutral of the ideological divide during the Cold War. See "The Asian Language," *Asiaweek*, 5 March 1999, p. 70. Because the areas of South Asia encompass immense diversity of culture, economic development and natural resources, as well as political systems, the term "Third World" is an incomplete, if not inaccurate description. On the Third World as a collective, see generally, John Ravenhill, "The North-South Balance of Power," *International Affairs*, Vol. 66 (1990), pp. 731–748.

22. Priscoli, "Water and Civilisation," p. 626.

23. In 1980, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat said, "If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force": cited in Norman Myers, "Environment and Security," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 74 (Spring 1989), p. 32.

24. See generally, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from the Cases," *International Security*, Vol. 19 (Summer 1994), pp. 5–40; idem., "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *InternationalSecurity*, Vol. 16 (Fall 1991), pp. 76–116.

25. Peter Gleick, "World Water Conflict Chronology," Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, 2000: www.worldwater.org/conflict.html.

26. See generally, Lothar Brock, "Security through Defending the Environment: An Illusion," in Elise Boulding, ed., *New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined* (Boulder, CO, 1992), pp. 79–102; Bruce Byers, "Ecoregions, State Sovereignty and Conflict,"

Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 22 No. 2 (1991), pp. 65–76; and Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, (February 1994), pp. 45–76.

27. Dr. Aaron T. Wolf *et al.*, "Transboundary Fresh water Dispute Database," undated study briefing available at: www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/.

28. Gary Hart, Warren Rudman *et al.*, *U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century* [Hart-Rudman Commission], Supporting Research and Analysis, *The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century, New World Coming: America Security in the 21st Century*" (15 September 1999), p. 16; The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (December 1999), p. 13.

29. One of the most useful and perhaps the most exhaustive catalogue for such agreements is the Transboundary Fresh Water Dispute Database, a project of the Department of Geosciences at Oregon State University in collaboration with the U.S. Institute of Peace, the World Bank, the University of Alabama, and other individuals and institutions. The database, which references 3,600 water-related treaties since the ninth century, contains over 150 full-text transboundary fresh water treaties and detailed negotiating notes on case studies: www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/.

30. James L. Wescoat, Jr., "Main Currents in Early Multilateral Water Treaties: A Historical-Geographic Perspective, 1648–1948," *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy*, Vol. 39 (1996), pp. 49–50.

31. Ibid., citing Clive Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series XII* (1969), p. 76.

32. Ibid. See also generally, Eugene F. Ware, *Roman Water Law* (1905).

33. Wescoat, Jr., "Early Multilateral Water Treaties," p. 71.

34. Ibid., p. 72.

35. The data, which is owned and compiled by Professor Aaron T. Wolf, Oregon State University, may be viewed at: www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/.

36. Miriam R. Lowi, "Political and Institutional Responses to Transboundary Water Disputes in the Middle East," *Environmental Change and Security Project Report 2* (Spring 1996), pp. 5–8, at p.6.

37. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Arms Control After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* (1989/1990), pp. 42–46.

38. See, Lilly R. Sucharipa-Behrmann and Thomas M. Franck, "Preventive Measures," *NYU Journal of International Law and Policy*, Vol. 485 (Spring/Summer, 1998), pp. 486–492.

39. Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements," *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol. 26 (Winter 1993), p. 1.

40. The terms "verification" and "monitoring" have been used interchangeably in arms control and are used interchangeably here. Stefan Oeter, "Inspection in International Law: Monitoring Compliance and the Problem of Implementation in International Law," 28 *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 164 (1997), p. 106.

41. Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements," *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol. 26 (Winter 1993), pp. 1, 4.

42. See Robert J. Einhorn, "Treaty Compliance," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 45 (Winter 1981–82), p. 30.

43. See generally, William R. Moomaw, "International Environmental Policy and the Softening of Sovereignty," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* Vol. 7(21) (1997), p. 7.

44. Remote sensing has been used for military reconnaissance and arms control verification, beginning in the Cold War. During the 1960s, remote sensing became a tool of the scientific community, collecting information on the Earth's weather patterns, monitoring natural resources, environmental surveys and land use planning and the study of erosion. It has been suggested that remote sensing be utilized for monitoring multilateral environmental agreements. See generally, Allison F. Gardner, "Environmental Monitoring's Undiscovered Country: Developing a Satellite Remote Monitoring System to Implement the Kyoto Protocol's Global Emissions-Trading Program," 9 *NYU Environmental Law Journal*, Vol. 9 (2000), pp. 152, 192–194.

45. Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements," *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol. 26 (Winter 1993), pp. 1, 4.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 29.

48. Kamen Sachariew, "Promoting Compliance with International Environmental legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Systems," 2 *Yearbook of International Environmental Law*, Vol. 2 (1991), pp. 31, 40.

49. Michael Bothe, "The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in International Environmental Law," in Rudiger Wolfrum, ed., *Enforcing Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means*, Vol. 13 (1996), p. 22.

50. Lilly R. Sucharipa-Behrmann and Thomas M. Franck, "Preventive Measures," *NYU Journal of International Law and Policy*, Vol. 30 (Spring/Summer, 1998), pp. 485, 492–493.

51. Edith Brown Weiss, "Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths," *University of Richmond Law Review*, Vol. 32 (1999), pp. 1555, 1563.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., p. 1564; Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, “Getting Countries to Comply with International Agreements,” *Environment*, Vol. 41 (July–August 1999), pp. 16, 18.

54. Nurit Kliot and Deborah Shumueli, “Development of Institutional Frameworks for the Management of Transboundary Water Resources,” *International Journal of Global Environmental Issues*, Vol. 1 (2001), p. 321.

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56. Ibid., p. 110.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., p. 108.

60. Ibid., p. 118.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 119.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 115.

65. Ibid., p. 114.

66. Ibid., pp. 121–22.

67. Ibid.

68. Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, eds., “Sources of Conflict in Asia,” in RAND Corporation, *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA, 1998), pp. 148–151.

69. D. Lilienthal, “Another Korea in the Making?,” *Collier's Magazine*, (4 April 1951), p. 58.

70. G.T. Keith Pitman, “The Role of the World Bank in Enhancing Co-operation and Resolving Conflict on International Watercourses: The Case of the Indus Basin,” in Salman M.A. Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, eds., *International Watercourses: Enhancing Co-operation and Managing Conflict*, World Bank Technical Paper No. 414 (Washington DC, 1998).

71. 419 *UN Treaty Series* 125, United Nations, *Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilisation of International Rivers for Other Purposes Than Navigation* UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, UN Sales No. 63.V.4 (1963), p. 300.

72. K. S. Sharma, “India's Experience in Developing the Indus River Basin Programme,” in United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation, Natural Resources Water Series No. 20, *River and Lake Basin Development, Proceedings of the United Nations Meeting at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 10–15 October 1988*, pp. 194–201.

73. Kliot and Shumueli, “Institutional Frameworks,” p. 321.

74. Farzana Noshab and Nadia Mushtaq, *Water Disputes in South Asia* (Islamabad). See also Jagat S. Mehta, “The Indus Water Treaty: A Case Study in the Resolution of an International River Basin Conflict,” *Natural Resources Forum*, Vol. 12 (1988), pp. 69–77.

75. Ahmad Fraz Khan, “Chenab, Jhelum vulnerable to Treaty Mischief: Indian Minister's Threat,” *DAWN*: www/dawn.com, Sunday, 26 May 2002. *DAWN* is Pakistan's largest English-language newspaper daily.

76. Ibid.

77. Anonymous official from the Ministry of Water and Power in Pakistan, as reported in Ibid.

78. Dams are not lawful targets under the customary law of war, but such observance might be reciprocal in a major war between the two nuclear states. See Arts. pp. 56–58, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 1125 *UN Treaty Series* 3, adopted June 8 1977 at Geneva and reprinted in W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, eds., *The Law of War* (1994), pp. 91–93.

79. See, M.V. Ramana and A. H. Nayyar, "India, Pakistan and the Bomb," *Scientific American* (December 2001); Strobe Talbott, "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78 (1999).

80. Jagat S. Mehta, "The Indus Water Treaty: A Case Study in the Resolution of an International River Basin Conflict," *Natural Resources Forum*, Vol. 12 (1988), pp. 69–77.

81. Kliot and Shumueli, "Institutional Frameworks," p. 322.

82. Jairam Ramesh, "13/12 and the USA," *India Today* (24 December 2001), p. 53.

83. Because India had severed travel links between the two countries, the Pakistani delegation had to travel to Delhi via Dubai. *BBC News, South Asia*, "Water Treaty Withstands Wars," (Thursday, 30 May 2002, 16:32 GMT).

84. Among items on the agenda was the Bagliyar hydroelectricity plan. In the past, hydroelectric projects, such as the Salal plan, have proved to be more contentious. *BBC News, South Asia*, "Water Treaty Withstands Wars," (Thursday 30 May 2002, 16:32 GMT).

85. Ann-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1997), pp. 183–185.

86. Christopher L. Kukk and David A. Deese, "At the Water's Edge: Regional Conflict and Cooperation Over Fresh Water," *UCLA Journal of*

International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 21, 57.

87. Ibid., pp. 39–52.

Europe in Taiwan's Post–Cold War Foreign Relations

Diplomacy & Statecraft

Volume 18, **Issue 2**, **2007**

DOI: 10.1080/09592290701322606

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pages 415-443

Available online: 20 Jun 2007

Abstract

The article examines Taiwan's relationship with Europe (both Western and East Central), paying particular attention to the Taiwanese diplomatic strategies and their consequences in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as to the European responses. It argues that although Taipei's greatest triumphs in Europe—such as the arms deals, diplomatic or consular agreements or gaining support for membership in international organizations—proved either sporadic or short-lived, their very existence demonstrated that the China factor did not necessarily restrict the European nations' choices with regards to the Taiwan issue. This was

particularly so when Taipei's economic rewards seemed sufficiently compensating for China's economic or political sanctions. More importantly, however, Taiwan—through economic diplomacy—successfully established strong foundations for long-term dialogue with all of Europe through representative offices, bilateral committees, parliamentary exchanges and periodical visits by government officials. Thus, Europe's functional relationship with Taiwan, which focused mainly on economic and cultural issues, not only facilitated low-key political dialogue with the island, but also stimulated Europe's interest in the geopolitical stability in the Taiwan Strait.

In the mid-1980s, Reinhard Drifte concluded that “any discussion of European perspectives concerning Taiwan […] means speaking about European business interests on the island; political considerations about Taiwan […] come into play only insofar as these business interests may be threatened by any internal and external political event.” [1] In 1995, Kay Moeller wrote of the “opportunists” and “cynics” when referring to West European policies on Taiwan. [2] Seven years later, Moeller noted that “at no time human rights and democracy considerations have visibly affected [German] thinking about Taiwan.” [3] In the early 2000s, Jean-Pierre Cabestan examined French “shopkeeper diplomacy” towards Taiwan, while Francoise Mengin claimed that in the long term, the Europeans would not oppose the “one China” policy as their relations with Taiwan were exclusively functional, taking full advantage of Taiwan's economic potential and lacking any political plan with regard to Taiwan's future. [4]

Thus far, the academic analyses of Europe's relations with Taiwan over the past two decades have been remarkably consistent in their conclusions on Europe's Taiwan policy as being focused on the economic, rather than geostrategic, dimension of relations with the

Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). [5] This article will not dispute this shared opinion. Lacking military capacity to project its “hard” influence to the Asia-Pacific and consumed with the “in-house” project of economic and political integration, the Europeans did not concern themselves with the geopolitics of the Taiwan problem. They left the geostrategic considerations to the United States (US), which since 1950 burdened itself with the containment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and, at least until the early 1970s, considered alliance with Taiwan as a geostrategic asset. Instead, the Europeans pursued non-political relations with Taiwan, which did not violate the “one China” principle, a foundation of friendship with Taiwan's arch-enemy and Asia's regional power, the PRC. Yet, in the process of fostering economic and cultural ties with the rebel island, the Europeans became increasingly aware of the advantages of an institutionalized, if not official, dialogue with Taipei. This was particularly the case when Taipei—capitalizing on its economic success and the resulting capacity to dispense economic rewards—tempted the Europeans with promises of economic largesse had they decided to exchange high-level government officials, establish reciprocal offices, sign diplomatic and consular agreements, sell weapons, initiate direct flights or support Taiwanese membership in international organizations.

Although Taipei's greatest diplomatic triumphs in Europe proved either sporadic or short-lived, they demonstrated that the China factor, while confining Taiwan's relationships with Europe to non-political realm, did not necessarily prevent the European nations from furthering political dialogue with the island, especially when Taipei's rewards seemed sufficiently compensating for China's sanctions. More importantly, however, Taiwan—through economic diplomacy—successfully established solid foundations for long-term relations with all of Europe through representative offices (de facto consular bureaus), bilateral committees on economic cooperation, parliamentary exchanges and periodical visits by ministerial-level officials. Thus, while not disputing the broad conclusions reached by the existing scholarship on the nature of Europe's relations with Taiwan, this article will argue that Europe's functional relations with Taiwan, far from being an obstacle to a more comprehensive relationship, not only facilitated economic relations and non-official political dialogue with the island, but also stimulated

Europe's interest in the Taiwan issue and the geopolitical stability in the Taiwan Strait.

THE COLD WAR DIVISIONS

The Cold War divided Europe on the Taiwan question. Most West European states followed the US policy of isolating the PRC in the international arena. All Soviet allies in East Central Europe, in turn, stood by the PRC and abstained from any contacts with the ROC. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Lichtenstein and the Scandinavian states—governed by the social democrats—took the middle road, having recognized China in 1950–1951, but maintained non-political relations with Taiwan. American allies in Europe, however, aware of Beijing's effective sovereignty over Chinese mainland and its power status in Asia, did not wholeheartedly subscribe to Washington's policy of containing China internationally. Prompted as much by the conviction that China was too important as an Asian power to be ignored, as by the desire to challenge the United States, the French were the first to break away from the US-led anti-PRC coalition and recognized Beijing in 1964. In response, Taipei broke diplomatic ties with Paris. [6] Its remaining diplomatic partners in Western Europe defected to the China camp in the early 1970s, following the Sino-US rapprochement and the PRC's admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1971. [7] By 1975, the polarisation of Europe into the PRC and ROC's camps ended with all states (except the Vatican) siding with Beijing on the question of “one China.” Given the low degree of political, military and economic interaction with Taiwan prior to de-recognition, West European states chose not to follow the Japanese formula, whereby non-official relations with the ROC after de-recognition were managed by nominally non-governmental organizations. They were also largely unconcerned with Taiwan's geostrategic security.

Responding to increasing international isolation, ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo initiated “total diplomacy” (*zongti waijiao*) in 1973 to develop substantive ties with states that established diplomatic relations with China, while relying on the United States' support to maintain its claim to internationally recognized statehood. [8] With regards to Europe,

“total diplomacy” focused on expanding economic relations with Western Europe and establishing commercial ties with the “non-hostile” states in East Central Europe. While economic cooperation with Western Europe indeed strengthened in the 1970s and prompted several West European states to set up their trade offices in Taiwan (their first bureaus after de-recognition), Taipei's emphasis on the anti-communism as a pillar of its diplomacy made economic rapprochement with communist Europe infeasible. [9]

Taiwanese authorities discarded hostility towards the Soviet allies (although not the Soviet Union itself) in 1988, when allowing direct trading with East Central Europe. [10] When Europe's post-communist states faced the dilemma of pursuing relations with Taiwan at the cost of alienating China for the first time since 1949, they felt reassured by West Europeans' success at maintaining close relations with Beijing, without sacrificing economic cooperation with Taiwan. Although this achievement owed more to Beijing's relaxed policies regarding Taiwan following the United States' de-recognition of Taiwan in 1979 and the second Sino–American joint communiqué (1982), which obligated Washington to scale down arms experts to the island, than to the Europeans' diplomatic inventiveness, it demonstrated the possibility of maintaining relations with both parts of divided China. By 1988, eleven West European states considered their level of economic cooperation with Taiwan advanced enough to justify intitutionalization of relations with the island (along the lines of the Japanese formula) through non-official bureaus dealing with economic, cultural and technical exchanges. Some of these offices functioned as semi-consulates, issuing visas. [11] In 1981, Belgian private firms and their Taiwanese counterparts formed a bilateral committee to promote economic cooperation. Within eight years, such committees were also set up with seven other European states. [12] Most remarkably, however, growing Taiwanese economic power facilitated the conclusion of the first arms deal with Europe in 1981, when the Netherlands sold two submarines to Taiwan. Ensuing Chinese economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Netherlands, however, reminded Western Europe of the dire consequences of pursuing relations with Taiwan beyond the economic and cultural realm.

“FLEXIBLE DIPLOMACY”

Failing to arrest diplomatic isolation, Taipei—under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui—launched a new diplomatic offensive in 1988 in order to "strive with greater determination, pragmatism, flexibility, and vision […] to develop a foreign policy based primarily on substantive relations." [13] In practice, however, his "flexible diplomacy" (*tanxing waijiao*) was as much concerned with strengthening substantive relations with China's allies, as with winning new diplomatic partners, resuming participation in intergovernmental organizations and diversifying Taiwan's trading markets in order to render Taiwanese economy more resilient to the economic cycles in the US and Japan, Taiwan's major trading partners. [14]

Democratization of Taiwanese domestic politics, Taiwan's booming economy, the June 4th tragedy and the end of the Cold War facilitated the execution of the "flexible diplomacy." The Tiananmen tragedy in particular influenced a shift in international opinion against China and encouraged the perception of Taiwan as a democratic part of the divided China. Taiwan's free market economy contrasted favourably with the economic retrenchment experienced by China in 1989–1991. [15] Due to the international isolation of China after the Tiananmen event, Beijing's foreign policy focused on regaining respectability in the international community and appeared less concerned with Taiwan's unofficial ties with the wider world. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet empire devalued the "China card," reducing the PRC's perceived leverage in world affairs, and encouraged some states to pursue more daring policies towards Taiwan. [16]

Taipei's "flexible diplomacy" was to play on the ROC's strengths, namely, to take advantage of Taiwan's growing international status as a trading power and major investor. By the late 1980s–early 1990s, Taiwan's economy had grown strong enough to sustain vigorous economic diplomacy. By 1991–1992, it ranked 2nd in foreign exchange reserves holdings, was the world's 14th largest trading nation and the 9th largest investor. Taiwan's GNP per capita exceeded US$10,000, placing it at the 25th position in the world. [17]

SEEKING NEW ALLIES

The post-communist economies' hunger for investments and developmental assistance, and the new democracies' foreign policies no longer bound by an ideological fraternity with communist China, rendered East Central Europe favourably predisposed towards Taiwan. Taipei hoped that providing the new democracies with economic aid would eventually lead to diplomatic relations. [18] Its first success came in 1989, when Budapest agreed to host an ROC trade office in exchange for unspecified foreign aid. [19] In 1991, the Taiwanese announced soft loans (valued at around US$10 million) for several post-communist states and entered into a partnership with the European Bank for Development and Reconstruction (EBRD) to form the Taipei China-EBRD Cooperation Fund, which aimed at aiding post-communist economies. The initial responses from East Central Europe were encouraging. Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's wife visited Taipei in 1990, while Polish President Lech Walesa promised to do so in 1991. Taiwanese officials predicted imminent diplomatic victories in post-communist Europe. Alarmed by the prospects of losing diplomatic ground, in 1991 Beijing resumed high-level political contacts—suspended in 1989—with Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague. Walesa's U-turn on the Taiwan visit symbolized the victory of wider geopolitical considerations in East Central Europe on the question of China and Taiwan. While former Soviet allies resolved to adhere to the “one China” principle, the disintegration of the Soviet Union opened a new diplomatic battlefield, where the anti-communist sentiments also ran high, economies were desperate for foreign assistance and China's influence was on decline.

Diplomatic communiqués between Beijing and Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine—vague on the “one China” policy—raised hopes in Taiwan that some post-Soviet states could have possibly desired official relations with the ROC and their diplomatic recognition of China was merely intended to facilitate their entry into international organizations. [20] Latvia —guided by anti-communist ideology and in need of developmental assistance—was the first to validate these hopes, when it established consular relations with Taipei in 1992. Economic aid was to cement and upgrade consular ties with Latvia to full diplomatic partnership. In addition to around US$60 million in grants Taiwanese media claimed Riga received from Taiwan, Latvia also got US$10 million in grants and

was promised US$16 million in soft loans. The loans, however, never arrived, while further aid and investments were conditional upon Riga's diplomatic recognition of Taipei. Amid disappointment over the scale of Taiwanese economic assistance, Riga terminated the consular agreement in 1994. [21]

Promises of El Dorado in exchange for diplomatic relations were made to all post-communist states. However, the rapidly growing Chinese economy, as well as the Western states' pursuit of the “one China” policy, discouraged post-communist nations from voicing support for Taiwan's de jure independence. In 1999, the newly elected centre-right government in Macedonia took Taiwanese pledges of injecting US$1 billion (or more) into Macedonian economy seriously and extended diplomatic recognition to the ROC. Taipei's diplomatic partnership with Skopje increased Taiwan's visibility in Europe. Macedonian Premier Ljubco Georgievski visited Taiwan in June 1999, becoming the second head of a European government to do so. [22] ROC Premier Vincent Siew reciprocated in August 1999 on what was the first and only official visit by the serving Taiwanese premier to a European state other than the Vatican. Although the Taiwanese denied promising US$1 billion in economic aid, the Macedonians expected massive aid, which Taipei ultimately proved unwilling (or unable) to provide. In June 2001, facing an escalating civil war, the new Macedonian government, hoping to gain the UN support to end the ethnic strife, re-established diplomatic ties with China.

Taipei envisaged its success in Macedonia as a first step towards expanding its official presence in the Balkans, if not Europe. In mid-1999, it unveiled a US$300 million package for the reconstruction of Kosovo not only to attract world attention, but also to convince some Balkan governments that they too could benefit from the Taiwanese largesse had they agreed to upgrade ties with the ROC. Concurrently, Albania was promised US$1 billion for diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, Skopje's decision to return to the China camp amid disappointment over the actual scale of the Taiwanese aid, shattered Taiwanese plans to find more allies in the Balkans and beyond. [23]

SUSTAINING ALLIANCE WITH THE HOLY SEE

While failing to maintain official ties with Europe's new democracies, Taipei was more successful in sustaining the partnership with the Holy See. And yet, this relationship also rested on shaky grounds. Guided by the desire to protect religious freedoms of China's Catholics and increasingly aware of the potential of converting millions of mainland Chinese into Catholicism, the Vatican initiated a dialogue with Beijing in the early 1980s. [24] Its efforts at normalizing relations with China, however, failed to produce results due to conflicting agendas: While Beijing insisted on the Holy See's termination of relations with Taiwan as a precondition of diplomatic relations, it also vetoed the Vatican's practice to appoint bishops, which allegedly interfered in China's internal affairs. The Vatican was ready to ditch diplomatic partnership with Taiwan, but it was not ready to abdicate its responsibility to lead the Chinese Catholics and protect their religious freedoms. [25]

Taipei was concerned over the Vatican's apparent readiness to switch diplomatic sides whenever the opportunity presented itself. Taiwanese leaders (including Vice President and Premier Lien Chan in January 1997, Vice President Annette Lu in March 2002 and First Lady Wu Shu-jen in July 2003) and successive ministers of foreign affairs (e.g., Jason Hu in February 1999, Tien Hung-mao in June 2000, and Chen Tang-shan in June 2004) travelled to the Vatican to strengthen ties and remind the Holy See of the commonly shared principles of peace, compassion, and human rights. Although reassured on countless occasions that the Pope would not compromise the interests of the Taiwanese people, Taipei did its best to promote relations with the Holy See by supporting Catholic charity projects. [26] It also tried to convince the Vatican officials of the untrustworthiness of the mainland promises regarding religious freedom.

The news of John Paul II's death in 2005 intensified speculations that the Vatican under a new leadership would be more willing to find a compromise with China. Hong Kong Bishop Joseph Zen declared that “the Holy See has thought about giving up Taiwan […], it was very difficult, but it has decided to do so.” [27] Unexpectedly, however, the

Pope's death strengthened the Vatican's ties with Taipei, when the Holy See invited ROC President Chen Shui-bian for the funeral ceremonies, attended by US President George W. Bush and 200 other foreign dignitaries. Although his visit lasted mere 19 hours, President Chen insisted that it symbolized the world's recognition of Taiwan's long-term efforts at pursuing democracy, human rights, peace and justice. [28] The Vatican's exercise in funeral diplomacy certainly increased Taiwanese visibility in the international media and boosted the value of the diplomatic partnership with the Holy See. It was not indicative, however, of the Holy See's scheme to play the “Taiwan card” in negotiations with China as antagonizing Beijing on the Taiwan question is unlikely to predispose Beijing favourably to a compromise on the issue of a much greater importance to the Vatican: religious freedoms in China.

STRENGTHENING SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

By 1989, Western Europe's substantive partnership with Taiwan featured bilateral trade (de facto consular) offices, bilateral economic agreements (including accord on aviation with the Netherlands) and bilateral (private) committees overseeing economic cooperation. Taipei aimed at injecting more officialdom into contacts with Western Europe through direct communication at the ministerial level, more inter-governmental agreements, intensified inter-parliamentary exchanges and gaining West European support for its efforts to re-enter international organizations. China's temporary diplomatic and economic problems, resulting from the international isolation after the June 4th tragedy, facilitated Taiwanese efforts. France led the way to stronger ties with Taiwan. In 1989, it upgraded its mission in Taipei to French Institute in Taipei, analogous to the American Institute in Taiwan, a US de facto embassy on the island. The French were the first Europeans to appoint a formally “retired” ambassador to head their representative office in Taiwan. This set a pattern for other European states to follow, appointing foreign ministry personnel to Taipei. [29]

Far from relying on the shared beliefs in democratic ideals as the foundation for stronger relations, Taipei resorted to hard cash to

strengthen relations with Western Europe. In particular, it used the Six-Year National Development Plan (1991–1996), valued at US$303 billion, linking the success of international tenders for large infrastructure projects with the degree of friendship between Taiwan and the state, where the bidding company came from. [30] Eager to win big contracts, high-ranking visitors from Western Europe for the first time since de-recognition travelled to the island. The first cabinet member of any European state to visit Taiwan in a “private” capacity was French Minister of Industry and Regional Planning Roger Fauroux in January 1991. A string of West European official visitors followed, including French Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Jean-Noël Jeanneney (January 1992), Dutch Minister of Foreign Trade Yvonne C. M. T. van Rooy (April 1992), Swedish Minister of Transport and Communications Mats Odell (May 1992), Belgian Foreign Trade Minister Robert Urbain (October 1992), and German Vice Chancellor Jürgen Möllemann (November 1992). [31] Many former leaders, including former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, also travelled to Taiwan to strengthen their nations' chances of securing lucrative deals. By 1991, there were 15 West European nominally non-governmental institutions on Taiwan to handle economic and cultural exchanges (while Taiwanese offices could be found in 16 West European states). [32] Some of these bureaus (e.g., the French, British, German, and Spanish) issued visas and were staffed by diplomats. Taiwanese offices in Western Europe were either allowed to rename themselves to better reflect their status or Taipei renamed them without prior consultations. [33] They enjoyed limited diplomatic privileges (and correspondingly, European representations in Taipei were accorded some diplomatic privileges as well). Taiwan established direct air services to Austria (1991), Great Britain, Germany, and France (1993).

Taiwan's substantive relations with Western Europe in the early 1990s also included arms deals, with France, Italy, Belgium, and Germany selling arms to Taiwan, of which the French sale of 60 Mirage 2000-5 jet fighters in 1992 proved most controversial. [34] The Europeans, however, became increasingly disappointed with the fact that the US and Japanese firms were given the thickest slices of the contracts pie while they were stuck with leftovers. [35] In the mid-1990s, following the sale of Mirage

fighters, China's economic retribution and the growing dearth of Taiwanese big contracts, Paris re-established trusting relations with China. French reorientation towards Beijing was indicative of the West European renewed focus on China, then the world's most dynamically developing economy.

The gains of the early 1990s, however, were not lost. In 1995, Italy signed a direct flight accord with Taiwan and in 1996 its office in Taipei began issuing visas. In 1996, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel declared no objections to ministerial-level visits to Taiwan, as long as such dealt with functional matters. [36] Political dialogue between Western Europe and Taiwan continued either through special envoys or regular consultations between the foreign ministries. [37] The US$10 billion high speed train project, unveiled in the late 1990s, stimulated a renewed round of ministerial-level visits from Germany and France, whose companies competed for the contract. In 2000, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs installed the German Institute Taipei, headed by the diplomatic staff “on duty.” [38]

The Taiwanese ministers continued their visits to Western Europe. Most of these visits, however, were functional in nature, designed to strengthen Taiwan's relations with various West European states in particular areas of economic or cultural cooperation. Visits by Premier Lien Chan to Austria (June 1995), Ireland (January 1997), and Iceland (October 1997) were of greater political symbolism, although some host governments did their best to downplay their significance. Chen Shui-bian wife, Wu Shu-jen's visits to France (November 2001) and Germany (July 2003) furthered Taiwan's political dialogue with Western Europe. Only ex-President Lee Teng-hui's private visit to Britain in June 2000 proved inconsequential, although London's courage to issue a visa to Lee was significant in itself. [39] ROC foreign ministers made occasional trips to Western Europe, but no information is available on their agendas.

Taipei also continued lobbying efforts in Western Europe via party diplomacy and the inter-parliamentary exchanges. Western Europe's centre-right parties (such as Britain's Conservative Party and the German Christian Democratic Union) enjoyed good relations with the KMT and traditionally supported Taiwan (esp. after the collapse of the “old

enemy," the Soviet Union), while European liberal parties established close relations with Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party. [40] The social democratic movement in Europe, traditionally ignoring Taiwan's existence and its economic success, discovered Taiwan in the late 1980s and appreciated its democratic achievements. [41] French socialists traditionally favoured Taiwan, while the Gaullists supported China.

Taipei's lobbying in European parliaments was particularly successful, where large, pro-Taiwan groups were formed. By 2002, 14 West European parliaments established "Taiwan friendship groups." The efforts of pro-Taiwanese parliamentarians bore fruit in the form of numerous resolutions supporting various Taiwanese initiatives to enter international organizations. Thus, for example, the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Belgian Chamber of Representatives passed resolutions in support of Taiwan's membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) as an observer in May and July 2002 respectively. [42] In February 2003, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives passed a resolution requesting the Belgian government to urge the European Union (EU) to seek feasible ways of allowing Taiwan to participate in the Europe-Asia Meeting (ASEM). [43] In late 2004, the German parliament passed a resolution requesting that the arms embargo against China be maintained. [44] Yet, none of these resolutions were binding. When in February 2003, the Belgian Parliament called for EU member states to grant visas to Taiwan's high-ranking officials, the Belgian government refused President Chen's visa application in late March 2003, even though Chen Shui-bian was invited by the European Parliament (EP). [45]

BUILDING BRIDGES TO POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

In East Central Europe, substantive relations with Taiwan were to be created, rather than strengthened. Repeated promises of economic assistance and prospects of investment flows from and advantageous trade with Taiwan proved sufficient to convince Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia to sign agreements on the exchange of representative offices with Taiwan. Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw opened their bureaus in Taipei. Although ostensibly

non-political in nature, they performed consular functions and were staffed by career diplomats.

Of all post-communist states, the Czech Republic spearheaded the most daring policy on Taiwan. Czech President Vaclav Havel, guided by his anti-communist convictions and his belief in Taiwan's just request for re-entry into the United Nations, engineered a creative strategy that opened channels for high-level official communication with Taipei. In 1990, Prague initiated the “first ladies' diplomacy” (*furen waijiao*), when Havel's wife, Olga, visited Taipei, ignoring Beijing's protests. Havel's second wife, Dagmar, followed in 1998 and President Lee's wife, Tseng Wen-fui, and Chen Shui-bian's wife, Wu Shu-chen reciprocated in 1999 and 2001 respectively. When Taipei launched a campaign in 1993 to return to the UN, the Czechs (soon joined by the Latvians) expressed their support. In 1995, Prague arranged a high-profile visit by Vice-President Lien Chan, a few days after President Lee's highly controversial visit to the United States. [46] Taiwanese ministers of foreign affairs, economic affairs and even defence followed Lien Chan. The Czech Republic was the second European state (after Britain) to welcome former ROC President Lee Teng-hui in 2000.

Taipei appeared ready to reward Prague for its courage to support Taiwan internationally. In 1993, the Czech heavy-industry conglomerate, Skoda received two sizeable contracts for public works in Taiwan, which coincided with the opening of the Czech office in Taipei. [47] After Lien's visit, the Taiwanese promised Prague US$100 million in investments. Some Taiwanese investments indeed did arrive, but not on the scale promised. The Czech businesses began vocally complaining about President Havel's Taiwan policy destroying their chances of clinching business deal in China's rapidly growing economy, while the Taiwanese investments were very slow in coming. The critics were proven wrong when in the late 1990s–early 2000s, large high-tech Taiwanese companies invested in the Czech Republic close to US$800 million, making Taiwan one of the largest foreign investors in the country. [48] Their Czech investments, however, had more to do with the Czech Republic's entry into the EU's common market and the Czech government's investment incentives, than with Havel's support for Taiwan's sovereignty.

The prospects of the Czechs gaining a bulk of Taiwan's economic assistance in the post-communist region reminded other newly democratized states of Taipei's economic potential. The Taiwanese promise of an industrial zone in central Poland, meant to employ over 20,000 Poles, facilitated Warsaw's welcome to ROC defence minister in 1995. [49] In 1998, ROC Foreign Minister Jason Hu's participation in the academic conference in Warsaw as the “ROC Foreign Minister” coincided with an announcement of a US$20 million soft loan for Polish small and medium size enterprises and the news of the US$500 million investment by Taiwanese company Acelon Fibres Corporation (Ju Long). [50] Other post-communist states also re-joined the Taiwan bandwagon. Belarus reached an agreement with Taipei on the opening of Taiwanese representative offices in Minsk in 1996 (in exchange for around US$40 million in soft loans). Kiev, for its part, invited Lien Chan in August 1996 for a “scholastic” visit in exchange for unspecified rewards.

By the late 1990s, Taipei's relations with post-communist East Central Europe resembled Taiwan's ties with Western Europe: major post-communist nations exchanged offices with Taiwan, engaged in economic, cultural and academic cooperation, pursued parliamentary exchanges, signed sister-city partnerships and other agreements with Taiwan. However, they also demonstrated that the “one China” principle was flexible enough to accommodate support for Taiwan on the international arena, which included visits by Taiwanese high-ranking officials, such as Vice-President and ministers of foreign affairs and defence and endorsement of Taiwan's UN bid. In the process of this communication, Taiwan gained wider public's support, ranging from friendly city councillors to academics and journalists who disseminated knowledge about Taiwan as a distinct political, social and economic entity. Added to these, were visits to Taiwan by renowned personalities, such as Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel, who—once retired from the office—fulfilled their earlier promises of visiting the island.

RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

Taipei sought diplomatic relations with the European Community (EC) as early as 1961, but the French and Dutch opposition made its efforts fruitless. The first agreement the ROC managed to sign with the Community was a textile agreement in October 1970, but it expired three years later. [51] Once the PRC established diplomatic ties with the EC in September 1975, Taiwan was cut off from the EC both formally and informally. In the absence of working relations, the ROC did not benefit from the EC's developmental assistance programmes, while its exports were excluded from any special treatment in the framework of the Generalised System of Preferences.

Following revitalized economic cooperation between Taiwan and major West European states in the 1970s, the EC initiated in December 1981 informal talks with Taiwan on economic issues of relatively minor importance, while leaving big problems, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, unresolved. Discussions on more crucial commercial issues followed only in the 1990s. [52] The visits by the European government officials to Taipei in the early 1990s paved the way for the first ever visit by an EC official to Taiwan, Vice President of the European Commission Martin Bangemann in May 1992. In the short term, his visit, however, led neither to institutionalized relations nor any structured dialogue on economic cooperation between the EC and the ROC. [53]

The EC/EU began playing a greater role in Europe's relations with Taiwan, when Taipei applied for the accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Noting Taiwan's persistent trade surplus with the Union, as well as the US and Japan's preferential access to the Taiwanese market, the member states provided Brussels with a mandate to support Taiwanese membership and coordinate the EU's position with the US, when negotiating with China on Taiwan's accession. The negotiations provided the context for direct consultations between the EU's high-ranking officials and their Taiwanese counterparts. Parallel to these negotiations, since 1996, the Commission also began developing a multilateral framework for economic cooperation with Taiwan via the EU–Taiwan industrial roundtables, grouping industrialists, EU and Taiwan's government officials and the Commission's representatives. [54] The EU–

Taiwan agreement on the WTO accession, signed by the Vice President of the European Commission, Leon Brittan, and Taiwanese Minister for Economic Affairs, Wang Chih-kang, in July 1998 was the first significant, official agreement inked by the EU and Taiwan. [55] With Taiwan's entry into the WTO in January 2002, the Commission could argue for the establishment of the EU office in Taiwan. Claiming that such an office was instrumental to monitoring Taipei's compliance with the WTO rules and Taiwan–EU agreements, it disregarded China's opposition and opened the European Economic and Trade Office in Taipei in March 2003. [56] While still formally non-official, the EU's dialogue with Taiwan currently features annual consultations at the vice ministerial level (alternating between Taipei and Brussels) and exchange of visits at the directorial or ministerial level. [57] The Taiwanese long-term goal of formalizing relations with the EU though bilateral offices and structured (albeit unofficial) communication has been accomplished.

While the EC and its later reincarnation, the EU—eyeing China's vast market and lacking a mandate from the member states to formulate any pro-active policy on Taiwan—shunned Taipei until the 1990s, the European Parliament demonstrated a remarkable activism in support of Europe's stronger ties with the island. As a result, Taipei cultivated friendship with the EP, believing that given its moral and political influence as the only EU institution directly elected by the Europeans, the EP's position on Taiwan "could encourage the EU to take a more affirmative position." [58] Indeed the EP did not disappoint, supporting the island at the crucial junctures of Taiwan's troubled relationship with China and emerging dialogue with the EU. Its explicit support began in 1985, when the EP adopted a "Resolution on Trade with Taiwan," calling for stronger relations with Taiwan. [59] Thereafter, the Association of Friends of Taiwan, formed in the European Parliament in 1991, sponsored numerous pro-Taiwan resolutions. These could be broadly divided into three areas. [60] First, the EP supported Taiwan's membership in international organizations, including the WTO, ASEM and WHO. On one occasion (resolution passed on 18 July 1996), prompted by China's military intimidation of Taiwan in the spring of 1996, the EP also voiced support for Taiwan's membership in the UN. The second category concerned Taiwan's relations with the Union. The Parliament repeatedly urged the European Council to strengthen political relations with the

ROC and demanded that the Commission opened an EU office in Taipei. The EP also promoted relations with Taiwan via parliamentary exchanges and extended invitations to the Taiwanese officials (e.g., Foreign Minister John Chang, who addressed the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy in 1997). The third area of the EP's concern focused on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. This concern was particularly manifested when China staged missile testing in the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996. The European Parliament issued three resolutions in 1996, all calling on the PRC not to carry out any aggressive acts against Taiwan. [61] Thereafter, virtually every resolution regarding relations with China contained a clause stating the EP's demand that China's reunification be accomplished peacefully. The European Parliament also opposed the lifting of the ban on arms sales to China, passing five resolutions on the issue in 2003–2005.

Unfortunately for Taiwan, the European Parliament's powers with regard to the European Union's external policies are limited to approving international treaties and budgetary matters. In the area of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EP plays mostly a consultative role. Its resolutions must be accepted by the European Council, the EU's decision making body, in a “co-decision” framework, before they are passed to the European Commission, the EU's executive body, which considers turning them into policy. Given the “one China” policy, officially endorsed by the EU, the Council routinely ignored the EP's resolutions on Taiwan, believing that the Taiwan problem should be solved by both parties involved. [62] Thus, for example, although the EP's voice on the arms embargo helped the opponents argue against lifting the ban, the EU's decision in April 2005 to postpone the decision on the embargo resulted from the fear of the US retribution, rather than from the EP's resolutions, or any wider concern for the stability in cross-Strait relations. [63]

While unable to gain the European Council and Commission's support on most issues raised in the EP's resolutions, Taipei gladly notes the Council and Commission's endorsement of the EP's view on the importance of China's peaceful reunification. Witnessing China's rapid military modernization and its increasingly bellicose stand on reunification with Taiwan (most recently manifested in the Anti-Secession Law in March

2005), the Commission gradually moved from merely welcoming “any steps which can be taken to further the process of peaceful reconciliation” between Beijing and Taipei [64] and “making clear the EU's strong interest in seeing the Taiwan issue resolved peacefully through dialogue” [65] to articulating more forcefully its “active interest” in the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In its most recent policy paper on relations with China, issued in October 2006 (and to be yet endorsed by the Council), the European Commission strongly objected to the use of force and any measures amounting to a unilateral change of the status quo (left undefined) in the Taiwan Strait. It voiced support for pragmatic solutions and confidence building measures between both sides of divided China and explicitly reserved its right to continuing strong economic and trade relations with Taiwan (a point missing in previous policy papers). [66] Given the confines of the “one China” policy, the shift of emphasis from “peaceful solution” to “active interest in peace” is the most explicit expression of the EU's support for Taiwanese people's freedom to define their future.

SECURING ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Since the 1970s, Europe has played an important role in diversifying Taiwan's export and import markets. Taiwan also hoped for European investments in its manufacturing industries and considered the viability of diversifying its investment portfolio to Europe. To accomplish these economic objectives, Taipei launched a campaign to turn Europe into one of its major trading partners. Resulting from the policy of trade diversification and Taiwanese need for European capital-intensive goods, Taiwan's trade with both Western and East Central Europe tripled between 1976 and 1980, quadrupled between 1980 and 1990 and then doubled in the 1990s (see Table 1). Since the mid-1970s, Taipei maintained trade surplus with Europe as a whole and the EC/EU in particular. Its trade surplus with the EU doubled in the 1990s, reaching US$11.8 billion in 2000 (see Table 2). In Europe, by the mid-2000s, only Germany, France, Sweden and Austria, as well as natural resources-rich Russia and Ukraine, managed to maintain trade surplus with Taiwan. Taiwan did little to balance trade with Europe, although it had been known to interfere occasionally to “correct market irregularities” (as it

did in 1998 with regards to Hungary, possibly as a reward for Budapest's decision to open its office in Taipei). When it came to politically motivated imports, Taipei favoured the US or Japanese firms, despite the European threats that geostrategic considerations in Taiwan's commercial decisions could damage relations with Europe. [67]

The EU is Taiwan's major trading partner in Europe, buying more than 90 percent of Taiwan's European exports and supplying the lion's share of Taiwan's imports from Europe. Taiwan's earlier exports to Europe consisted mainly of textile products, garments and shoes. By the late 1990s, technology-intensive products replaced light industrial products. Taiwan's imports from the EU included military equipment and raw materials, factory machinery and steel. [68] Despite the rise in trade volume, Europe remained Taiwan's fourth largest trading partner (after China, the US and Japan). The EU's share in Taiwan's total trade in goods peaked in 1998 (16.9 percent) and began declining thereafter, hitting 12 percent and 10.6 percent in 2003 and 2005, respectively, the figures last recorded in the late 1960s–early 1970s. If Europe is taken as a whole (including the post-Soviet states), its share in Taiwan's total foreign trade increased from 6 percent in 1952 to over 18 percent in 1998. It declined to 12.1 percent by 2005 (see Table 1), which reflects Taiwan's progressing trade reorientation towards Asia (particularly China). Contrary to some predictions, [69] Taiwan's entry into the WTO, with the resulting greater market access for European manufacturers of cars, agricultural produce, tobacco and liquor, exerted limited impact on the scale of Taiwan's trade in goods with Europe in general and the EU in particular. However, it did help boost trade with the EU in some products (e.g., liquor) and in services. The latter grew faster than trade in goods, increasing its share in the bilateral trade flows from 10 percent of the trade in goods in 2001 to 14 percent in 2004 (and generating e1 billion in a surplus for the EU). [70]

Taiwan benefited from economic cooperation with Europe in terms of attracting European investments. Although the EU's investments in Taiwan were small as a percentage of the EU's total outward investments (accounting for 0.35 percent of all of the EU's foreign direct investments

in 2002), by 2005, they stood at a respectable figure of US$13.69 billion (with the Netherlands being by far the largest investor), accounting for 19.18 percent of all foreign investments in Taiwan (see Table 3). [71] The EU was the third largest investor in Taiwan, after the US and Japan. The European Chamber of Commerce in Taipei (comprised of 350 corporate members) argued that the ROC government's enforcement of intellectual property rights, revision of “outdated” industrial regulations, opening of direct economic links with China and allowing European firms to bid on more government contracts would attract more European investors to Taiwan. [72]

For Europe, trade with Taiwan was neither as profitable nor important as it was for Taiwan. In 1975, Taiwan accounted for 0.3 percent of extra-EU15 exports and 0.5 percent of extra-EU15 imports. [73] With the expansion of bilateral trade in the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan's share in extra EU trade increased, but never exceeded 2.1 percent and dropped to 1.6 percent by 2003, below the level registered 13 years earlier (see Table 2). [74] By 2005, Taiwan was the EU's 14th largest trading partner (down from 9th position in the early 2000s), 9th largest exporter (down from 7th in the late 1990s), 23rd largest importer (down from 19th position in 2004) and 5th trading partner in Asia (after China, Japan and South Korea and India; down from 4th in 2003 and 3rd in the late 1990s).

Various European states and regions sought Taiwanese investments. The ROC investors, however, concerned about Europe's labour regulations and costs, as well as cultural differences, opted to invest in China and Southeast Asia instead. They also ignored the ROC government-sponsored projects, such as Taiwanese industrial zones in the Czech Republic, Poland and Macedonia. By 2005, Taiwanese overall investments in Europe amounted to US$1.4 billion or over e2 billion (depending on the source of statistics), less than 1 percent or 1.5 percent of its overall outwards foreign direct investment and approximately 0.2 percent of the total stock of FDI in the EU. [75] Until the late 1990s, up to 80 percent of Taiwan investments in Europe involving manufacturing projects were located mostly in the United Kingdom (UK), where

investment approval process was fast and labour laws most flexible in Europe. [76] In the late 1990s, the Czech Republic surpassed the UK as Taiwan's favourite investment destination in Europe, accounting for 41 percent of the ROC's cumulative investments in Europe by the end of 2004, against 22 percent for the UK (see Figure 1). [77] The flow of investments to the Czech Republic (and, to a lesser extent, Hungary and Poland) results from the former communist states' success in creating investment-friendly regulations, their lower labour costs, attractive investment incentives and their EU membership.

BEIJING'S VIGILANCE

By 2000, China's trade with the EU had increased five-fold when compared to 1990. Two years later, China became the EU's second largest trading partner (see Table 4), while in 2004 the EU was China's largest trading partner. At the time, European investments in China reached US$35 billion. Economic considerations, coupled with China's growing international influence, convinced most European states, as well as the EU, to the desirability of toeing to the “one China” policy. Beijing, however, did not trust the Europeans' self-policing on the Taiwan question and monitored Taiwan's activities on the Old Continent, intervening when necessary.

Although China accepted Europe's substantive ties with Taiwan, featuring pseudo-consulates, direct flights and ministerial-level meetings, it remained intolerant of Europe's explicit or implicit support for Taiwanese claims to sovereignty, including diplomatic or consular agreements, arms sales to Taiwan, and visits by the ROC president, vice-president, premier, foreign and defence ministers. In each case, Chinese response involved diplomatic protests, often followed by economic and political sanctions. Thus, for example, following the Dutch sale of two submarines to Taiwan in the early 1980s China downgraded diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, boycotted Rotterdam port and did not

grant visas to Dutch nationals. Following French arms sales to Taiwan in 1992, China's retribution included the exclusion of the French companies from various business deals, closure of the French consulate in Guangzhou, and cancellation of signed contracts. [78] When Prague welcomed Lien Chan, Beijing cut short the visit by the PRC State Education Commission and delayed a planned agreement on academic cooperation. [79] Possibly owing to the low publicity accorded to Lien Chan's visit by his hosts, Kiev escaped with a lighter punishment a year later as Beijing merely postponed the visit by a Chinese government delegation. [80]

When Latvia and Macedonia mounted the most direct challenge to the “one China” principle, Beijing resorted to political retributions and preferential policies towards states neighbouring Latvia and Macedonia, rather than economic sanctions. The steps taken against Latvia included cancellation of the dispatch of the PRC ambassador and the diplomatic isolation of Riga in the context of Beijing's dialogue with other Baltic states. [81] Beijing also proffered a small incentive in the form of expansion of Sino–Latvian trade, which until 1995 consistently surpassed the PRC's trade with the remaining Baltic states. In the Macedonian case, Beijing cut off diplomatic ties, halted the implementation of all agreements and vetoed the extension of stay for the UN peacekeeping troops in Macedonia. [82] Yet, it neither suspended soft loans granted before 1999 nor trading with Skopje. At the same time, Beijing intensified relations with other Balkan states through the exchange of high-level visits and economic assistance.

China's political and economic sanctions served two purposes. First, they were intended to force the reversal of the offending policy. Riga and Skopje returned to the China camp in 1994 and 2001 respectively. The Dutch promise in 1983 not to authorise any new arms deals with Taiwan paved the way for the restoration of full diplomatic ties with China in 1984. [83] In a Sino–French Joint Statement, signed in 1994, the French pledged not to approve any arms sales to Taiwan (as well as, for the first time, recognized Taiwan as the part of the PRC). [84] The second purpose of Beijing's sanctions was to deter other European states from copying the undesirable behaviour. Most European states learned from the Dutch and French lessons and abstained from arms deals with Taiwan. [85]

Learning from the Czech experience, the Spanish government cancelled Lien Chan's visit at the last minute in 1997, while in the early 2000s, the Swedish, French and Belgian governments refused to grant visa to President Chen Shui-bian. To strengthen the deterrent effect of its actions, Beijing resorted to the policy of playing one European state against another, by bestowing favours on those states that adhered to the "one China" policy's letter and spirit. The Germans, not the French, for example, got the contract for metro construction in Guangzhou in the early 1990s.

China, however, appeared powerless when facing Europe's multinational policies on Taiwan. This was apparent when the European Parliament called for Taiwan's accession to various international organizations and stronger political ties between the EU and Taiwan. The EP's calls were met only with China's diplomatic protests, but never with sanctions. Following the Dutch decision against a new arms deal with Taiwan in 1991, the Dutch parliament proposed that the Netherlands should initiate a joint European policy on Taiwan in order to make China unable to play one European state against the other. A similar idea surfaced in Germany two years later, when the German Federal Security Council recognized that successful arms sales to Taiwan could be carried out only on a pan-European scale and the EU needed a European arms agency. [86] In July 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was indeed created by the European Council. However, given the EDA's focus on strengthening Europe's defence capabilities and establishment of the European Defence Equipment Market, [87] rather than creating a pan-European arms exporting agency, it is unlikely to play any role in the EU's policy on arms exports to Taiwan.

Beijing seems to be aware of the danger of the EU developing a more pro-active policy on Taiwan either in response to the EP's resolutions or in competition with the US. This is why the first *China's EU Policy Paper*, issued in October 2003, reminded the EU that the "one China" principle was an important "cornerstone" underpinning bilateral relations. The Paper demanded the EU to prohibit visits by the Taiwanese officials and all kinds of political cooperation; not to support Taiwan's accession or participation in any international organizations and not to sell to Taiwan any military equipment. According to *China's EU*

Policy Paper, only the exchanges of high-level visits and political dialogue with the EU were more important than the EU's strict adherence to the “one China” principle in the context of China–EU relations. [88]

CONCLUSION

Until the 1980s, East Central Europe and the European Community entertained no contacts with Taiwan, while the majority of West European states restricted their interaction with the island to purely commercial and cultural cooperation. With the launch of “flexible diplomacy,” reinforced by Taipei's economic sweeteners, Taiwan not only upgraded its relations with Western Europe to semi-official level, featuring representative offices (headed by career diplomats and functioning as de facto consulates), direct air links, arms deals, visits at the ministerial or even vice-presidential level, periodical consultative meetings and active cultural cooperation, but also succeeded in establishing substantive relations with the majority of post-communist states and institutionalizing cooperation with the EU. Most importantly, it scored two crucial victories when it signed consular and diplomatic agreements with Latvia and Macedonia respectively. Taipei also succeeded in maintaining a diplomatic partnership with the Vatican and securing European support for its bid to enter the WTO.

It could be argued that Taiwan's most significant achievements in Europe, namely, arms deals, consular or diplomatic accords or support for the UN membership, were either sporadic or short-lived and that the Vatican remained in the pool of the ROC's allies because it failed to find a compromise with China on issues unrelated to Taiwan. Even so, to describe Taipei's diplomacy towards Europe as a failure because it did not live up to the highest expectations is unnecessarily critical. The very fact that the arms deals went ahead, while Riga and Skopje acceded to the consular or diplomatic agreements, were laudable achievements, given the dire economic and political consequences for those states' relations with China. Despite Taipei's limited economic resources and the domestic debates regarding the necessity to fund friendships with the foreign states, as well as Europe's emphasis on cultivating relations with China, Taiwan's interaction with most European states was surprisingly

intense and eventful. Far from being marginalized by the emerging strategic partnership between Europe and China, Taiwan successfully carved its place in Europe's trade and foreign relations. In the process, pro-Taiwan lobbies emerged in the pan-European and national parliaments, while the political parties, media and academia championed Taiwan's closer relations with Europe in the name of shared beliefs in democracy and freedom, rather than merely financial profitability of economic cooperation.

It cannot be denied that European interests in developing closer links with Taiwan were motivated by economic considerations. But it also cannot be denied that Europe—disunited on foreign policy issues and lacking capacity to project credible power beyond its immediate geographical neighbourhood—was poorly equipped to develop a strategy reaffirming explicitly Taiwan's right to the de facto sovereignty. Taiwan's internal disagreements regarding the desirability of the de jure independence also conditioned Europe's non-involvement in the intra-Chinese dispute and its continued loyalty to the “one China” principle. To some extent, the Europeans—championing democracy and human rights world-wide—felt relieved of the duty to defend democratic Taiwan against communist China's bellicose designs as the United States continued its mission to protect Taiwan, albeit no longer as unambiguously as it did until 1980. However, Europe's increasing economic engagement on both sides of the Taiwan Strait enhances its active interest in peace and stability in the region. Moreover, the Europeans, through their elected representatives, became increasingly more appreciative of the achievements of the Taiwanese democracy and explicitly unsupportive of China's plans to subjugate the island militarily. Thus, the emphasis on the functional relationship and the official commitment to the “one China” policy notwithstanding, Europe—regardless of whether it develops a pro-active common foreign policy on the Taiwan issue—is more likely than not to stand by Taiwan if and when Beijing decides to complete national reunification against the wishes of the Taiwanese people.

Notes

1. Reinhard Drifte, “European and Soviet Perspectives on Future Responses in Taiwan to International and Regional Developments,” *Asian Survey*, 25/11 (November 1985), p. 1115.

2. Kay Moeller, “A New Role for the ROC on Taiwan in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Issues and Studies*, 32/2 (February 1995), pp. 76–77.

3. Kay Moeller, “Germany and China: A Continental Temptation,” *The China Quarterly*, 147 (September 1996), p. 722.

4. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “France's Taiwan Policy: A Case of Shopkeeper Diplomacy,” *East-West Dialogue*, 6–7/1–2, (June 2002), pp. 264–291; Francoise Mengin, “A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties,” *The China Quarterly,* 169 (March 2002), p. 136.

5. For analytical purposes, Europe in this article is divided into two geographical areas: Western Europe and East Central Europe. The former refers to all states west and north of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia. The latter refers to the former Soviet allies in Europe and post-Soviet Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine.

6. Chueiling Shin, “Development of ROC-France Relations: The Case of an Isolated State and Its Economic Diplomacy,” *Issues and Studies*, .37/1, (January/February 2001), pp. 126–128; Stephen Erasmus, “General de Gaulle's Recognition of Peking,” *The China Quarterly*, 18, (April–June 1964), pp. 196–197.

7. All East Central European and most West European states supported China's entry into the UN. John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 258. Only Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal stood by Taipei.

8. Byron S. J. Weng, “Taiwan's International Status Today,” *The China Quarterly*, 99, (September 1984), p. 465; Michael Yahuda, “The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan,” *The China Quarterly*, 148 (December 1996), pp. 1329–1330; Samuel S. Kim, “Taiwan and the International System: The Challenge of Legitimation”

in Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson (eds.), *Taiwan in World Affairs* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 150.

9. Gao Lang, *Zhonghua Mingguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian, 1972–1992* (An Evolution of Foreign Relations of the Republic of China) (Taibei: Wunan Tushu, 1994), p. 20; Chiao Chiao Hsieh, *Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949–79* (London: The Sherwood Press, 1985), p. 262; Czeslaw Tubilewicz, "Taiwan and the Soviet Bloc, 1949–1991," *Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, No. 4, 2005, pp. 43–46.

10. *Republic of China Yearbook 1989* (Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing Co., 1989), p. 239; Tubilewicz, "Taiwan and the Soviet Bloc, 1949–1991," pp. 50–52.

11. According to Mengin, France was the first European state to issue visas in Taipei in 1985. Francoise Mengin, "Taiwan's Non-Official Diplomacy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 8/1 (March 1997), p. 234.

12. Cheng-Wen Tsai and Chu-Cheng Ming, "The Republic of China and Western Europe: Past and Future" [in] Yu San Wang (ed.), *Foreign Policy of the Republic of China: An Unorthodox Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 133–134.

13. Linjun Wu, "Does Money Talk?: The ROC Economic Diplomacy," *Issues and Studies*, 31/12 (December 1995), p. 31.

14. Chiao Chiao Hsieh, "Pragmatic Diplomacy: Foreign Policy and External Relations" in Peter Ferdinand (ed.), *Take-off for Taiwan* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 76.

15. Shu-yin Ho, "Walking the Tightrope: The ROC's Democratisation, Diplomacy, and Mainland Policy," *Issues and Studies*, 28/3 (March 1992), p. 10; Chi Su, "International Relations of the Republic of China During the 1990s," *Issues and Studies*, 29/9 (September 1993), pp. 10–12.

16. Hsieh, "Pragmatic Diplomacy," p. 71.

17. “A Pragmatic Vision. Interview with Fredrick F. Chien, minister of Foreign Affairs, by Yvonne Yuan,” *Free China Review*, 43/No, (February 1993), p. 18; Bernard T. K. Joei, “Pragmatic Diplomacy in the Republic of China: History and Prospects” in Jason C. Hu (ed.), *Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan, Republic of China* (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1994), p. 313.

18. Interview with the then Vice Minister of Economic Affairs, Chiang Pin-kung, *Zhongguo shibao*, 7 June 1991.

19. The media speculated that Taipei extended a soft loan of US$100 million to Budapest, followed by the order of Hungarian-made buses, valued at US$43 million. While the bus deal indeed took place, the Hungarians deny getting any loans from Taiwan.

20. *Renmin ribao*, 12, 13, and 15 September 1991; *Renmin ribao*, 5 January 1992; *Zili zaobao*, 27 October 1992.

21. Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “The Baltic States in Taiwan's Post-Cold War ‘Flexible Diplomacy,’” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54/5, July 2002, pp. 795–799.

22. Latvian Premier Ivars Godmanis was the first in September 1992.

23. Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Taiwan's ‘Macedonian Project,’ 1999–2001,” *The China Quarterly*, 179 (September 2004), pp. 796–801.

24. Richard Madsen, “Catholic Revival during the Reform Era,” *The China Quarterly*, 74, June 2003, p. 469.

25. Beatrice Leung, “Sino-Vatican Relations at the Century's turn,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14 (May 2005), pp. 355–357.

26. In October 2004, for example, Taipei donated US$100,000 to the Holy See in response to a call by the pope to assist poor people in Asia.

27. *Agency France-Presse*, 5 April 2005.

28. *Central News Agency*, 11 April 2005.

29. France was also the first to appoint an active career diplomat to head its office in Taipei in 1993.

30. Mengin, “A Functional Relationship,” p. 148.

31. Linjun Wu, “Does Money Talk?,” pp. 32–33; Hsieh, “Pragmatic Diplomacy,” p. 89; Joei, “Pragmatic Diplomacy in the Republic of China,” p. 319; Mengin, “Taiwan's Non-Official Diplomacy,” pp. 236–237.

32. Hsieh, “Pragmatic Diplomacy,” p. 89; Shin, “Development of ROC-France Relations,” p. 139.

33. For example, Association to Promote Commercial and Tourist Exchanges with Taiwan was renamed to Taipei Representative Office in France; the Free China Information Office in Denmark was renamed to Taipei Economic and Cultural Office and The Taipei Representative Office in 1995. Taipei renamed its offices in Germany to Taipei Representation in Germany in 1996 without prior consultations with the German government. Gunter Schubert, “German-Taiwanese Relations since 1949: A Critical Assessment,” *East-West Dialogue*, 6–7/1–2, (June 2002), p. 299.

34. Hsieh, “Pragmatic Diplomacy,” p. 90; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (5 November 1992). The corruption scandals that engulfed the French arms sales to Taiwan are briefly discussed in Cabestan, “France's Taiwan Policy,” pp. 271–272.

35. In 1997, for example, the French lost to the Americans in the bidding for nuclear power station project. In 2000, Franco-British and German companies were outbid by the Japanese for the construction of high-speed railway.

36. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, “The Relations of the ROC with the European Union,” Nath (ed.), *The Republic of China on Taiwan in International Politics* (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1998), pp. 94–95.

37. Cabestan, “France's Taiwan Policy,” p. 280.

38. Mengin, “A Functional Relationship,” p. 145; Schubert, “German-Taiwanese Relations since 1949,” pp. 303–304.

39. According to the UK Foreign Office, Lee's visit was a “private visit by a private citizen,” who attended his grand-daughter's graduation. *BBC News Online*, 27 June 2000. Lee met no governmental officials when visiting the UK.

40. In 2001, the London-based Liberal International, grouping over 80 liberal parties from around the world, bestowed on President Chen Shui-bian the “2001 Prize for Freedom.”

41. Barbara Krug, “German-Taiwanese Relations: A Reappraisal” in Maysing H. Yang (ed.), *Taiwan's Expanding Role in International Arena* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 71.

42. *Central News Agency*, 24 July 2002 and 25 November 2002. Taiwan attempted to enter the WHO since 1997. In May 2004, the Italian Assembly of Deputies again passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority supporting Taiwan's bid to become an observer of the WHO.

43. Taiwan applied for membership into the ASEM in 1998, two years after ASEM's formation.

44. *Central News Agency*, 21 November 2004.

45. *European Report*, 19 March 2003.

46. *Zhongguo shibao*, 19 June 1995.

47. *Gongshang shibao*, 19 June 1995.

48. Interview with Jaromir Cernik, Director of Southeast Asia Operations, Czech Investment and Business Development Agency, Hong Kong, 11 August 2006.

49. The ROC Defence Minister's visits to Poland and the Czech Republic, however, did not lead to any arms deals.

50. *Zhongguo shibao*, 28 June 1998; *Zhongyang ribao*, 27 June 1998; *Zhongguo shibao*, 29 June 1998. The Asian Financial Crisis, however, cancelled Acelon's investments in Poland.

51. Mengin, “A Functional Relationship,” p. 139.

52. Christopher M. Dent and Debra Johnson, “Taiwan-EU Economic Relations: A European Perspective,” *EurAmerica*, 30/1 (March 2000), p. 120.

53. Hsieh, “Pragmatic Diplomacy,” pp. 90–91. In its aftermath, however, Taipei for the first time was allowed to host informal talks with the EU (October 1992). Parallel to the EU–Taiwan informal talks, the European Chamber of Commerce Taipei, founded in 1988, promoted European business interest in Taiwan. Since 1995, it made annual “Open Door Missions” to Brussels where it held discussions with EU commissioners and parliamentarians. Taipei, for its part, coordinated relations with the EU via its representative office in Belgium.

54. Wang Wan-li, “Improved Taiwan-EU Relations will Bring Great Mutual Benefits,” *Taipei Journal*, 2 November 2001.

55. Wang Wanli, “Taiwan Accession to GATT/WTO: A Case Study in Recent Taiwan-EU Relations,” *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*, 4/2 (1999), p. 109. A formal EU–Taiwan WTO agreement was signed in January 1999.

56. The opening of the EU's office in Taipei coincided with the opening of the EU's delegations in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in April and June 2003, respectively, and as such, was a part of an expansion of the network of EU's delegations throughout Asia. Taiwan by and large complies with the WTO agreements. For details on Taiwanese compliance, see The European Chamber of Commerce Taipei, *2006–2007 Position Papers* (Taipei: The European Chamber of Commerce Taipei, 2006).

57. Interview with Frederic Laplanche, Deputy Head of the European Economic and Trade Office, Taipei, 17 November 2006.

58. Wang, “Taiwan Accession to GATT/WTO,” p. 104.

59. Tsai and Ming, “The Republic of China and Western Europe,” pp. 135–136.

60. Yuchun Lan classified the EP's resolutions on Taiwan as resolutions under consultation procedure, resolutions in response to the annual report of the Commission or the Presidency report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and resolutions on members of parliament's own initiative on a topical and urgent subject. Yuchun Lan, “The European Parliament and the China-Taiwan Issue: An Empirical Approach,” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9 (2004), p. 117.

61. Kindermann, “The Relations of the ROC with the European Union,” pp. 96–100.

62. This position was clearly articulated by External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, who stated that “the issue of Taiwan's relations with China can only be resolved by the two sides. Economic integration should help to bring them closer, provided that it is seen as an opportunity, not a threat.” *European Voice*, 23 January 2003.

63. Lora Saalman and Jing-dong Yuan, “The European Union and the Arms Ban on China,” *Centre for Nonproliferation Studies*, July 2004, accessed 26 April 2005 from www.nti.org. Officially, the EU conditions the lifting of its arms embargo on China upon China's human rights situation, cross-Strait relations and Beijing's transparency of its military expenditure. *EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities*, 24 October 2006, p. 11. Accessed 14 November 2006 from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/docs/06-10-24_final_com.pdf.

64. *Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China*, 25 March 1998, accessed 22 November 2006 from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/com_98/index.htm.

65. *EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a More Effective EU Policy*, 15

May 2003, accessed 22 November 2006 from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/com01_265.pdf.

66. *EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities*, p. 11.

67. In 2002, for example, state-owned China Airlines chose the Boeing's offer for the purchase of 16 aircrafts, valued at US$1.5 billion, despite the fact that Airbus offered more attractive financial terms. A year later, the European Commission warned that China Airlines' purchase of new engines from General Electric, rather than Rolls-Royce, could damage Taiwan–EU relations. The China Airlines did buy 7 airbuses in 1999.

68. Wu Rong-I, "Taiwan-European Relations after WTO Accession," accessed 20 May 2005 from www.gio.gove.tw.

69. Wang, "Taiwan Accession to GATT/WTO," p. 114.

70. *EU-Taiwan: Trade and Investment Factfile 2006* (Taipei: European Economic and Trade Office, May 2006), p. 5.

71. According to a different set of statistics, European investments in Taiwan amounted to US$9.4 billion, representing 15.47 per cent of all foreign investments in Taiwan. *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2006* (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2006), p. 268.

72. *The China Post*, 21 December 2001; *Reuters*, 3 November 2003.

73. Dent and Johnson, "Taiwan-EU Economic Relations," p. 114.

74. It is estimated that between e15 billion to e30 billion of goods produced in China and exported to the EU originated in Taiwanese-owned companies. *EU-Taiwan*, p. 18.

75. *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2006*, p. 270; *EU-Taiwan*, p. 26.

76. *Central News Agency*, 20 March 1998. See also Robert Ash, "Economic Relations between Taiwan and Europe," *The China Quarterly*, No. 169, March 2002, pp. 174–177.

77. *EU-Taiwan*, p. 28; Czeslaw Tubilewicz, "The Scrooge Effect: Taiwan's Economic Diplomacy toward Central Europe, 1988–2005," *Issues and Studies*, 41/4 (December 2005), p. 242.

78. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 January 1994, p. 13.

79. *China Post*, 21 June 1995.

80. Chang Ya-chun, "Beijing's Reaction to Vice-President Lien Chan's Trip to Ukraine," *Issues and Studies*, 32/8 (August 1996), pp. 131–133.

81. *Renmin ribao*, 26 February 1992.

82. *Xinhua*, 9 February 1999; *Zhongyang ribao*, 25 and 26 February 1999.

83. Kindermann, "The Relations of the ROC with the European Union," p. 95.

84. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 January 1994, p. 12.

85. Drifte, "European and Soviet Perspectives," p. 1118. Harlan W. Jencks, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market" in Sutter and Johnson (eds.), *Taiwan in World Affairs*, p. 92; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 February 1993, p. 14. Most recently, Germany and the Netherlands, citing rules forbidding arms exports to regions in crisis, refused to sell Taiwan diesel-powered submarines, which were an important part of the arms package offered by the Bush administration to Taiwan in 2001. *BBC News*, 26 April 2001; Richard D. Fisher, "Europe's Taiwan Submarine Dilemma," *The Jamestown Foundation China Brief*, 1/1 (12 July 2001), accessed 14 November 2006 from http://www.jamestown.org.

86. Kindermann, "The Relations of the ROC with the European Union," p. 96.

87. *EDA Bulletin*, 2, July 2006.

88. *China's EU Policy Paper*, 13 October 2003, accessed 13 November 2006 from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xos/dqzzywt/t27708.htm.

Cuban Medical Internationalism and its Role in Cuban Foreign Policy

DOI: 10.1080/09592290903001578

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pages 275-290

Available online: 05 Aug 2009

Diplomacy & Statecraft

Volume 20, Issue 2, 2009

Abstract

Cuba's medical internationalism is extraordinary, and in many ways the extent of its outreach programme puts the developed world to shame. It is impossible to fit Cuba's actions into any neat theoretical box—quite simply the revolutionary process follows no established paradigm. This exceptionalism is seen both in its approach to foreign relations and in its medical internationalism policy. Indeed, even during the days when it was economically dependent upon the Soviet Union, Cuban actions showed an exceptional degree of political independence. But because Cuba is so different, it is also difficult for developed nations to understand. This is a tremendous pity, for there is much to learn from Cuba's approach to developing sustainable public health systems in poor, Third World countries. There is also a great deal that, on a moral basis, wealthy nations can also learn about Cuba's policy of internationalist solidarity.

Cuba's medical internationalism is extraordinary, and in many ways the extent of its outreach programme puts the developed world to shame. One comparative example will illustrate the importance of this strategy.

Canadians are rightfully proud of the Disaster Assistance Response Team [DART], a group of about 200 Canadian Forces soldiers designed to fly into disaster areas around the world to provide drinking water and medical treatment. Of the contingent, some forty are medical staff. A 2005 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation report noted that DART had been successfully deployed on three occasions: to Honduras (1998), Turkey (1999), and Sri Lanka (2004). [1] A comparison with Cuba is instructive.

There is a saying in popular culture in Cuba that there are no half measures on the island: either people fall short of a target or go way past it. A case in point is Cuba's policy of medical internationalism or, as in this case, the response to a natural catastrophe. When Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, for example, Cuba immediately offered to send 1,586 doctors to assist, each with twenty-four kilograms of essential medicines—an offer sadly rejected by President George W. Bush, who placed politics before saving lives. A few months later when a massive earthquake in northern Pakistan killed 73,000 people, Cuba responded immediately, eventually sending 2,500 medical staff to the region and setting up thirty field hospitals—later donated to the local communities. [2] When the Cubans withdrew a year later, they offered 1,000 scholarships to youth from the affected area to study medicine in Cuba in an effort to develop a sustainable public health system in the affected area—with the first class of 300 Pakistani students starting their medical education in 2007. Since 2005, Cuba has also sent emergency medical relief teams to Guatemala (688 medical personnel, following Hurricane Stan), Bolivia (602, in the wake of massive flooding), Indonesia (135 after a major earthquake), with smaller brigades to Peru and Mexico (2007) and China (2008). Significantly the smallest of these medical brigades was far larger than the DART contribution anywhere.

This is just one illustration of a multifaceted policy of medical internationalism employed by Cuba since 1960, when its first relief mission was dispatched to Chile following an earthquake there. This article examines the nature of the wide-ranging approach employed by Havana. Several examples are provided—the “Operation Miracle” vision restoration programme, medical support for children affected by the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown in 1986, the Cuban response in Central America to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the founding of the Latin American School of Medicine [the Spanish acronym ELAM] the following year,

and the development of the Comprehensive Health Programme [CHP] in dozens of Third World countries. This will be followed by an analysis of the diplomatic impact around the world of the Cuban approach to medical internationalism.

OPERATION MIRACLE

One extremely successful example of Cuba's medical internationalism in Latin America and the Caribbean is “Operation Miracle,” a programme designed to help people suffering from vision loss. Supported financially by Venezuela, in many ways it started in 2004 by a fortuitous accident. Cuban literacy teachers have developed a successful programme—“*Yo, sí puedo*,”—are involved throughout the world, and have taught over two million people to read in recent years. They noticed, however, that many people were physically unable to read because of various medical problems with their eyes. As a result, Operation Miracle was born. At first patients from the region were flown to Havana, where they were operated on at the Pando Ferrer Hospital. Accompanied by a family member, they generally stayed a week in Cuba to ensure that the surgery had been successful. All costs, including transportation, accommodation, and surgery, were borne by Cuba and Venezuela.

In early October 2008 Cuba launched a similar programme in Barbados, and a recent report noted that a medical facility there was the latest of fifty ophthalmologic centres located in thirteen other countries that Cuban specialists managed. [3] Data from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations in May 2008 reveals the extent of this project. Since July 2004, 1.31 million patients from thirty-three countries had received eye surgery at no cost. [4] In a symbolic and fitting form of revenge, the Cuban soldier who executed Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 had his cataracts removed by Cuban doctors forty years later. This medical programme alone is exceptional, yet it is only one of a host of extraordinary medical initiatives of Cuba in developing nations.

THE CHILDREN OF CHERNOBYL

In many ways one of the most moving examples of Cuban medical internationalism is the treatment of Ukrainian children. In 1986 the reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Ukraine exploded, with the toxic fallout responsible for thousands of deaths within a thirty-kilometre radius. Several countries responded to this disaster, including Cuba,

which transported children from Belarus and the Ukraine to Havana for medical treatment. Some 139 severely ill children arrived in March 1990 and, each year since, between 700 and 800 have made the journey to Havana for both medical treatment and to recuperate. In all some 24,000 have been treated in Cuba—again at no charge. The significance of this example of medical solidarity needs to be understood in the context of life in Cuba when the programme started—just as the Soviet Union was collapsing. The impact of the implosion of the USSR in Cuba was devastating, since fully 85% of its trade had been with the socialist trading bloc. GDP decreased 35%, food and fuel supplies from the USSR dried up, and trade ground to a standstill. The impact on Cuban society was immediately visible: bare shelves in stores, cars placed on blocks, public transportation trips cut by 80%, and weight loss of 20–25 pounds for the average male by 1993–1994. Yet despite this massive decrease in the standard of living—as well as a feeling shared by many that the former Soviet Union and its East European allies had betrayed the revolution—Cuba continued to receive and treat the Chernobyl children—and continues to do so.

HURRICANE MITCH, 1998

The origins of the most recent and most successful stage of Cuba's medical internationalism policy can be traced to 1998, when Hurricane Mitch devastated Central America. Over 30,000 were killed, and 2.4 million were left homeless. Particularly badly damaged were Honduras and Guatemala. At the time diplomatic relations between Cuba and both Guatemala and Honduras were extremely strained, a vestige of the Reagan years when both countries were headed by right-wing military governments, and both were the recipients of enormous amounts of American military aid. At that time Cuba was the objective of much hostility from Washington, which used its influence throughout the region. Within five days of the hurricane hitting the area, however, Cuban medical staff was on the ground to help people affected by the hurricane—and eventually some 1,000 Cubans were involved in caring for hurricane victims. While medical staff has been replaced on an average two-year rotation, fully a decade later Cuba still maintains a large medical presence in the area.

After the storm abated, however, the regional governments faced enormous problems in their reconstruction efforts. Among these

problems was a clear need for ongoing medical care for the population—particularly for those who could not afford to visit a doctor or who lived in rural areas where medical attention was scarce. Private medical facilities existed in the capital and regional cities, but for the majority of the population this was little consolation. The situation was particularly bad on the Atlantic Coast, where life expectancy among some indigenous groups was just over forty years, and where the infant mortality rate was approximately 250 per 1,000 live births. It is here, and in traditionally ignored areas of the region, where Cuban medical staff have concentrated their work. A decade after Cuban medical staff first reached this impoverished, neglected area, the infant mortality rate has been reduced to under 20 per 1,000 births. [5]

The Cuban approach employed in both Honduras and Guatemala is remarkably similar—and also remarkably successful. In Honduras there are approximately 280 Cuban medical personnel, found in all 18 departments [states] of the country. During the first nine years of the Cuban presence after "Mitch," the lives of nearly 232,000 people were saved. Usually in inaccessible and under-served areas of the country where Cuban medical staff works, infant mortality rates have dropped dramatically—to just over 10 per 1,000 live births, while the national average is 37. [6] In Guatemala, also devastated by Hurricane Mitch, a similar situation is found. As of July 2007, approximately 300 Cuban physicians worked there—significantly in seventeen of the country's departments. It is estimated that 230,000 lives have been saved in the decade since their arrival. Significantly, maternal and infant mortality rates have been reduced by more than half. [7]

The enormity of this massive medical airlift should not be dismissed. At a time of great shortages in Cuba, and yet at no cost to the host countries, the revolutionary government sent hundreds of medical staff, and dozens of tons of medical supplies, to two countries which were outspoken ideological foes. Not only that, but they stayed—and remain to this day—in those same countries. Moreover, in an attempt to provide a sound, sustainable public health system for the region, Cuba has trained—again at no cost to either the students or the recipient governments—hundreds of students to become doctors with the clear commitment of returning to work with their under-serviced population. Once again the revolutionary government introduced an innovative and unexpected element by inviting these badly affected countries to send the students to Cuba for

medical training, in this way guaranteeing medical care for those who traditionally had been unable to afford it. A medical revolution throughout the region—the effects of which have still not been analyzed properly—was thus underway.

THE LATIN AMERICAN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

In light of the dire public health situation that it encountered in Central America after Hurricane Mitch, the Cuban government decided upon an unusual two-pronged strategy: to maintain Cuban medical staff there but, at the same time, to replace them gradually with local students who would be trained as doctors in Cuba. Significantly, however, the people who were selected to study medicine were students from marginalized backgrounds who could not afford normally to attend university. The theory behind this approach is that these doctors understood well the dominant socio-economic realities of their communities and, since they had been given an extraordinary opportunity to further their education and become a physician, they would be prepared to return to work with their people. So ELAM was born—as the Cuban government turned a sprawling naval academy west of Havana into the world's largest medical university.

In essence the intention was to stop the “brain drain” from South to North by selecting students from working class origins in the countries affected and obtaining from them a commitment to return to work in underserviced areas upon graduation. In this way, the “band aid” approach of hundreds of Cuban doctors working in the region for an average of two years would be steadily replaced by “radical surgery” where hundreds of local students would be trained specifically to return to their home countries. While several hundred Cuban medical personnel remain in Central America, they are gradually being replaced by medical graduates from the region.

The same phenomenon is happening with Haitian students, who started their studies in a parallel medical faculty for francophone students in Santiago de Cuba after Hurricane George devastated Haiti in 1998. Again, the Cuban involvement began by immediately sending 200 medical staff. By 2004, 535 Cuban medical personnel were providing healthcare to fully 75 percent of the country's 8.3 million inhabitants. [8] Again the Cuban approach evolved into training hundreds of Haitians to

become doctors, steadily replacing Cuban medical staff there. The Haitians make up the largest student nationality in the Santiago de Cuba campus. Because of the pressing needs in Haiti, the final term of their six-year programme is spent back home. This development started in 2005 when 80 students returned to undertake their practicum in their homeland, under Cuban medical supervision. In 2006 and 2007 the same approach was used, with 80 and 63 students respectively returning to Haiti. They joined the 226 Cuban-trained doctors already there—128 from the graduating class of 2005 and 98 from the following year—as well as the approximately 500 Cuban medical staff still working there.

Since 1999, students from around the developing world have arrived in Cuba to study medicine at ELAM. Students spend six years to obtain a degree in medicine. The most recent data from March 2008 indicates that there are 8,234 students from twenty-eight countries—including 105 visible minority US students—attending. Students spend two years at ELAM and then move to one of the twenty-one medical schools around the island. To date, 5,962 medical students have graduated, most of whom have returned to their country of origin, while many have stayed in Cuba for further specialization. Sadly, many have faced problems upon their return, largely because the existing medical associations in their home countries have complained that the Cuban-trained doctors will reduce their income possibilities. The returning doctors counter that in fact they offer little competition, since they will be working with marginalized sectors of the population which cannot afford the private medical services offered by their colleagues. This is an ongoing problem, although with time it appears to be diminishing—since the Havana-trained staff are concentrating on rural and poor urban sectors of the population.

In 2006 a new model was introduced in Cuba to develop even greater numbers of doctors. Known in Cuba as ELAM II, it is based upon the concept of having four to five medical students working with a Cuban physician/professor in a hands-on approach with patients. Less structured than the daily classroom routine of ELAM, the model has these students —25,000 at the latest count—spread throughout the country, using broadcasts of lectures from ELAM and the Internet to round out their practical education. Under the guidance of Cuban specialists, Venezuela has also embarked upon a similar model, and both countries have made a

commitment to train 100,000 doctors within a decade—a remarkable feat.

THE COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PROGRAMME

The number of Cuban medical staff working abroad are staggering—with almost one-quarter of the country's doctors working abroad in late 2008. That means about 36,770 health professionals working in seventy-two countries. It is a well-developed tradition in Cuba, since an extraordinary number of over 130,000 Cuban doctors have volunteered abroad since 1963. [9] Of those currently serving abroad, the bulk are working in Venezuela—approximately 30,000, where they staff 6,500 community-based clinics set up by the Chávez government; others are working on specific bilateral agreements with the Cuban government; and 3,462 are working under CHP in forty-three countries—including twenty-two sub-Saharan countries in Africa. In these countries, where there are pressing needs for medical care, the Cuban record has been remarkable. [10] It is also important to note that Havana has established medical schools in several of these countries: Yemen (1976), Ethiopia (1984), Uganda (1986), Ghana (1991), Gambia (2000), Equatorial Guinea (2000), and most recently Guinea Bissau (2004). In all of these endeavours, the fundamental goal has been to develop a sustainable, culturally appropriate public health service.

One recent example, East Timor, will perhaps suffice to illustrate the importance of Cuba's contribution to the development of a sustainable healthcare system—although it should be remembered that this approach is used by the Cuban government with literally dozens of Third World countries). Often international NGOs will send medical personnel on short-term contracts to a strife-torn country to provide essential medical care. Governments, too, employ a similar approach when they provide humanitarian or relief aid. By contrast the Cubans emphasize the need for ongoing, long-term sustainable support involving the consistent input of locals. They have started this process recently in East Timor after widespread violence in 1999 resulted in 75 percent of the population being displaced—and left only thirty-five physicians in the entire country. [11] This situation translated into one physician for 28,571 people. Cuba then sent 300 healthcare workers to the island, as well as offering 1,000 medical scholarships to local East Timorese students.

Understandably, the government of East Timor was delighted—and there are currently 800 students from that country training to be doctors at ELAM. As Huish and Spiegel note, “if all the scholarships were filled, and if all graduates returned to the country, the doctor to patient ratio would be one physician for every 1,250 people.” As can be seen, this is a major improvement on the existing public health system there. In this way a sustainable medical system, managed and staffed by locals—particularly in rural and underserviced areas—can be implemented.

THE VENEZUELAN CASE

Cuba's relationship with Venezuela since Hugo Chávez was first elected has understandably been extremely close. Dozens of joint ventures have been set up by companies from both countries, an army of engineers has finished the previously mothballed oil refinery in Cienfuegos, and thousands of Venezuelans have trained in Cuba, while tens of thousands of Cuban medical staff, teachers, and sports instructors have worked in Venezuela. One of the most beneficial aspects of the burgeoning relationship has been the export of some 98,000 barrels of petroleum a day to Cuba at preferential rates, while Venezuela's most successful import has been the massive increase of medical services provided to the population by Cuban medical staff.

While it is simplistic to reduce the very complex relationship to an “oil-for-doctors” trade, it is nevertheless true that the subsidized oil has been a boon to the Cuban economy, while Cuban medical cooperation is an enormously important factor in the relationship. The numbers are again astounding: 31,000 Cuban medical personnel have been working in Venezuela—usually for two-year periods—particularly since 2003 when the Chávez government started a massive medical reform programme known as the “Barrio Adentro Mission,” designed to work in the urban slums and generally medically under-serviced areas of the country. In subsequent stages, 6,000 clinics, 388 polyclinics, and 492 rehabilitation centres were opened across the country with sophisticated diagnostic equipment. [12] The results of this medical invasion *a la cubana* have been extremely beneficial. Infant and maternal mortality rates, for example, have decreased dramatically—between 1995 and 2005 almost 1,000 children yearly had died from curable infections.

The most updated figures for the results of the first stage of the medical “Mission” were provided by the Venezuelan president in August 2008 in

his weekly radio call-in programme “Aló Presidente.” He noted that since the first stage of Barrio Adentro launched on 16 April 2003, there had been some 308 million consultations with medical staff and, in total, 99,873 lives had been saved largely as a result of the preventive medicine approach employed by the Cuban medical personnel. [13] As can be seen, the Cuban medical contribution has been enormous, a fact recognized by Chávez on 30 September 2007 on the same radio programme. He took on his critics who accused him of giving away oil to Cubans, noting that Cuban health professionals had saved more lives in just five years than all of Venezuela's doctors in the entire history of the country. “What is worth more, in objective prices? The barrels of oil we sell to Cuba or this?” [14]

CUBA, EXPONENT OF “SOFT POWER”

Following a brief overview of this wide-ranging outreach programme employed by Cuba for almost five decades, it is obvious that it has been remarkably successful and exceptional by any medical yardstick: the numbers of lives saved; the emphasis on sustainable public health systems in the developing and underdeveloped world; a cost-effective model promoting preventive measures and the involvement of the local population; and the extraordinary medical assistance to countries affected by natural disasters. Indeed, any one of the programmes noted would be seen as exemplary humanitarianism for any wealthy, developed country. To see them *all* carried out, however, and by a small, poor nation like Cuba—11.2 million population—is indeed exceptional. Quite simply, no nation on the planet has done so much in terms of saving lives through medical intervention. Indeed Cuba's medical contribution is greater than that of all of the G-7 nations together.

There is no doubt that this far-reaching policy of medical internationalism has greatly enhanced Cuba's international profile, particularly in the Third World—which, after all, is the main recipient of this wide-ranging support. But what impact has this programme had upon Cuba's international relations? To what extent has it enhanced its diplomatic standing? It is of course impossible to see any direct relationship between medical cooperation offered by revolutionary Cuba and diplomatic support afforded by recipient nations. Reading between the lines, however, it is clear that the medical outreach programme has done an extraordinary job in winning over reluctant allies—even when

there had been significant diplomatic tension. The amount of medical support and, more important, the clear dedication to the task at hand are legendary—as is their willingness to work where local, generally middle-class physicians refuse to participate. I have been fortunate to interview scores of Cuban medical staff who have worked in extremely difficult conditions; many refer to the surprise shown by their hosts when they saw the pragmatic approach of the Cubans, who put up with extremely difficult living conditions, almost inevitably spurned by local medical staff.

Pertinent to this discussion of the impact of Cuba's exemplary medical internationalism is the analysis of Joseph S. Nye Jr. who, in 1990, published his groundbreaking study outlining the value of "soft power." [15] In essence Nye indicated that, unlike policies of coercion and force – "hard power" —a new, viable form of influence was possible: "soft power." He has fine-tuned his understanding since then, noting the basic factors that inspire others to accept the influence of the party exercising it: "A country's soft power can come from three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)." [16] Two years earlier he had emphasized a related aspect of this approach's influence: "Soft power uses a different type of currency—not force, not money—to engender cooperation. It uses an *attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values*" (Emphasis added).[16]

In the case of Cuba, this widely perceived emphasis on the "moral authority" of its struggle for survival against overwhelming odds has long been recognized. Just as important, however, is the recognition, particularly in the countries of the Third World, of both the "justness" and the "duty" which the revolutionary government has displayed in its medical internationalism programme for almost five decades. The issue of "moral authority" is, of course, extremely relevant, and it is clear that the exemplary medical conduct of Cuban personnel—in both natural disasters and in the CHP programme—has helped them to win over sceptical government leaders in host countries. Whether or not Havana deliberately sought to pursue this "soft power" in 1963 when its first medical mission went to assist Algeria, the fact remains that the result

has been an extraordinary level of support for Cuba in international fora and in bilateral relations.

The case of Honduras is instructive. Mention was made earlier of Cuba's swift response to the devastation of Hurricane Mitch. Indeed, within the first five years of their arrival, Cuban medical staff had provided 3.7 million consultations, including performing 31,627 major operations and 28,346 minor surgeries. [17] Two years later, 300 Cuban medical staff remained in the country, and in total 7 million consultations had been provided. This emphasis on preventive medicine had an almost immediate effect. In areas where the Cubans work, for example, infant mortality dropped from 80.3 per live birth to 30.9 per 1000 live births within the first 18 months of their arrival and, by late 2007, was just over 10 percent. But what impact did this widespread and exemplary medical cooperation have on the initially rather hostile Honduran government? As the data revealed beyond the shadow of a doubt the value of the Cuban medical support—and as United States neglect continued to grow—the government in Tegucigalpa gradually lost its scepticism. It also participated in supporting the badly-needed Cuban personnel after the local College of Physicians organized demonstrations designed to force the Cubans out. Not accidentally, diplomatic relations—suspended since 1961—gradually improved until they were normalized in January 2002. It was extremely difficult to maintain frigid diplomatic relations when Cuban medical personnel were working in extremely difficult conditions—and saving the lives of tens of thousands of Hondurans.

Cuba's role in the Anglophone Caribbean is also illustrative of the successful impact of the policy of what the Cubans call “cooperation” and we call “aid.” The difference is far more than just semantics, since it speaks to the moral imperative that the Cuban revolution has to show solidarity with the Third World. Indeed the preamble to the Cuban Constitution talks of the commitment to “proletarian internationalism, fraternal friendship, support, cooperation and solidarity with the people of the world, especially with Latin America and the Caribbean.” [18] Examples have been given to show how this has been carried out in sub-Saharan Africa, in Central and South America, and in the Far East. The same holds for Cuban medical internationalism as practiced closer to home—in the Caribbean.

Before 1972, when the nations of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago normalized relations with revolutionary Cuba,

diplomatic ties between Havana and regional capitals had again been extremely poor. The years of the Reagan administration, 1981–1989, were a time of United States muscle-flexing in the region as typified by the 1983 invasion of Grenada with 7,000 troops; and Caribbean leaders were understandably keen not to offend Washington. But by 1992 full normalization of relations by Cuba with the Caribbean had taken place—and Havana had started an active programme of support for the region. This grew steadily, reaching most of the countries of the area. In December 2005 Fidel Castro summarized the extent of Cuban cooperation with CARICOM nations: 1,142 Cubans were then working there—including almost 1,000 in the medical sector—1,957 students from fourteen Caribbean countries had already graduated from Cuban schools, while a further 3,118 were being trained in thirty-three university and technical specialties; eleven Caribbean countries were the beneficiaries of Operation Miracle, and in the five months that the programme had been in effect, 33,000 had received surgery in Cuba at no cost. Castro concluded: “We support the efforts of our Caribbean brothers to consolidate their regional integration and, as always, Cuba is willing to offer its modest contribution in those areas where that may be possible. The peoples of the Caribbean community can always count on Cuba's respect and friendship.” [19] It is worth noting that as was the case in Central America, this extensive programme of support took place at a time when Washington's neglect of the region brought United States influence to the lowest point in living memory.

Cuban humanitarian solidarity with the Caribbean nations has of course not gone unnoticed in the region. In a visit to Cuba in May 2006, Prime Minister Kenny Anthony of St. Lucia praised the Cuban government for its ongoing medical support. Within the previous two years, some 1,700 patients from his country had been operated on in Havana under the “Operation Miracle” programme, with a further 14,000 treated in St. Lucia. He noted that the costs incurred by Cuba had mounted to many millions of dollars—yet St. Lucian patients had not been asked to spend anything. “Only one people [in all the world], one government and one extraordinary leader like the president of Cuba can do what you have done for our country.” [20] He was not alone in his fulsome praise for Cuba.

The following year President George W. Bush was left in no doubt as to the respect which the CARICOM community felt for Cuba. In June

2007, Guyanese president Bharrat Jagdeo took his American counterpart to task for critical remarks about Cuba: “We too have national interest considerations. . . . But our national interest considerations are a little bit different from those of the United States in that they relate more to educating our people, getting them out of poverty and providing decent health care for them.” He noted that Cuba was training Guyanese students at no charge—while it would cost $70 million to send the students to the United States. In other words, Guyana appreciated the practical hands-on support received from Cuba, despite lobbying from President Bush. The fact that a leader of a small Caribbean nation would address the United States president in such a way speaks volumes about the widely felt frustration of the Caribbean with neglect shown by the Bush administration—and, by contrast, respect for Cuba's significant—and ongoing—contribution to the area.

Other regional leaders have voiced similar sentiments. The nature of CARICOM's relationship with Cuba was clear, noted Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, who emphasized to President Bush both the region's respect for Cuba, and the right to forge its own regional alliances: “We're a free and independent people. . . . We articulate our own voice.” His Guyanese counterpart echoed these thoughts even more strongly: often, he noted, United States policy-making circles saw the Caribbean countries as “stooges,” nations “induced by bribes” to support Cuba or Venezuela. That was completely false, he noted. Caribbean countries maintained solid relations with Cuba and Venezuela for one basic reason, since “combined they provide huge assistance to the region. If Cuba were to withdraw their doctors from Haiti, their health system would collapse.” [21] These clearly stated remarks from a variety of the region's leaders speak volumes of the respect for Cuba's medical internationalism—all the more so since they were stated in direct conversations with George W. Bush.

The success of Cuba's cooperative approach in the Caribbean can also be judged by a recent comment by Prime Minister Owen Arthur of Barbados. In July 2007, the Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, made an official visit to four Latin American and Caribbean countries. In Barbados, he was firmly put in his place by Arthur after criticizing “certain aspects of governance and human rights” in Cuba. Arthur responded with vigour: “We have a relationship with Cuba that's over 30 years old,” he commented, recommending that the Canadian approach

show a “respect for people's sovereignty, and non-interference, and the right of peoples to pursue alternative plans to development.” [22] This level of reply again underlines widespread regional respect for Cuba's contributions to the region—medical cooperation being is the most important by far—and would have been unthinkable a decade earlier—prior to Cuba's large medical internationalism programme in the Caribbean.

Finally, a recent general example helps to illustrate the extent to which Cuba has succeeded in winning the “hearts and minds” of countries around the world. In October 2008, 185 countries at the United Nations General Assembly voted to condemn the United States embargo with three voting against—the United States, Israel and the US protectorate, Palau [population 21,000]—with two abstentions—the Marshall Islands, which traditionally had supported the American position, and Micronesia). Significantly, none of the dozens of countries in receipt of Cuban medical assistance abstained, with all supporting Havana.

The close relationship between Cuban medical internationalism and diplomatic support from recipient countries is not easy to quantify in terms of tradeoffs of medical and diplomatic favours. But clearly it is a key factor in explaining Cuba's evolving leadership in the developing and under-developed world. Cuba, for instance, is the elected leader of the 118-nation Non-Aligned Movement, most of whose members have been the recipients of Cuban co-operation programmes at one time or another. Moreover Havana was elected to the new United Nations Human Rights Council with the support of 135 nations—significantly five more than those who voted for Canada. In the most recent UN vote on the United States embargo, East Timor's president, José Ramos Horta, showed his government's appreciation of Cuba's support, implying perhaps unconsciously how closely intertwined were Cuba's medical cooperation and East Timor's political support. In his motion to the UN in which he roundly condemned Washington's position, he indicated the need for the embargo to be lifted. He also outlined the co-operation provided his small country by Cuba: 700 young people from East Timor were studying medicine in Cuba, while another 140 were training under Cuban doctors at home. In addition, thousands of East Timorese had learned to read and write through a Cuban literacy programme. [23] In these circumstances, not to support Cuba would be most surprising.

As noted earlier, the cases of Guatemala and Honduras—recipients of enormous medical cooperation from Cuba—are useful illustrations of the dramatic evolution of improved bilateral relations with Cuba. At the time of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, relations were extremely strained. Yet the same year that Cuba dispatched hundreds of medical personnel to help the beleaguered Guatemalan population, the government normalized relations with Havana. Likewise Honduran president, Carlos Flores, normalized relations in 2002 shortly before leaving office. Clearly the presence of hundreds of Cuban medical staff working for free in their countries, saving tens of thousands of their citizens and training many hundreds of young students to become doctors had a major factor upon both Central American governments.

It is of course difficult to draw a straight line showing the cause and effect of Cuban medical internationalism and its subsequent diplomatic influence. No evidence exists in the public domain of Havana offering medical support in return for a normalization of relations, or a vote in favour of Cuba at the UN. At the same time, however, it is clear that there is—logically—a correlation between Cuba's medical internationalism and its high standing in international fora. How can one condemn, or at the very least, not support a nation which is making extraordinary sacrifices to help one? There is no doubt, then, that “soft power” works—and Cuba is a master in practicing it.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Supported by Venezuela, Cuba seeks to train 100,000 doctors within a decade for the Third World. Meanwhile Operation Miracle continues to restore the sight of people in three dozen countries—1.6 million of whose citizens has received this gift by May 2009; ELAM is still accepting 1,300 medical students a year; hundreds of children annually travel to Cuba from the Ukraine for medical treatment; and some 38,000 Cuban medical staff, including over 17,000 doctors, continue to serve abroad in seventy-three countries. All of this in a country of 11.2 million people, a country about twice the size of Nova Scotia—and ninety miles away from its self-declared enemy, which has imposed an embargo for almost fifty years costing Cuba billions of dollars. Any one of these contributions would be exceptional for a poor, developing country—and, indeed, any one would represent a far greater contribution than any

developed nation. When seen together, however, they are truly extraordinary.

It is often said that a nation's humanity can be measured by the way that it cares for those who cannot care for themselves. A useful illustration can be seen in Cuba's role in Haiti—the poorest country of the western hemisphere. Cuban doctors are now found throughout that country, caring for the medical needs of fully 80 percent of the population. In addition to the hundreds of Cuban medical staff living in desperately poor conditions, in a country whose infant mortality rate is almost 15 times that of Cuba, there are also 800 Haitian students studying medicine in Cuba. There are no material benefits to be gained for Cuba from working for the poorest of the poor, little money to be made from pharmaceutical sales, and just one vote at the United Nations. Yet Cuba has been actively involved in providing medical care to Haiti for over a decade, and it will continue to do so until it is no longer needed—a fascinating example of human solidarity, selflessness, and life-saving dedication.

It is impossible to fit Cuba's actions into any neat theoretical box—quite simply the revolutionary process follows no established paradigm. This exceptionalism is seen both in its approach to foreign relations and in its medical internationalism policy. Indeed, even during the days when it was economically dependent upon the Soviet Union, Cuban actions showed an exceptional degree of political independence. But because Cuba *is* so different, it is also difficult for developed nations to understand. This is a tremendous pity, for there is much to learn from Cuba's approach to developing sustainable public health systems in poor, Third World countries. There is also a great deal that, on a moral basis, wealthy nations can also learn about Cuba's policy of internationalist solidarity. For example, on at least three occasions in the past decade, Cuba has offered to send 5,000 medical staff to take up the challenge of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa—providing that the developed countries of the world cooperate by sending pharmaceuticals. So far the silence is deafening—and once again Cuba is leading the world in its medical internationalism programme.

While many hardened observers in developed countries might well look askance at the claim, the key to understanding Cuba's approach to medical internationalism comes from the inculcation over decades of moral rather than material values in medical staff. At times it is hard for

us to grasp this fact, since our ideological basis, our socio-economic system, and our entire formation have trained us to develop an alternative value system. Opposed to our capitalist philosophical and societal underpinnings is the Cuban model, whose most vocal exponent is of course Fidel Castro. His observations to the first graduating class of ELAM in August 2005 are pertinent in this analysis. He compared the Cuban and American approaches to forming doctors. In the United States, it costs $300,000 to train a doctor. Since Cuba was planning to train 100,000 within a decade, that was the equivalent in the United States context of Cuba contributing $300 billion to the Third World. How can a small, poor country do that? The secret, he explained to the graduating class, "lies in the fact that the human capital is worth far more than the financial capital. Human capital involves not only knowledge, but also—and this is essential—conscience, ethics, solidarity, truly humane feelings, spirit of sacrifice, heroism, and the ability to make a little go a long way." [24] He is right. Moreover, this approach has saved hundreds of thousands of lives around the globe—and in so doing has garnered widespread diplomatic support for this small, but exceptional nation.

Notes

1. "Disaster Relief: Canada's Rapid-Response Team," CBC News report, 17 October 2005: http://www.cbc.ca/bews/background/cdnmilitary/dart.html. Accessed 20 September 2008. The report notes how "Ottawa decided not to send the team to Haiti during the hurricane season of 2004, with Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew saying that Canada must consider the cost of such an aid mission. The team's mission to Turkey, for example, cost $15 million."

2. Bruno Rodríguez, the Cuban Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, summarized the level of Cuban support in Pakistan. Within two months of the earthquake, Cuba had dispatched 789 doctors—of whom 44% were women, an important feature in a Muslim country—had established thirty field hospitals, and had treated 60,000 patients. See "Statement of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, His Excellency Mr. Bruno Rodríguez," 19 November 2005:

http://www.canadiannetworkoncuba.ca/Documents/Pakistan.05.shmtl. Accessed 17 October 2008.

3. See Agencia de Información Nacional, "Operation Miracle Launched in Barbados with Cuban Assistance," 9 October 2008: CUBA-L@unm.edu. Accessed 17 October 2008.

4. Of the 1,313,213 patients operated on, there were 171,183 Cubans. The distribution of the other patients is as follows: 54,801 from fifteen Caribbean countries, 511,358 from fourteen Latin American countries—not counting Venezuela—566,704 from Venezuela, 6,714 from Mali, and 2,453 from Angola. See "Misión Milagro" at the Cuban government website focusing on medical cooperation: http:www.cubacoop.com/cubacoop.misionmilagros.htm. Accessed 31 October 2008.

5. Data provided by Dr. Elis Alberto González Polanco, head of the first Cuban medical mission to Honduras, in an interview ten years later. See José de la Osa, "Predicar con el Ejemplo," *Granma*, 3 November 2008.

6. See the Agencia de Información Nacional report, "Cuban Doctors Make an Impact on Honduran Health Levels," 9 September 2007: Cuba-L@unm.edu. Accessed 11 September 2007.

7. Carmen Esquivel, "Médicos Cubanos Ascienden al Volcán de Pacaya," *Granma*, 7 July 2007.

8. Derrick O'Keefe, "A Real Humanitarian Intervention: Cuba's Doctors Without Borders," *Seven Oaks Magazine*, 5 April 2004. Available at www.sevenoaksmag.com/commentary/07_cuba.html. Accessed 9 November 2008.

9. Conner Gorry, "Cuban Health Cooperation Turns 45," *MEDICC Review*, 10/3 (Summer 2008), p. 44. By November 2008, this number had increased to 38,544, of whom 17,697 were doctors. Data provided in de la Osa, "Predicar."

10. According to Cuban government records, in the countries served by the CHP, 834,634 births have been attended, 9,424,262 vaccines have

been administered, and 1,720,301 lives have been saved. Data from the Vice-Ministry for Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Relations [MINREX], May 2008. Cited in Gorry, p. 45. In addition, 117,798,248 patients have been seen by Cuban medical staff, and some 2,831,870 operations have been performed. See de la Osa, "Predicar" for further data.

11. This data and the following quotation taken from the informative article of Robert Huish and Jerry Spiegel, "Integrating Health and Human Security into Foreign Policy," *International Journal of Cuban Studies*. Available at: http:www.cubastudiesjournal.org/issue-1/articles/integrating-health-and-human-security-i. Accessed 14 September 2008.

12. See the report by the Agencia de Información Nacional, Havana, "Cuban Doctors Save Over 57,000 Lives in Venezuela," 7 November 2007: Cuba-L@unm.edu. Accessed 31 October 2008.

13. Agnerys Rodríguez Gavilán and Otmaro Rodríguez, "Reconoce Chávez Papel de Colaboradores Cubanos," *Granma*, 25 August 2008.

14. Salim Lamrani, "Venezuela's Debt to Cuba," *Progreso Weekly* (Miami), 10 January 2008: Cuba-L@unm.edu. Accessed 31 October 2008.

15. Soft power refers to the ability to obtain one's goal by persuasion and cooption, rather than by pressure and coercion. It is widely accepted that the architect of this theory is American academic Joseph Nye.

16. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The Benefits of Soft Power," *Compass: A Journal of Leadership* (Spring 2004): http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html. Accessed 17 October 2008.

17. Data found in Leo Burghardt, "Guatemalans Hail Cuban Medical Workers," *People's Weekly World Newspaper* (3 March 2004); and "Cuba's Medical Missionaries Blanket Honduras," *Prensa Latina* (18 February 2005).

18. See the Cuban Constitution: www.cuba.cu/gobierno/cu.

19. Fidel Castro, “Fidel Castro Addressed Cuba-CARICOM Summit,” 9 December 2005: Cuba-L@unm.edu. Accessed 11 December 2005.

20. Francisco Forteza, “Premier de Santa Lucía se reúne con presidente cubano en ambiente cordial,” *Granma*, May 24, 2006: Cuba-L@unm.edu. Accessed 26 May 2006. Translated from Spanish by the author.

21. All comments taken from the 25 June 2007 Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation, Barbados report, “CARICOM Tells U.S. They Will Remain Friends with Cuba and Venezuela”: Cuba-L@unm.edu. Acessed 30 June 2007.

22. See the Can West News Service bulletin, “Harper's Cuba Tack Meets Resistance,” 20 July 2007.

23. “Destacan Reclamo de Ramos Horta Sobre Cuba en la ONU,” *Granma*, 26 September 2008.

24. “Speech Given by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba, at the First Graduation of Students from the Latin American School of Medicine, Karl Marx Theatre, August 20, 2005”: located at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/2005/ing/f200805i.htm.
Accessed 21 October 2008.

Britain and the Recognition of Bangladesh in 1972

Diplomacy & Statecraft

Volume 19, Issue 1, 2008

DOI: 10.1080/09592290801913767

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pages 125-144

Available online: 31 May 2008

Abstract

This analysis reviews the discussion behind Britain's recognition of Bangladesh as an independent state in February 1972. It concentrates on correspondence in the preceding six weeks between Whitehall and its diplomatic postings, particularly in the Commonwealth, and considers in detail the role of the Commonwealth Secretariat. Perceptions of recognition are first briefly discussed, followed by Bangladesh's historical background and the international security issues surrounding it. Government and Commonwealth Secretariat files are studied in detail. They show above all the influence on Government decision-making of

diplomatic intelligence, in particular the importance of economic and political factors. Also revealed are London's concern for Pakistan's president, Zulfiquar Bhutto, its desire not to recognize alone and the attitude of the Commonwealth's Secretary General. The study suggests that recognition is a far more complex matter than the legal definition would imply and presents a compelling case for its further analysis in an historical context.

Britain recognized Bangladesh as an independent state on 4 February 1972. This was some three weeks after the Government had satisfied itself that the international, legal requirements for such a declaration were met. [1] Rather than immediately announcing its conclusion, it delayed until long and careful consideration had been given to the impact of recognition upon British interests. Only when Ministers believed that the optimum moment had been reached with regard to these did they implement the judicial decision already taken. The sequence of events suggests that recognition, while *a priori* a legal affair, is far from being the exclusive preserve of lawyers but is also a valid and rewarding subject for research in both international relations and intra-governmental decision-making. At present it figures prominently in the indices of legal text books but has largely escaped historical investigation. [2] Primary sources show that British recognition was the culmination of intensive correspondence between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and its High Commission staff in India and Pakistan. A discrete amount of the information relayed to London enabled the Government to determine at which point the conditions of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, controlling the international recognition of new states, were fulfilled. [3] Most however was used by Whitehall to assess the potentially conflicting effects of recognition upon Britain's economic and political concerns.

This article examines Britain's approach to acknowledging Bangladesh, both from the legal aspect and her own self-interest, as disclosed in original files released under the thirty-year rule. It seeks to identify those

factors which influenced both the decision to recognize and the particular timing of the announcement. Special attention is paid to the FCO, its Ambassadors and High Commissioners, the Cabinet and Prime Minister's Office and the Commonwealth Secretariat. The relationship between the FCO and the Commonwealth Secretariat, especially the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Arnold Smith, was significant because of Pakistan's position as a Commonwealth state. Through this historical analysis the article will engage with the broader compass of recognition, which falls neatly into two, discrete camps of theory and practice. It is clear that the former, even when amply fulfilled in terms of its legal definition, was implemented by the British only when practical considerations had been satisfied and that the catalyst was diplomacy. It is also evident that this is a widely followed model extending far beyond the current example. [4]

The numerous new states which gained recognition in the latter half of the twentieth century, of which Bangladesh was one, owe their success to as many different sets of circumstances but the diplomatic factor is common to all. It enables an awareness of self-interest and provides the means by which the implementation of a legally valid recognition may be retarded or accelerated. For example, it is productive to speculate if Britain would have been as keen to recognize Bangladesh as early as she did had the economically important tea gardens flourished in the West of Pakistan rather than the East. As it was, they were a factor in diplomatic advice to recognize, tendered to Whitehall by its representatives. [5] These properties of diplomacy have the effect of questioning the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* recognition which, Peterson believed, “collapsed under its own internal confusions.” [6] Jönsson and Hall refer to diplomacy as a “political instrument” of approval or disapproval. The same authors also explain diplomacy as a “relatively stable collection of social practices . . . defining appropriate behaviour.” [7] If they are correct in this, it begs the question of which is the more legitimate recognition of a state, legal criteria or diplomatic pragmatism.

A distinction should be drawn between the recognition of a state, as a new legal entity, and of a violent regime change within an existing state. The regime-based approach has increasingly fallen out of use by governments during the last century but was employed by Britain until

1979. It was condemned in the Estrada doctrine, advanced in the 1930s by the eponymous Foreign Minister of Mexico, as “an insulting practice” implying a judgemental attitude by one state to the internal affairs of another. While the present study centres on the birth of a state rather than a change in its government, empirically it seems certain that recognition of Bangladesh belonged to the pragmatic school. The evidence, presented below, supports Ruda's conclusion that states do not have an obligation to recognize legally accredited newcomers *a priori.* [8] It indicates strongly that a study of the subject in its historical setting, as here, rather than its exclusively legal guise, as formerly, would be amply repaid.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to know something about the origins of Bangladesh as part of Pakistan. The latter was geographically split in two by more than one thousand miles of Indian territory. The divisions of ethnicity, culture, and language between the East and West of Pakistan were exacerbated by inequalities in the treatment of their inhabitants. The former was home to more than half the population and, through its agriculture and manufacture, provided the economic base of the country yet government was conducted from the latter. Easterners complained that West Pakistan discriminated against the employment of civil servants from the East and initially refused to accept the Bengali tongue as an official language alongside Urdu. [9] However it was not the ensuing and inevitable resentment against the West of the country which led the East to secede and claim autonomy as “Bangla Desh” in 1971. [10] Nor was it the government's refusal to implement the results of the country's first general election, in December 1970, which was internationally judged to be free and fair and won by the Eastern leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Secession was triggered by the unleashing of Pakistani troops upon the population in the East in March 1971. In that month, unwilling to acknowledge West Pakistan's loss of power in the wake of the election, President Yahya Khan flew to Dacca for talks with Mujib. He remained there for two weeks, during which time his army crossed to the Eastern wing and, upon his departure, swept across the province. Mujib was arrested and taken to Karachi as a prisoner. It was at this point that independence was declared, on 26 March 1971. Renamed “Bangla Desh,” the East was plunged into bloodshed for almost nine months and its leader imprisoned in West Pakistan until January 1972. The Western-

based army had the upper hand and the Bangladeshis relied on guerrilla tactics until neighbouring India made its contentious decision to invade in December 1971. The Pakistani army was defeated and the new government of Bangladesh, at this point recognized only by India and Bhutan, was able to restore a degree of order.

In the circumstances recognition was a delicate matter for many countries. It carried far-reaching security issues, particularly for the United States, Russia, and China which had all become involved in the original tensions between Pakistan and India. When the sub-continent was partitioned upon British withdrawal in 1947, there was immediate dissent over Kashmir, a largely Muslim province ruled by a Hindu prince and containing some of Hinduism's holiest shrines. The prince prevaricated over whether to take his country into Muslim Pakistan or Hindu India. Unrest was fostered within the province by resentful, Islamic elements supported by Pakistan, provoking India into offering military assistance to the Maharajah. The latter threw in his lot with India but Pakistan retained control of a large area of Kashmir, part of which it later ceded to China, the boundary being drawn by the United Nations. India did not recognize the division and the second Indo–Pakistani war over Kashmir in 1965 also ended in stalemate. There were similar, persistent problems between the neighbours over Assam, within India itself. Before the sub-continent was partitioned, poor Muslims had migrated to Assam from East Bengal and were continuing to settle there. Many had been evicted by India and it was sometimes claimed that Pakistan would seek to absorb Assam as a Muslim-majority province. Since the East Pakistanis had little interest in the vexed issue of Kashmir, Bhutto intended that Assam should become its eastern equivalent and worked to stir up the same sort of passions in the East that Kashmir itself aroused in the West. India's intervention in Pakistan's eastern wing in 1971, although nothing to do with Kashmir, further inflamed the smouldering discord between the neighbours. [11]

This innate hostility naturally allied each with the mightier enemy of the other. The People's Republic of China, hostile to Soviet Communism, was early recognized by Pakistan and reciprocated with economic and military assistance. The United States also offered support to Pakistan, viewing both it and China as allies against the threat of the Soviet Union

during the Cold War. China herself in 1962 attacked India over a disputed length of their mountainous common border, emerging victorious from a month-long war. Disturbed by what it perceived to be Chinese aggression, the US then flew supplies to India. However relations rapidly cooled when the latter reviewed her foreign policy in the wake of the 1962 and 1965 conflicts and began to forge closer links with the Soviets. America reacted by strengthening her practical commitment to Pakistan. India received substantial aid from the SU and, in August 1971, the two signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. Four months later, India and Pakistan were once more at war. The potential consequences of the conflict, fought almost as a proxy war between the two superpowers and certainly with their hardware, were limited by the clearly valid claims of Bangladesh to be a sovereign state. Westad's view is that the wars had less to do with the Cold War than “their very special regional rationale.” [12] Nevertheless most other countries were alive to the sensitivities of those most closely involved in the issue, and to the possible impact upon their own interests, and were correspondingly cautious about the timing of their recognition.

It would have been strange if India herself, having intervened in Pakistan's internal strife, had not recognized Bangladesh when she did at the end of 1971. An already precarious situation was aggravated by the presence in her jails of thousands of prisoners of war from West Pakistan. In addition her fragile economy was further threatened by the flood of refugees which poured across her eastern border to escape the fighting. Her desire for Britain to endorse her own recognition is clear from the diplomatic files. Garvey pointed out that British businessmen were still obliged to go through India to reach Dacca and that diplomatic delay might present them with difficulties. As a counterweight to Soviet influence and pressure upon herself, India would welcome British and other Western recognition. [13] In the British view, elucidated by the British Foreign Secretary at the Bermuda summit between Britain and America in December 1971, the trouble began when Pakistan moved towards China, leaving the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization and loosening links with the Central Treaty Organisation. [14] This was inevitably perceived by India as a threat and directed her towards the Soviets. The memorandum of the conversation is a striking illustration of the differences between American and British perspectives on foreign

policy and deserves far more attention than is possible here. Only the previous week, according to released documents, Kissinger had told the White House that India was “unbelievable” and Britain “well beyond the edge of what is tolerable” in their demands at the UN for an autonomous Bangladesh. At the same time Nixon observed that Soviet threats to veto Britain's resolution aligned the United Kingdom with America. [15] This dichotomy and the all-but-conflicting attitudes of the allies towards the situation perhaps go far towards explaining the disengaged civility with which each seems to have greeted the other's approach to Bangladesh as indicated below.

The loss of Bangladesh created domestic difficulties for Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who became President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971 and subsequently released Mujib. Bhutto remained totally inflexible to the suggestion of partition, in defiance of both the *status quo* and his earlier statements. Well before the elections he had held that Mujib was a secessionist, despite the latter's protestations to the contrary. It may be argued that Mujib himself had no need to speak of partition but could allow events to take their likely, provocative course which he appears not to have discouraged. [16] Bhutto was repeatedly warned by the British that they would recognize Bangladesh but, in the event, seems to have been unprepared to the extent of disbelief. In the ensuing months most of the world's nations acknowledged the existence of Bangladesh but Pakistan utterly refused to do so.

The British Government recognized Bangladesh as a sovereign, independent state on 4 February 1972 in accordance with the internationally accepted definition laid down in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, Article 1, that is to say, a permanent population, specific territory, effective government and the ability to relate with other states. [17] On 13 December 1971 the Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, made a statement to the House of Commons about the problems in the subcontinent. Within the FCO file labelled “Recognition of Bangladesh,” there lies a synopsis of Government criteria for recognition. It has neither title, signature nor date and reads,

a revolutionary government is not entitled to recognition as the Government of the State until it may fairly be held to enjoy, with a

reasonable prospect of permanency, the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of much of the greater part of the national territory. [18]

On 9 December the First Secretary at the FCO, Peter Walker, had counselled the Overseas Development Minister that the necessary criteria for *de facto* or *de jure* recognition "have not been satisfied on the present evidence." An accompanying background note explains the difference the two and defines "*de facto*" as implying "some doubt about the stability or permanence of the state or government recognized." [19] FCO advice early the following January was that recognition must be taken "very slowly" to meet the conditions. [20] However Rae Britten, the British Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca, believed this to be already the case. On 6 January 1972 he told Whitehall that the government was "fully functioning" and had "re-established order." He concluded that "the condition of government compares favourably with that of other governments which we have recognized after revolutionary take-overs." [21] The High Commissioner in Delhi, Terence Garvey, also believed law and order had been established but his report, despatched a day later than Britten's, is overall less positive. It advised Whitehall that the criteria "though inherently elastic, are perhaps not conspicuously fulfilled." The Indian army, although "the power behind the scenes," was confined to barracks and took no part in civil affairs. There were Indian advisers "but I do not think one could justifiably say that the Indians are running the country." He concluded that the balance of the argument tipped in favour of "moving fairly smartly towards British recognition." [22] It seems clear that the standards were being met in Mujib's absence. After meeting him on his release, Prime Minister Edward Heath wrote to other Western leaders that "a new national entity is coming into being." [23] In a passionate letter to Heath in mid-January, Bhutto argued strongly that the presence of Indian forces in Bangladesh negated the possibility of this [24] but Garvey gave the issue little weight. Heath employed it to buy time when discussing recognition with Mujib, during the latter's unexpected visit to London on 8 January 1972, [25] but on the 19th was warning Bhutto that the British announcement could not be deferred until the Indian army had left. [26] Its presence had become a matter neither of principle nor of timing. At the end of the month Heath somewhat bluntly

told the President that “in our view, the criteria for recognition of a new state have now been fulfilled.” [27]

During January 1972 it rapidly became a matter of “when rather than whether” the new country would be recognized. [28] Economic and political pressures on Britain for an early announcement suggest that a different timetable may have been adopted had West Pakistan been deemed more financially important than the East. As it was, in Dacca Britten identified the East's tea gardens as “by far our most valuable asset in an undivided Pakistan.” [29] Garvey advised in a similar vein from Delhi and it is evident that Bhutto's predicament remained a minor factor although provoking inverse proportions of sympathy. [30] Late in December 1971, Britten had warned of the importance of Bangladesh to British business and the disruption it was suffering. [31] Also in December John Pumphrey, British High Commissioner in Islamabad, wrote that British firms in both Karachi and Dacca faced “real difficulties” and that “we must clearly plead for maximum understanding from both governments.” [32] The imperative for Britain to consider her financial interests was continually put to Bhutto and his ministers but it seems plain that Pakistan was little concerned. Bhutto possibly attempted to redress this on 19 January when he compared the situation with East Germany which Britain (and other Western powers) refused to recognize. He told Heath that British interests in East Pakistan could be pursued “without entering into the formality of recognizing ‘Bangladesh.’” [33] The latter however was fully alive to the significance of British business to its recognition, its Foreign Minister pointing out that Britain could not indefinitely delay “in view of its interests.” [34] Concerns over trade interests and the Soviet threat were closely linked. The economic imperative must have been reinforced for Britain by Cold War considerations. Bangladesh did not enjoy the same protection from Communist advances that America gave to Pakistan and Britten wrote that delay in recognition could only strengthen Eastern Europe's grasp on Bangladesh's economy. [35]

Several states had intimated that they were prepared to follow Britain's lead on the recognition of Bangladesh, including Russia, Germany, and Korea. [36] However it is clear that the Government was still anxious not to find itself isolated, particularly among Commonwealth nations. In a

letter to Heath of 13 January, the Foreign Secretary stated that recognition “should be a joint operation with our European allies and other members of the Commonwealth, such as Australia and New Zealand.” [37] On 19 January, representatives in like-minded Commonwealth postings were asked to ascertain if their hosts would cooperate in a British announcement on the 31st. [38] Correspondence on timing accelerated within Whitehall and between heads of government. In a widely circulated telegram of 19 January, the Foreign Secretary advised British representatives that New Zealand, Switzerland, Germany, and others were prepared to follow the proposed timetable, although Australia was to recognize early the following week, but that most Commonwealth countries wished to wait. [39] On the 21st, he told Commonwealth postings not previously addressed that Britain could not act at least until the week of 31 January. [40] A second telegram from Douglas-Home that day instructed the same diplomats to seek their host governments' commitment to recognize Bangladesh at more-or-less the same time, the week of the 31st, although a date should not be specified. They were to draw on his own statement to the House, that Bangladesh was a fact and the criteria for recognition satisfied. [41]

Douglas-Home informed the Cabinet at this time that a number of friendly countries were then ready to recognize Bangladesh including five or six “substantial powers.” [42] He seems not to have named them, although their identities are clear from his telegrams, but they plainly excluded the United States. The British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Cromer, was sent separate instructions from those passed to most other UK representatives on 19 January. [43] Cromer had previously expressed the fear that “that the Americans would take it very ill if we were to recognize Bangladesh too early and in particular before President Nixon's visit to Peking.” [44] There also appears to have been disquiet following Mujib's visit that “some people in Washington” thought he had been invited to London by the British. [45] Heath seemed unimpressed by both the above and, when informing Nixon of the situation in a brisk, much-drafted letter of 13 January, merely hoped that the American President would agree with the decisions made and stressed his own belief that they should work together. He was certain that “your views will . . . weigh heavily” with Pakistan but seemed less confident that America would express them. [46] The reply from Nixon is dated 2

February, three days after Bhutto had withdrawn Pakistan from the Commonwealth. While Washington's lack of interest in the Commonwealth per se might be expected, its indifference to Britain's actions is perhaps surprising. Nixon's ultimate sentence, “we are most interested in keeping in close touch with you on your talks with Bhutto,” suggests that Britain was of little consequence to America's involvement in the sub-continent. [47]

In a report to London of 24 January 1967 from the Rawalpindi High Commission, Barrington called Bhutto “a strange phenomenon in Pakistan,” possessing “hardly any political roots or close political allies” yet one of only two or three politicians “who has a widely based popular following.” [48] The report was seized on by the Commonwealth Office as “a useful assessment of Bhutto's current position” and drew the prescient comment from Robert Purcell, First Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Department, that “his day will no doubt come.” London's assessment of Bhutto demonstrates a profound grasp of both his personality and Pakistani politics. His bitter antipathy towards India had long been widely known and the Foreign Secretary warned the Cabinet in December 1970 that this could lead to worsening relations over Kashmir if he came to power. [49] The Government had no illusions about Bhutto's use of intrigue to further his ambition and a cutting has been included in the file, from the Pakistan Times of December 1967, in which he is accused “in his mad pursuit of power . . . (of) raising each and every issue than can excite passions.” [50]

It may be asked, then, to what extent Whitehall employed this knowledge in dealing with Bhutto, particularly during the weeks immediately before its recognition of Bangladesh when he was already President of Pakistan. It is noticeable that not the smallest opportunity was lost to shower him with almost fulsome praise. The Prime Minister told him on 7 January 1971 that he “was most heartened to read an account of your statesmanlike speech in Karachi” and spoke of his “wise gesture” in releasing Mujib. He had long urged Yahya to take this step. He added, “I am sure that the wisdom of your decision in this matter will be widely recommended and applauded.” [51] The Foreign Secretary sent a similar message at the same time. [52] It was made clear to Bhutto that Heath's meeting with Mujib, of which a frequently drafted account was sent to

him on 10 January, had been private and unofficial. Care was also taken to find the best way of approaching him, particularly with disagreeable information and especially recognition. Douglas-Home asked the British High Commissioner in Pakistan for advice “on how to put all this to Mr. Bhutto.” [53] The records of FCO internal discussions on the subject twice include warnings that Bhutto might be goaded into retaliation against British interests [54] yet there also seems to have been a certainty that he would only go so far. [55] As the requirement to recognize Bangladesh became more pressing, there was intense activity within the FCO to relieve the pressure on him. Pumphrey warned on 23 December 1971 against early recognition because Bhutto “is deeply concerned gradually and gently to lead the people to . . . this fact.” [56] The tone of the communication is unmistakeably urgent. The British desire to persuade Bhutto to accept reality is also a constant throughout the period. [57] However Bhutto's reaction to the idea of partition remained consistently inflexible.

It is difficult to ascertain whether or not Bhutto really wished for talks with Mujib. In late December Pakistan's Director General for Western Europe, Tabarak Husain, told Pumphrey of “President Bhutto's intention to discuss the future relationship of the two wings within the framework of one Pakistan.” [58] It is clear that Pumphrey also believed Bhutto wanted such a meeting and that it might be facilitated by the Foreign Secretary's visiting Pakistan. [59] However references to Bhutto's desire for talks, if genuine, are at first sight puzzling since there was ample opportunity for discussion while Mujib was still in the West of Pakistan. According to the latter's account of their discussions before his release, he left Bhutto in no doubt of his determination to continue towards partition and there seems to be no record of Bhutto contradicting this. [60] It is possible that he hoped the freed Mujib would become sympathetic towards a loosely united Pakistan out of gratitude for his release and appreciation of the completely different style of leadership he offered. Alternatively he may have totally misjudged the international community's approach to the evolution of Bangladesh and believed few countries would recognize it as an independent state.

As the tension mounted, Bhutto became more demanding and there are signs of increasing frustration and anger on his part at the course of

events. Although it is clear that concern for Pakistan did not affect recognition itself nor its timing broadly speaking, it had a major impact on the detailed arrangements for its announcement and it is difficult to discover why the Government went to the lengths it did to accommodate him. In the event, as already noted, the conviction that he would not sever diplomatic relations was justified but it seems that his dramatic and perhaps maliciously timed withdrawal from the Commonwealth was received in Whitehall with both surprise and resignation. Late on Friday, 28 January 1972, Pumphrey telephoned London with the message that Bhutto did not expect Britain to take a decision on recognition before he had met the Foreign Secretary. [61] Yet the President knew full well, as shown above, that the decision itself had already been taken and only the detail remained to be finalized. The Prime Minister's much-revised reply of the following day observed that Bhutto's message “raises a particular problem.” It had been decided to announce the recognition of Bangladesh on 4 February and he was “on the point of instructing our High Commissioner to inform you” of it. Bhutto is reminded that “this timing had been decided bearing in mind your request . . . to delay action until your return from China.” Although the Foreign Secretary would visit Pakistan, recognition could not be delayed “by more than a few days” and a declaration of intent must be made to the House before his departure. However this would not include the actual date “so that you might have an opportunity to bring to our attention any new factors which might affect timing.” [62] Within twenty-four hours of receiving this and in the full knowledge that Arnold Smith, the Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat, had flown from London to Islamabad for the express purpose of persuading him to keep Pakistan within the Commonwealth, Bhutto took his country out of it. Moreover the first anyone knew of it, including the Secretary General, was through a public announcement on Radio Pakistan. It was a slap in the face not only for the Commonwealth but also for Smith personally.

It must be asked what the British government expected Bhutto to do in the face of East Pakistan's looming recognition, given its knowledge of his character and the above evidence of its efforts to smooth his path prior to its own announcement. In the event, Bhutto steadfastly refused to discuss the possibility of partition, much less acknowledge it, despite it being repeatedly presented to him. Yet as early as 23 December

Pumphrey wrote to London, “Bhutto knows perfectly well that Bangla Desh has come to stay.” [63] Douglas-Home told Heads of State on 19 January that Bhutto's release of Mujib and “certain of his recent statements” showed he was resigned to the division of Pakistan but not yet ready to go public. However in a supplement to this telegram, for Commonwealth postings only, he admitted “President Bhutto has not yet explicitly acknowledged that the unity of Pakistan cannot be maintained” and many problems therefore remained. [64] It is possible that further time, as Pumphrey continually urged, would have enabled Bhutto to find a face-saving formula and that the lack of it came as a shock. Not six weeks elapsed between his arrival in power and the withdrawal, scarcely sufficient to master the already potentially explosive implications of the lost war with India, let alone the formal loss of the East. There is evidence that the FCO, internally at least, later acknowledged Bhutto's “constitutional inability” to recognize Bangladesh without “the necessary parliamentary steps.” [65] On the other hand, Bhutto may have deluded himself. Pumphrey's explanation of the swiftness and timing of his reaction to the British recognition may be correct. It solved the problem of his response to the expected announcements from Australia and New Zealand, from whom he could not sever diplomatic relations nor leave the Commonwealth on their account, and he “wanted to hurt us.” [66] The subjective element in this analysis marries with Bhutto's outburst that he had no rancour for the British people and would encourage Pakistani media to play more British songs, even “God Save The Queen.” [67] It suggests that the partition distressed him profoundly on an emotional as well as a political level.

After the event, the Commonwealth Secretariat informed Whitehall that it had been clear “President Bhutto had decided to leave the Commonwealth and was only looking for an opportunity.” [68] With diplomatic hindsight, the FCO likewise let it be known to Marlborough House through an unofficial channel that “we judge Bhutto had already . . . decided to leave the Commonwealth.” [69] Deputizing for Douglas-Home, his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Anthony Royle, termed the move “precipitate.” [70] Even Pumphrey said he would have left anyway. The High Commissioner was outraged, calling Bhutto “disingenuous to the point of deceit” and “most discourteous.” [71] Yet the President had released plenty of straws into the wind, which must have indicated his

train of thought to the practised minds in Whitehall. The inference must be that the Government felt it had some basis, though no surety, for hoping Bhutto would accept recognition but every confidence that he would not sever relations. Pumphrey understood the withdrawal as his "only available weapon, other than a rupture of relations (which I am sure he never intended)." [72] If this remark is a précis of Whitehall's belief, on which policy was based, it suggests that the proffered help was an effort by the British Government to let him down lightly. The strategy appears to have an avuncular slant to which Bhutto's rather childish reaction corresponds.

The desirability of preserving Commonwealth unity was a factor in British thinking, complicated by both Pakistan and India being Commonwealth members. As shown, Bhutto used withdrawal from the organisation as his primary response to Britain's recognition of Bangladesh. The first concern of Arnold Smith, as Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat, was unquestionably the welfare of the association and its component parts, the member states. It appears from the files however that, at this crucial time, he had no coherent strategy by which such an aim might be pursued. In mid-January 1972, ten months after Bangladesh had declared independence, five weeks after India and Bhutan had recognized it and in the middle of British discussions on doing so, Smith told Douglas-Home that "he had come to no conclusions and was toying with . . . suggesting . . . that both sides remain in the Commonwealth." [73] His own actions during 1971, according to Secretariat records are few. On 17 June he made a vague offer of help to India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, "perhaps by approaching Commonwealth governments" regarding the mounting refugee crisis in India, of Pakistanis fleeing from the East, and suggested he should visit. At the same time he wrote in a similar vein to Yahya. [74] No reply from either is recorded and it seems that his idea of a visit fell on stony ground. Nor was there any further action on his part to deal with the problem, in contrast to the FCO's setting up of a special relief unit in its South Asian Department (SAD). [75]

There were rumours of Pakistan's possible withdrawal throughout 1971. Jamaica and Cyprus wrote letters of concern to the Secretariat at Marlborough House and there was vigorous activity by the Ceylonese

(Sri Lankan) Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike. [76] Many member states were clearly reluctant to recognize Bangladesh, even with the example of major players before them. [77] It must be asked if Bhutto would have acted as he did had he understood the extent of international sympathy for him and if that might have been harnessed to ameliorate the situation and mitigate the isolation his action indicates. The only certainty is that the potential of such a move was not fully explored. Smith seems to have seriously misjudged Bhutto's personality and the domestic pressures under which he was operating. Neither did he seem aware that early admittance of Bangladesh to the Commonwealth could have potentially troublesome consequences. These shortcomings are unambiguously recorded in the notes of a meeting between Smith and Douglas-Home at Marlborough House on 13 January 1972. [78] The two plainly clashed, the former stating that “pending clarification of the recognition question, both would be treated as Commonwealth members” and the latter feeling that “the Commonwealth membership issue” were better left until after recognition which “if early and wide-spread . . . would make things easier.” Warning that if it were pushed “one might be asking for trouble,” Douglas-Home pointed out that worries over religious solidarity might deter some Muslim Commonwealth countries from recognizing the new state. Smith dismissed this, a surprising reaction when, only two days earlier, the Malaysian Deputy High Commissioner had advised the Secretariat that he could not visit Mujib, then in London, for that very reason. [79] It seems likely that Smith jumped the gun on the membership issue. Following his own meeting with Mujib on 8 January, he wrote to him asking if Bangladesh wanted to stay in the Commonwealth. There is no sign that the letter was copied to departments within the Secretariat or to the FCO. Attempts by the Foreign Secretary and A. C. Stuart, who accompanied him from SAD, to discuss possible avenues of diplomacy were opposed at every turn during the January meeting. The Secretary General was contradictory, subjective, and digressive, observing that he himself had “regretted that the Kruschevian proposal for three Germanies” had not been fully considered by the West. [80]

It is difficult to understand what Smith was hoping to achieve by taking so un-cooperative an approach. His memoirs betray a degree of self-importance unmatched by the weight of his authority and which he seems to have extended to the Commonwealth itself. [81] His assessment

that Bhutto needed the organisation “and the links and aid it provided” was proved wholly without foundation two weeks later when Pakistan withdrew. [82] His officials were “at pains to point out” to the FCO that they considered the sequence of events surrounding Bhutto's announcement, which had involved the Secretary General, of no material consequence to Pakistan's withdrawal. [83] This was at odds with their chief's opinion, set out in a synopsis of events which he compiled for Denis Greenhill, Head of the Diplomatic Service. [84] He had not, William Nicholas of the Secretariat informed the FCO's First Secretary, Peter McEntee, “missed the significance of the fact” that Britain's message reached Bhutto before he had had a chance of speaking to him and was “somewhat resentful about this.” [85] It seems as if the possibility of non-compliance with his own view was lost to the Secretary General and the records indicate that it laid him open to rebuff. It appears from the files that in the summer of 1971 he was snubbed by the Pakistani High Commissioner [86] and more politely repulsed by the Ceylonese Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) for foreign affairs when he all but embarked on an uninvited visit to Mrs. Bandaranaike. He was apparently prevented in classic, diplomatic fashion but the episode seems to have been a serious error of judgement on Smith's part. [87] His severest rebuff came from Bhutto himself who allowed him to reach Islamabad but failed to meet him before announcing Pakistan's withdrawal. Ironically Smith's memoirs contain no suspicion that he may have been duped but show a quite astounding failure, given his experience as a Canadian ambassador, to comprehend the likelihood and scale of background diplomacy between London and Islamabad, now revealed. On the contrary he cherished an unshakeable conviction that he himself could have prevented the withdrawal had the Foreign Secretary, on whom he squarely laid the blame, not denied him the chance. He was allowed no opportunity, he complained, “to try and talk sense to Bhutto” before the latter was handed Britain's note giving notice of its announcement. He wrote that it was “a costly lapse” and that Bhutto, privy to all of which he himself was ignorant, had remarked, “Why couldn't they have waited a few hours?” [88]

The FCO clearly lacked confidence in Smith. It can also be reliably deduced from the notes of the meeting on 13 January 1972 that the Foreign Secretary, while unfailingly polite, had little regard for him.

Smith's want of judgement and discretion undoubtedly limited cooperation between Whitehall and Marlborough House, for which there seems to have been a genuine desire. Following the Secretary General's fruitless mission to Islamabad, McEntee arranged for him to see the relevant telegrams between London and Pakistan and was told by Stuart that “anything you can do to persuade (him) that we did not deliberately queer his pitch would contribute to an understanding of the real facts of the matter.” [89] But Smith, as his autobiography reveals, was not to be persuaded and even accused Britain to New Zealand of deliberately bypassing him. [90] Nicholas thought it “inconceivable that an hour's talk by the Secretary General could have had any influence on subsequent events” [91] and Iain Sutherland, Head of SAD, later concluded that Smith had indulged in “wishful thinking.” [92]

The Government's desire to retain Pakistan within the Commonwealth is clear from these papers but it is equally obviously not a priority. [93] Douglas-Home plainly stated on 19 January, in a flurry of telegrams to Commonwealth postings, that the British Government did not wish Pakistan to leave. He argued that the risk would be reduced if other member governments recognized Bangladesh “at about the same time” as Britain, adding “you may, if asked, say the Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat is also being informed of our views.” [94] It is possible that this was a belated recognition of Bhutto's true intentions but unlikely, it is believed, in view of the surprise in official circles when he acted. A more cogent reason for the Government to argue as it did would have been to synchronize international support for its own acknowledgement of the secession. Taking into account Whitehall's expressed wish not to recognize alone, it is held that this seems the most probable, if deliberately manipulative, motivation. There was however genuine concern for the plight of Pakistani immigrants from both wings who abruptly found themselves without Commonwealth citizenship. Douglas-Home assured Pumphrey on 4 February 1972 that he was urgently considering the consequences of withdrawal on immigration and other matters and that there would be no change without legislation. [95] Letters from the FCO's Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Lord President's Office likewise show a compassionate approach to the legal complications. [96]

The British decision to recognize Bangladesh in early 1972 rested almost entirely on the fulfilment of international criteria. However the timing of the announcement, as opposed to the principle, was heavily influenced by other factors. Foremost among these was the imperative to protect both regional, British, economic interests and the sub-continent as a whole from the predations of Communism. Secondly was a keen desire to act in cooperation with other leading world states and to be seen to do so. It appears that many countries, within and without the Commonwealth, respected and emulated the British response and that, conversely, the United States trod its own path with little real desire to work with others. Thirdly there was a genuine wish by all concerned in government to give Bhutto time to accept the situation and to keep his country within the Commonwealth. However the Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat seems not to have shared these views but to have pursued a personal agenda.

The files show that the decision in principle rested entirely upon Bangladesh's fulfilment of international criteria, as laid down in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. The Government became satisfied that these had been met during January 1972, following considerable correspondence and assessment from British representatives in the subcontinent and officials within Whitehall. Heath subsequently informed fellow heads of government, including Pakistan, that the decision had been taken. The major impacts on timing were the closely related issues of British trade and Soviet economic and political predation. British High Commissioners were warning of the dangers even before Bhutto became President, in mid-December 1971. With increasing intensity they reminded London of the value to Britain of Bangladeshi trade and services, considered to be greater than those of West Pakistan. This was coupled with evidence of economic advances from East European countries and fears of blatant Soviet aggression towards Dacca and also India. Following high-level discussions in London, these factors eventually outweighed the frequently expressed concern that recognition would exacerbate Bhutto's problems in the West although, within those limits, he was repeatedly offered help and warned of the impending proclamation. The indications are that Mujib's unexpected release did not materially affect either the decision or its announcement. Secondary influences include a perhaps surprising desire,

almost anxiety, by Britain not to be seen to recognize alone but in the company of other nations, particularly within Europe and the Commonwealth. At the end of January, the FCO directed a great deal of successful, diplomatic activity to achieve this.

The abrupt withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth appears to have taken most British diplomats by surprise although it caused little consternation. The greatest concern was for Pakistani citizens abroad who suddenly found themselves to be without Commonwealth status. Steps were taken to alleviate their plight in contrast to the lack of consideration for them within Pakistan itself. Bhutto's attitude to the secession is puzzling particularly in view of the opportunity he was afforded, but evidently did not take, of setting up talks with Mujib. Although the idea of contact with the East was several times obliquely referred to, he seems to have had no real wish to do so and remained implacably hostile to the partition. His unrealistic stance may have been caused by a combination of constitutional and domestic difficulties, thwarted ambition, and genuine distress at the division of his country. The most remarkable factor in his relationship with the British Government is the latter's unflagging desire to accommodate him, for reasons which remain unclear and would be interesting to pursue.

Bhutto's drastic action plainly demonstrates contempt for the Commonwealth and in particular for its Secretary General, Arnold Smith. There is evidence that Britain gave Bhutto continual encouragement to remain within the organization but that, in reality, attached little importance to it. This is in contrast with the sterling efforts made by Ceylon's Prime Minister, and concern shown by other members, to take action to ameliorate the situation. It is debatable whether Bhutto would have behaved differently had he been aware of the good will there existed for him. It is however plain that Smith did little either to make him aware of it or to coordinate suggestions and certainly initiated no sustained action. There are indications that the FCO mistrusted Smith's judgement, which inhibited its liaison with the Secretariat, although he was always treated with unfailing courtesy. His attitude brought him several external rebuffs which he may not have always recognized as such, the greatest probably from Bhutto himself. Evidence of the Government's attitude to the Commonwealth from these files is

ambivalent. It appears at times entirely unconcerned for it yet was anxious to synchronize its own recognition of Bangladesh with as many member states as possible.

London's reaction to every aspect of the issues surrounding recognition seems based on a *laissez faire* policy, other than those directly affecting British trade and security which were given the highest priority. Garvey aptly distinguished between what was, and was not, of British concern. Observing the carnage in East Pakistan in late 1971 and the impending international crisis as India prepared to intervene, he concluded that it was the responsibility of neither Britain "nor the world." [97] The remark encapsulates the Government's belief that it was under no obligation to publicly recognize Bangladesh until such a declaration suited its own purposes. This study has shown the overwhelming part played by British diplomacy throughout that process, illustrating the significance to Government decision-making of information garnered, analysed and, where appropriate, diffused through diplomatic channels.

Notes

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3. Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, *Cases and Materials on International Law*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2003), p. 133.

4. A. C. Bundu, "Recognition of Revolutionary Authorities: Law and Practice of States," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 27(1978), 18–45; John Dugard, *Recognition and the UN* (Cambridge,

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6. M. J. Peterson, *Recognition of Governments, Legal Doctrine and State Practice 1815–1995* (Basingstoke, 1997), p. 100.

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8. Jose Ruda, “Recognition of States and Governments” in Bedjaoui, *International Law*, pp. 449–65.

9. Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, The Search for Saladin* (London, 1997), p. 6, n. 20.

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12. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War, Third World Interventions and The Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 4.

13. Delhi to FCO (7 January 1972), PREM, 15/751.

14. Louis J. Smith, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, South Asia Crisis 1971* (Washington, DC, 2005), 331, pp. 864–7.

15. Ibid., 315, pp. 835–7.

16. Feldman, *End and Beginning,* 91, p. 125.

17. Dixon and McCorquodale, *Cases and Materials*, p. 133.

18. 13 December 1971, FCO 37/902.

19. Walker to Richard Wood, 9 December 1971, FCO 37/902.

20. Record of meeting, South Asian Department, FCO, 3 January 1972, FCO 37/1019.

21. Dacca to FCO, 6 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

22. Delhi to FCO, 7 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

23. Heath to Pompidou, Brandt, Trudeau and Holyoake, 13 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

24. Bhutto to Heath, 19 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

25. Note of meeting between Heath and Mujib, 8 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

26. Heath to Bhutto, 19 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

27. Heath to Bhutto, 29 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

28. Heath to Pompidou, Brandt, Trudeau and Holyoake, 13 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

29. Dacca to FCO, 6 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

30. Delhi to FCO, 7 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

31. Dacca to FCO, 27 December 1971, FCO 37/902.

32. Islamabad to FCO, 30 December 1971, FCO 37/902.

33. Bhutto to Heath, 19 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

34. Dacca to FCO, 3 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

35. Dacca to FCO, 6 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

36. Seoul to FCO, 23 December 1971, Moscow and Berlin to FCO, 31 December 1971, FCO 37/902.

37. Douglas-Home to Heath, 13 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

38. FCO outward telegram, 19 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

39. FCO outward telegram, 19 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

40. FCO outward telegram, 21 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

41. FCO outward telegram, 21 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

42. Cabinet Minutes, 20 January 1972, CAB 128/50 Part I, 1972.

43. FCO to Washington, 19 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

44. Washington to FCO, 8 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

45. Patrick Grattan (FCO) to Moon, 11 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

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52. Douglas-Home to Bhutto, 7 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

53. FCO to Islamabad, 13 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

54. Draft FCO advice, unsigned, 29 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

55. Cabinet Minutes, 3 February 1972, CAB 128/50, Part 1, 1972.

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57. Heath to Bhutto, 10 and 19 January 1972; draft letter Heath to Bhutto, 19 January 1972; draft FCO advice, unsigned, 29 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

58. Islamabad to FCO, 23 December 1971, FCO 37/902.

59. Islamabad to FCO, 19 January 1972, FCO 37/902.

60. Note of meeting between Heath and Mujib, 8 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

61. Contained in note from Bridges (FCO) to Heath, 28 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

62. Heath to Bhutto, 29 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

63. Islamabad to FCO, 23 December 1971, FCO 37/902.

64. FCO outward telegram, 30 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

65. Crowe (Second Secretary, FCO) to Douglas-Home, 7 December 1972, FCO 37/1180,

66. Islamabad to FCO, 31 January 1972, FCO 37/1141.

67. Press Association tape recording, 30 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

68. Nicholas to Storar, 2 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

69. Stuart to McEntee, 7 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

70. Royle to John Wilkinson, MP, 8 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

71. Islamabad to FCO, 31 January 1972, FCO 37/1141.

72. Islamabad to FCO, 31 January 1972, FCO 37/1141.

73. Record of meeting between Smith and Douglas-Home, 13 January 1972, CW SEC, [Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, London], 2004/30.

74. Smith to Gandhi and Yahya, 17 June 1971, CW SEC 2005/32, 2/2.

75. FCO circular, 14 June 1971, CW SEC 2005/32, 2/2.

76. Kingston to CW Sec, 6 June 1971, CW SEC 2005/32, 2/2; Nicosia to CW Secretariat, 5 May 1971, Colombo to CW Secretariat, 29 June 1971, CW SEC 2005/32, 1/2.

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78. Record of meeting between Smith and Douglas-Home, 13 January 1972, CW SEC 2004/30.

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81. Arnold Smith with Clive Sanger, *Stitches in Time, The Commonwealth in World Politics* (London, 1981).

82. Record of meeting between Smith and Douglas-Home, 13 January 1972, CW SEC 2004/30.

83. McEntee to Stuart, 2 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

84. Smith to Greenhill, 1 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

85. McEntee to Stuart, 1 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

86. Islamabad to Smith, 1 July 1971, FCO 37/1141.

87. Colombo to CW Sec, 30 June 1971, CW SEC 2005/32, 2/2.

88. Smith with Sanger, *Stitches in Time*, p. 144.

89. Stuart to McEntee, 7 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

90. Ibid.

91. Nicholas (CW Secretariat) to Storar, 2 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

92. FCO memorandum, 3 March 1972, FCO 37/1141.

93. Record of meeting between Smith and Douglas-Home, 13 January 1972, CW SEC 2004/30.

94. FCO outward telegram, 21 January 1972, PREM 15/751.

95. FCO to Islamabad, 4 February 1972, FCO 37/1141.

96. FCO to Lord President's Office, 1 February 1972, PREM 15/751.

97. Delhi to FCO, 3 September 1971, FCO 37/892.

Britain and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: The Rann of Kutch and Kashmir, 1965

DOI: 10.1080/03086530903157664

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pages 465-482

Available online: 04 Sep 2009

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Volume 37, Issue 3, 2009

Abstract

Britain mediated successfully in the Indo-Pakistani clash over the Rann of Kutch region in spring 1965, but when hostilities broke out over Kashmir soon afterwards, 10 Downing Street managed to alienate New Delhi with what was supposed to be an even-handed statement. The Indian government seemed to feel that the Labour government had violated some kind of historic special obligation to them, and the Anglo-Indian relationship was damaged. For his part Prime Minister Harold Wilson condemned the ‘pro-Pakistani faction’ in the Commonwealth Relations Office responsible for drafting the statement, although he had been warned of the likely consequences. Eventually, the Soviet Union, operating through the United Nations, mediated an end to the war. The article draws upon British government documents to fill a gap in the literature, and it ends with a few reflections on Britain's ‘decline’ as demonstrated by the failure to end the conflict over Kashmir in 1965.

After decolonisation and partition in 1947 under the Labour government of Clement Attlee, India and Pakistan developed somewhat divergent relationships with London. The ties between the Conservative governments of 1951–64 and India undoubtedly had some positive features, such as Britain's position as India's largest trading partner and military supplier, the provision of economic aid, and diplomatic cooperation at the Geneva conference over Indochina in 1954. However, New Delhi strove at the same time to expand its influence through non-alignment and disdained the British entry into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) or ‘Baghdad Pact’, both of which it saw as destabilising. Similarly, Indian policy-makers had serious reservations about London's close connection with Washington, whose bipolar Cold War policies clashed with the concept of non-alignment. Pakistan, for its part, alternated between military and democratic rule and on occasions displayed neutralist tendencies, but was generally a closer ally than was India not least because of Karachi's membership of SEATO and CENTO. Broadly speaking, British policy aims during the 1950s were to maintain influence in India and Pakistan to use the ties to bolster British influence in relation to the United States, and to inhibit the growth of Soviet and Communist Chinese influence on the subcontinent.[1]

London also had a concern about preserving stability between India and Pakistan after the ferocious fighting of 1947–48, but in 1965 there were two further bouts of hostilities. The first was in April, in the long-disputed Rann of Kutch region. The recently-elected Labour government under Harold Wilson intervened and, to its credit, played an important role in ending the fighting. The peace proved short-lived, though. In August the Pakistanis, emboldened by their military performance in the Rann, began infiltrating troops into Kashmir, another disputed region, with the intention of fomenting an uprising against Indian rule. India responded by launching an armoured thrust through Pakistani territory, in an effort to stem the infiltration. These clashes were on a much larger scale than those in the Rann. London, fearing the escalation of the war,

responded with a public statement condemning both sides for their actions. India took particular offence to the statement, given the Pakistani role in initiating the conflict. New Delhi had anticipated that a Labour government would be more sympathetic to Indian policies than the Conservatives had been, but the belief that London was a *de facto* supporter of the Pakistanis in the war now made it impossible for Britain to act as an effective mediator. It was the Soviet Union, operating through the United Nations, that succeeded in bringing the dispute to an end early in 1966. The two sides agreed to withdraw their forces and to restore relations. Meanwhile, Britain and India entered into a more hard-headed and pragmatic relationship, free of any belief in special ties between the Labour government and New Delhi.

The fighting between India and Pakistan in 1965 took place between members of the British Commonwealth and had the potential to cause serious instability in South Asia, but the British dimension to what went on has generated relatively little coverage. For example, Victoria Schofield's survey text *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War* (2000) provides a discussion of the British role in the Rann but leaves out London's policy towards the war over Kashmir. Alastair Lamb's book, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990* (1991), is a useful long-term survey of the Kashmir question and includes an account of the 1965 war, but it is mainly from the Indian and Pakistani viewpoints and does not have the benefit of British government documents. Clive Ponting's *Breach of Promise: Labour in Power, 1964–1970* (1989) does not discuss British policy towards the conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965, nor do most general surveys of British foreign relations, such as David Reynolds's *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (1991). John W. Young's *The Labour Governments 1964–1970: International Policy* (2003) draws upon British government documents to examine British policy toward the disputes, but only briefly.[2]

Thus, there is ample scope for a fuller exploration of British policies towards the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir in 1965. This article draws upon files from the National Archives in Kew, Surrey, including documents from the Prime Minister's

Office, the Dominions Office and the Foreign Office. Use is made of selected US government papers, along with memoirs and secondary sources. The article first examines British intervention in the Rann of Kutch dispute, and then addresses London's involvement in the war over Kashmir. The mediation over the Rann of Kutch was effective and laudable, but it was too much to expect a repeat performance in relation to Kashmir, given that the circumstances were significantly different and that more was at stake for the parties concerned. It is argued that the 6 September statement was a catalyst rather than a cause of the readjustment of the Anglo-Indian relationship to a cooler and more pragmatic one. Furthermore, the limits of Britain's international influence, as revealed by the failed efforts to moderate the war over Kashmir, are placed in the context of the country's apparent decline in the era of the Wilson governments, 1964–70.

In 1965 the first major worry for British diplomats in relation to the subcontinent was the Rann of Kutch issue. The Rann was a 7,000-square-mile territory situated at the end of the India-West Pakistan frontier on the Arabian Sea. It was submerged with the onset of the rains between May and October, and for the rest of the year it presented a hard, flat surface of stone, shingle and salt. The area was, as a Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) diplomat pointed out, ‘virtually uninhabited and, as far as is known, has no economic value, apart from some grazing’.3 Title to the Rann had been disputed long before the partition of India in 1947—the provinces of Sind and Kutch had both claimed the right to levy dues on the use of the Rann, and no definitive boundary between the two had been established beyond a 40–50-mile coastal section. Further inland, the Indians claimed that the frontier followed the Rann's northern boundary, while the Pakistanis insisted that the boundary should run through the centre, based on the premise that the Rann was in effect an inland sea or lake. Although the location of the India-West Pakistan frontier was settled during talks in 1960, planned discussions over the Rann of Kutch did not take place, with the result that the issue remained unsettled.4 Early in 1965 both the Indians and the Pakistanis complained that the other country was patrolling in the Rann, and these patrols ended up clashing with one another. The situation grew more ominous when at the end of March the Indians held land, sea and air manoeuvres in the vicinity and, on 9 April, there was an engagement

involving troops, on the Pakistani side, of brigade strength. The Indians replaced their police personnel in the vicinity with soldiers. Minor skirmishes took place, culminating in a more serious engagement on 24 April.[5] This engagement was, as one analysis noted, the first time that forces of brigade strength, with artillery support, were ‘engaged on either side … since the Kashmir cease-fire of January 1948’.[6]

Throughout the 1965 Rann of Kutch crisis there was a good deal of confusion among outside observers about precisely what was going on, making it difficult to assess who was most to blame. As Chester Bowles, the US ambassador to India suggested, ‘the fight started by accident as in [the] case of two small boys pushing each other on [*sic*] playground after school’.[7] John Freeman, Britain's High Commissioner to India, took the view that ‘the balance of right, although not the whole of it … is on the Indian side’.[8] However, generally there was less concern about culpability than with the fact that the fighting had broken out between two Commonwealth countries and that it might expand to involve whole populations and large-scale casualties—memories of the communal slaughter that had occurred after independence were still fresh. Indian leaders, having come off worse in border clashes with the Chinese in 1962, did not want to pay the domestic price of defeat and might be inclined to retaliate elsewhere, in conditions more favourable than those in the Rann of Kutch.[9] The CRO noted that, for their part, the Pakistanis were inclined ‘to make the maximum trouble for India … as part of [a] continuing effort to ensure that world opinion does not cease to bring pressure on the Indian government to reach an acceptable settlement of the Kashmir dispute’.[10]

It was a volatile situation, not least because there seemed to be little room for compromise. The Pakistanis demanded a complete withdrawal from the region by both sides, a requirement that would compel the Indians to make the major withdrawal. At the same time, Pakistan refused to consider in isolation the evacuation of Kanjarkot, a post in the disputed area, while the Indians regarded the evacuation of this post as a ‘pre-requisite to the successful conclusion of any talks which may be held’.[11] On 26 April, Harold Wilson authorised Freeman and Morrice James, High Commissioner to Pakistan, to inform Prime Minister Lal

Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan of ‘the profound concern of the British government, the hope that an early cease-fire could be achieved, and our readiness to help in any way we could’. The prime minister followed this up soon after with personal messages to the Indian and Pakistani leaders.12

It turned out that, whether by luck or by design, the offer to mediate was well timed, for the Indian army had found itself unable to contain Pakistani troops in Kutch, and the government in New Delhi was under severe pressure, as some observers had anticipated, to retaliate elsewhere. By now the moderate Shastri and his army chief of staff, General Chaudhuri, had, according to Freeman, come to realise the ‘terrifying consequences for the sub-continent’ if the war was to spread. Shastri was therefore ‘receptive to our offer of good offices, though his ministerial colleagues were divided into “hawks” and “doves”’.13 For its part, Pakistan was favourably disposed to negotiations because its forces had performed creditably; Pakistani diplomats possessed, in the words of a British official, the ‘confidence gained by military success’.14

Despite promising circumstances, progress towards peace was faltering. An informal cease-fire was arranged on 30 April. On 5 May, Shastri and Ayub responded to personal messages from Wilson by stating publicly that they had ordered their respective forces to refrain from taking any aggressive action. Negotiations began in New Delhi and Rawalpindi, through Freeman and James, to reach a cease-fire agreement designed to regularise the *de facto* lull in the fighting. However, India then moved powerful forces to the Pakistan borders in the Punjab and in Bengal. According to a British official, this ‘put Pakistan in greater military danger than at any time in the last seventeen years’. The Pakistan government saw hope in linking a settlement of the Rann of Kutch dispute with a general disengagement in the other border areas. The second week in May onwards saw further progress in negotiations, and eventually Shastri and Ayub met with British ministers, and one another, in London during the meeting of commonwealth heads of government at the end of June.15 Despite last minute difficulties, the peace agreement was signed on the last day of that month.16

The British role won international acclaim. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, informed President Lyndon B. Johnson that the British had ‘worked like Trojans, under the most complicated and frustrating circumstances, to hammer out … an agreement’.17 Johnson sent the British prime minister a letter of congratulations.18 The British valued the praise from their most important ally and overall were very happy with the way things had turned out. Freeman suggested at the end of July that, if Wilson and commonwealth secretary Arthur Bottomley had not got involved when they did, then

the Indian subcontinent might now be reeling from the double shock of widespread military conflict and of communal massacre on a vast scale. … if we had not intervened, no one else could have done so. President Johnson had just offended both Shastri and Ayub … [Soviet premier] Mr. [Alexei] Kosygin could not have been accepted as an impartial umpire in Rawalpindi (and in any case showed singularly little inclination to become involved); the Afro-Asians were preoccupied with the ill-fated Algiers Conference, and the United Nations was in no position to consider any worries than its own.19

In Pakistan, as James noted, ‘the British Government's efforts have brought widespread and genuine gratitude from all sections of the community’.20 Yet one must note that British mediation was not the only reason the fighting over the Rann of Kutch ended. According to US Ambassador to Pakistan Walter McConaughey, American admonitions over the use of US-supplied military equipment helped to moderate the Pakistani stance.21 Prosaically, the weather conditions probably played a role in calming the hostilities—in late May the CRO judged that the risk of escalation was less because the onset of the rainy season had flooded the marshland.22 The influence of a contingency such as the weather in the Rann of Kutch suggested that the fighting between India and Pakistan in 1965 was but one punctuated conflict that happened to manifest itself in two different arenas. In any case, the truce over the Rann left key issues unresolved, as Freeman acknowledged:

we must not deceive ourselves that we have solved the fundamental problems that divide India and Pakistan—or that we have set a precedent

which will necessarily be applicable to other disputes. We have not even solved the Kutch dispute; all we have done is to make a negotiated settlement possible. We have remedied a symptom, but the basic malaise still exists. Other symptoms may appear at any time, without the peculiar conditions which enabled us to cope successfully on this occasion.[23]

The high commissioner added that Shastri's capacity to carry the belligerent Indian parliament with him could not be assured, not least because the peace agreement gave Pakistan some access to the Rann, restricting what Shastri had described some months earlier as ‘sacred Indian soil’. There was hostility in India to undertaking arbitration, which had been provided for under the terms of the agreement: the revered leader Jawaharlal Nehru had for ten years until his death in 1964 resisted arbitration out of a concern that it might establish awkward precedents in relation to Kashmir.[24] Once signed, the 30 June agreement proved difficult to implement. Eventually a tribunal presided over by a Swede was assembled in Geneva, with India represented by a Yugoslav and Pakistan by an Iranian. There was no decision until February 1968, when the tribunal found more in favour of India than Pakistan—giving India 3,150 miles out of the 3,500 that the Pakistanis demanded. However, the small portion of the Rann of Kutch transferred to Pakistan seemed to be enough to settle the issue, and the arrangement was formalised in July 1968.[25] Although the fact that the underlying conflict between India and Pakistan was not terminated, it is worth reiterating that Britain brought its influence to bear over the Rann of Kutch dispute in a very beneficial way.

II

It hardly needs emphasising that the peace between India and Pakistan after the truce was all too brief—but this time it was the Kashmir issue that precipitated the fighting. The Indian princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was so situated that it might have joined either India or Pakistan following the British departure from the subcontinent in 1947. The thinking behind the partition of India into Muslim and non-Muslim elements suggested that Kashmir should become part of Pakistan, but for reasons of his own the Maharajah decided to accede to India. India and Pakistan fought over the issue, and an uneasy truce developed along the

500-mile cease-fire line where the two countries stopped fighting in 1948. One-third of the former princely state was administered by Pakistan, a region known as ‘Azad’ or ‘free’ Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern Areas; the rest, known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was under Indian control; this area included the regions of Ladakh, Jammu and the prized valley of Kashmir. Since 1949, a small force of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) had held the line.26

One factor in the re-emergence of the Kashmir dispute in 1965 was the growing self-assurance of the Pakistanis. They recognised that the negotiations over the Rann, as James suggested, focused ‘unprecedented international attention on Kashmir, much of it sympathetic to Pakistan's case’. The Pakistani government considered itself to have done well at Indian expense, and had grown ‘truculent and self-confident’.27 Military success in the Rann had encouraged their view that the Indian army was still suffering from its defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962.28 The government in Rawalpindi looked upon the diminutive, reticent Shastri with growing disdain, and ‘[a]dventurists within the regime led by the Foreign Minister Mr. [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto decided that the time was ripe to use force to promote a settlement of the Kashmir dispute favourable to Pakistan’. The idea of taking up arms had ‘great intrinsic attraction for Pakistanis and probably received early support from senior members of the army and Civil Service’. James surmised that President Ayub's weak judgement in foreign affairs helped the protagonists to get their way.29

John Freeman heard about the Pakistani adventure on the evening of 8 August, when he and Chester Bowles were summoned by C. S. Jha, the Indian foreign secretary, to learn that ‘about 1,200 Pakistani troops in civilian dress had infiltrated across the cease-fire line in Kashmir on the night of 5–6 August’. The troops were ‘well armed and carrying leaflets and posters urging the local population to insurrection’. Before long there were more than 5,000 infiltrators, who secured ‘three strongholds, including a landing strip for light aircraft and two dropping zones’ in ‘difficult country to the west of the Vale’ of Kashmir. Reports from General Nimmo, the chief military observer of the United Nations in Kashmir, substantiated the charge that the invaders came across the

cease-fire line. There was also evidence that planning and training for the operation had begun in May, even before the cease-fire agreement on the Rann of Kutch had been concluded.30 However, the Kashmir population did not join with the invaders in a general uprising, as the Pakistani government had hoped. Obviously, this did not help Pakistan's cause, and, according to a CRO official, it was India which was ‘on paper’ most likely to win any prolonged conflict given that it was the largest military power—but ‘in this sort of war neither side can win’. The fear was that an expanded conflict involving the mobilisation of entire populations would lead to ‘chaos’ in the subcontinent.31

Naturally, the British, with their Rann of Kutch success fresh in their minds, stepped in to try to restrain the belligerents. On 3 September, Wilson despatched messages to Shastri and Ayub urging moderation, but these had limited effect—three days later, on the Monday, the Indians made an armoured thrust into Pakistan towards Lahore. This opened up a new chapter in the conflict, generated great alarm among British diplomats, and gave rise to the chief controversy in British policy towards the war. Wilson maintained in his memoirs that upon hearing the news of the Indian invasion of Pakistani territory, officials of the CRO ‘inveigled’ him ‘into issuing … a statement—justified they said by cast-iron evidence—condemning India for an act of aggression’ (the idea that the prime minister was somehow manipulated into this course of action will be considered later).32 Jha reflected in his memoirs that the 6 September statement ‘destroyed the possibility of the United Kingdom, as a senior member of the Commonwealth, playing any conciliatory role between India and Pakistan … as it had done during the Kutch episode’.33 Shastri responded to Wilson at the time by pointing out that it was the Pakistanis who, beginning on 5 August, had infiltrated the cease-fire line. These personnel were not ‘stray raiders, but had been trained and equipped in Pakistan to bring about a revolution in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir’. The Indian leader added that on 1 September Pakistan had launched a ‘brigade-strength attack supported by heavy artillery, heavy tanks and aircraft in the Chamb sector of the State of Jammu and Kashmir’. This was a ‘massive attack by the regular forces of Pakistan without any attempt to disguise the fact’ and it ‘altered the whole area of the conflict, because the attack was launched not across the cease-fire line but across the international boundary between the

Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and West Punjab in Pakistan'.[34] Shastri told Freeman that Anglo-Indian 'relations were more strained now than at any time since independence'. The Indian prime minister even suggested that 'both America and Russia were considered by his government to be more trustworthy friends than ourselves'.[35] There was undoubtedly hyperbole in comments such as these, but they could not be dismissed lightly.

Arthur Bottomley returned to London on 7 September, after curtailing a holiday in Scotland. He told the prime minister that had he been present the day before then no such statement would have been issued. Wilson noted in his memoirs that the indignation of the Indians was such that 'Anglo-Indian relations were … embittered for many months to come'.[36] Freeman noted at the time that Britain's 'public attitudes and actions over the Indo-Pakistani dispute have been extremely badly received by both government and by normally pro-British elements in public life'. Britain was now 'in a weak position to influence the Indian government'.[37] The controversy was perpetuated when, on 1 December after visiting India, Francis Noel-Baker MP wrote to the prime minister asking for comments about India's resentment of Britain's attitude to the war. Wilson's reply a few weeks later set out the reasons for the statement, indicating among other things that the Indian invasion of Pakistan had initiated a more dangerous phase of the conflict. Noel-Baker published the reply without the permission of 10 Downing Street. The correspondence was widely reported in India 'where it seemed to be rubbing salt into old wounds'.[38] The resentment was certainly slow to disperse. In February 1966 the Indians were, as a Foreign Office diplomat commented, still 'quick to seize on anything which might be taken as evidence of British hostility'. In particular, 'they showed themselves to be highly sensitive about the Prime Minister's statement of 6 September 1965 and the publication of the Noel-Baker correspondence'.[39]

In his memoirs, Wilson stated that it was a 'pro-Pakistani faction in CRO' that had manipulated him into making the statement.[40] The reference to a 'faction' suggests of course that there were a number of people responsible for misleading the prime minister, but the

documentary record does little to illuminate who this faction might have comprised and it is not easy to reconstruct the precise role of 10 Downing St in relation to the statement. However, Morrice James indicated in his memoirs that CRO official Cyril Pickard was involved in drafting the statement,41 while there is reason to think that Wilson saw Cledwyn Hughes, Bottomley's deputy, as most culpable. With Bottomley away on holiday, it was Hughes who was most responsible for drafting the 6 September statement and the follow-up messages to Shastri and Ayub. Notably, Wilson omitted to mention in his memoirs that Hughes had anticipated that that the Indians would be especially upset by the terms of the communications, and that he conveyed this view to Wilson: 'it is important to send stiff messages, in particular in order to try to shake the Indians' confidence in their rectitude'.42 Moreover, Wilson's Foreign Office secretary, Oliver Wright, informed US National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that London had 'issued [a] pretty tough statement (on India) from no. 10 Downing St'.43 So there is evidence that Wilson had been warned of the likely impact of the statement, but for whatever reason (perhaps the speed and confusion of events) he went ahead with it as drafted by Cledwyn Hughes, Cyril Pickard and others—the 'faction'—in the CRO. Therefore, the civil servants who drafted the speech, which showed a lack of balance, were culpable of its impact, but ultimately it was the prime minister's responsibility—not least because he been forewarned of the possible impact.

Some British diplomats felt in any case that the Indians deserved a reprimand. Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office and former High Commissioner to New Delhi Paul Gore-Booth, for example, thought it 'quite proper' that the British government had 'hit the Indians … a severe crack about their crossing the international frontier'.44 Sir A. Rumbold in the CRO suggested that the Indian press and Indian politicians were never likely to be happy with British policy, 'whatever we did'. Whenever the Kashmir issue became prominent, 'their position has always been that, unless we declare our unqualified acceptance of their case on Kashmir, we are hostile to them'. All that was new in September 1965 was 'the shrillness of their criticism'.45

It is worth saying more about why the Indians were so hostile to the 6 September statement, as the Anglo-Indian relationship did suffer as a result. First, they resented the fact that Britain had done little to condemn Pakistan's infiltration of Kashmir in August or the crossing of the international border on 1 September. Indian diplomats believed that, in the words of Freeman, London had ‘jumped with indecent haste at the opportunity to criticise India's action in the Punjab’. Although the British had made a statement in the United Nations Security Council supporting UNMOGIP reports about Pakistani misdemeanours, the statement went ‘unnoticed in the general indignation’.46

Second, it seems that New Delhi had higher expectations of the Labour government than it might have had if the Conservatives had still been in office. The Indians felt that the British government in these years had ‘consistently tended to show a pro-Pakistan bias’, and there was a belief that the Labour government would be much more favourably disposed towards India.47 It was of course the Labour government of Clement Attlee from which India had become independent in 1947, and many Labour politicians were inclined to indulge in anti-colonial and anti-American rhetoric. But, according to Freeman, the public statement and the private message from Wilson to Shastri on 6 September ‘shattered’ the feeling that the British Labour government under Wilson would side with India.48

Third was the issue of military aid. With the clash of arms over Kashmir, Britain ended all forms of military assistance to the warring parties. This involved suspending the shipment of equipment from government sources or as part of any commercial agreement, ending help with the development of military production facilities in India and Pakistan, ending bilateral training arrangements and ending naval visits to India and Pakistan.49 Pakistan was reliant on the United States and did not receive military aid from the British, but India did. Some Indian newspapers reported, incorrectly, that Britain had ‘actually withdrawn arms supplied under aid; despite denials this story gained wide currency’.50 Shastri and his colleagues resented Britain's confidential request for an assurance that military aid would not be used against Pakistan—not least because the United States made no comparable

request towards the Pakistanis.51 The possibility, however remote, of communist Chinese intervention meant that Britain's ‘failure to make any public statement indicating her willingness to resume arms aid in the event of a Chinese attack caused deep resentment’.52 It was fair to try to ensure that British arms were not used offensively, but London's military aid policy exacerbated India's sense of vulnerability and placed strain on the Anglo-Indian relationship. As one British diplomat put it, what had ‘got Indians most on the raw was the feeling that at a moment of real national crisis like the war with Pakistan, vital military supplies could be cut off in a way over which India had no control’.53

Fourth, the Indians resented the sense of shock evident in the British press and radio over the Indian push towards Lahore, although, as Freeman suggested, the shock was ‘perhaps an unrecognised tribute to Pandit Nehru's earlier success in presenting an image of non-violent India to the world’. India, the high commissioner continued, had ‘herself largely to blame for her poor public presentation of the case’. Opinion in London was ‘unduly coloured by Pakistan's superior public relations techniques and by the apparent inertia of India House’. Indian ministers and officials resented the fact that ‘in talking to the Indian High Commissioner on 7 September, Mr. Wilson criticised India's bombing of “open cities”’. But the reality was that there was no evidence of ‘any deliberate bombing of towns by either side’.54 All of this illustrates the heightened Indian sensibilities at a time of great stress.

During the war over Kashmir, British policy-makers were anxious not only about the possibility of bringing peace but about the conduct of the communist Chinese, whose relationship with the Pakistanis had grown significantly closer in recent years. China had also detonated a nuclear device in October 1964, and so appeared to be an increasingly belligerent presence on the world scene. A combined Foreign Office and CRO analysis of 29 September suggested that, by the use of belligerent anti-Indian rhetoric, China was trying to use the crisis ‘to swing Pakistan to her side’ while avoiding any actions that might ‘strengthen either American or Soviet influence on the sub-continent’. Chinese aims, it was suggested, were: to help Pakistan by causing India to fear a Chinese attack; to profit from India's predicament by ‘bringing to a sudden head

long-standing border claims and chronic frontier incidents in order to secure local territorial gains' or 'political advantage' from the Indians; to prolong the fighting in order to generate chaos in India and Pakistan from which to benefit; to exploit the crisis in the eyes of developing countries by means of anti-Soviet and anti-American propaganda; to strengthen Chinese influence among Afro-Asian countries 'by her resolute intervention in support of a Muslim state being attacked by a larger and more powerful neighbour', urged on by the United States; and to attack the UN 'as at present constituted and to raise again earlier threats of the need for a new revolutionary body', if the UN were not reorganised.55

Harold Wilson certainly shared these suspicions, taking the view that 'the sole object of the Chinese' in connection with the war was 'to fish in troubled waters. Whatever else came out of the unhappy business of Kashmir, he hoped that no-one would allow China to profit from it.'56 He was aware that if the dispute was settled in Pakistan's favour it would create a large common frontier between China and Pakistan and he believed, as did Freeman, that this would produce an extension of the Chinese sphere of influence in the subcontinent.57 As things turned out, China did not benefit much from the war. Although Beijing's anti-Indian diatribes garnered some favour with the Pakistanis, the Chinese found themselves accused by other countries of 'exploiting a military conflict … to try to impose her territorial demands on one of the combatants' and threatening war 'to resolve minor frontier incidents and disputes'. China appeared to relish the conflict between India and Pakistan: Peking had 'violently opposed the efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations to bring an end to the fighting'.58 But the fact that the Chinese now appeared to be a 'paper tiger' by making idle threats had encouraged the Pakistanis to engage in 'a fundamental re-examination of their relationship with … China'.59

There is also the Soviet dimension to consider. The Foreign Office suggested on 8 September that London and Moscow shared a 'strong common interest' in seeing the return of peace on the subcontinent and that without Moscow's agreement or acquiescence the Security Council of the UN would have been unable to bring 'effective pressure to bear'

on the belligerents.60 In recent years, the ideological and geopolitical strains between communist China and the Soviet Union had become overt (the ‘Sino-Soviet split’), a factor which contributed to Moscow's desire to see an end to the fighting between India and Pakistan—in common with Wilson's view, the Soviets' concern was that the Chinese would profit from the war. As Freeman suggested, the Soviet Union wanted to ‘avoid Pakistan's becoming a Chinese satellite, by the hope of weaning Pakistan from CENTO and SEATO, by fear of a major war developing so close to the Soviet border, and also perhaps because the neighbouring Soviet territories are mainly Moslem in character’.61

While Cold War policies meant that British policy-makers were reluctant to see Soviet influence expand in the subcontinent, they came to feel that Moscow's role in the Indo-Pakistani war, in contrast to the Chinese contribution, was an entirely responsible one. At Tashkent in January 1966 the Soviets mediated a formal truce. The main points of the agreement were: the renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes, clearly including the Kashmir question; the withdrawal by 25 February of all armed personnel of the two countries to the positions they occupied before 5 August (the date laid down in a Security Council resolution); the resumption of diplomatic, trade and other relations; the continuation of discussions on ‘matters of direct concern to both countries’; and the discussion of ‘the return of property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict’. The renunciation of the use of force was a notable concession by Pakistan, while the withdrawal of military personnel was a comparable sacrifice by India: it meant ‘withdrawing Indian troops from the Uri-Punch bulge opposite Lahore—the retention of which the Indians regard as important for the protection of the road through Kashmir to the Chinese border’.62 The Tashkent declaration enabled the Soviets to improve their position in the subcontinent and, correspondingly, it meant a setback for Chinese influence.63

Clearly the latter was a beneficial outcome from London's point of view, and there was a belief in some quarters that, even though Britain had been on the sidelines, it had still managed to exert a peaceful effect. Two days after the Tashkent Declaration, the British Embassy in Washington reported the State Department's view that previous British as well as

American representations to the belligerents had ‘made a significant contribution to the success achieved by the Russians’.64 This was probably a flattering perception. At any rate, a long-term solution to Indo-Pakistani hostility over Kashmir proved elusive. Domestic problems led Pakistan to engage in severe repression in East Pakistan in 1971. Shastri, the ‘little sparrow’, had died just before the conclusion of the truce talks over Kashmir, and his successor, Indira Gandhi (daughter of Nehru) presided over the liberation of East Pakistan to create Bangladesh, thereby establishing Indian dominance within the subcontinent. At a summit conference at Simla in 1972, Gandhi and the new Pakistani president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto committed themselves to peaceful coexistence over Kashmir, the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and to heeding the existing cease-fire line in Kashmir. Bhutto subsequently told Parliament that, in effect, Pakistan had no hope of bringing self-determination to Kashmir.65

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and the upset generated by the 6 September statement provided Britain with an opportunity to develop a new policy towards Kashmir. Freeman wanted an approach reflecting the fundamental, material fact that India was much larger and more populous than Pakistan and was, by these criteria alone, ultimately the more valuable ally. In October 1965 he suggested that Britain should consider supporting a pro-Indian settlement of the Kashmir question. Until then British policy towards the issue had rested, he noted, on the premise that a lasting settlement would involve moving political control away from India towards Pakistan. This ‘involved the assumption that the balance of both power and justice and immediate military power lay on Pakistan's side’. But the military assumption was no ‘longer valid—and the moral one at least more open to argument than we have usually admitted’. As a result of the war, New Delhi would not consider a settlement which did not leave India in overall control of the Vale as well as Jammu and Ladakh.66 Since Pakistan had sought

a military solution and demonstrably failed to achieve it, the settlement was bound in essence to be an Indian one, reflecting the natural realities of power on the sub-continent. If we continue to resist, I fear that we shall fail; that at best we shall succeed only in fostering instability; that

our breach with India shall become final; and that Soviet influence will become the dominant factor in Indian politics.67

Following a pro-Indian approach might well put Pakistan in the Chinese sphere of influence, but this outcome would be less unattractive than permitting the Anglo-Indian relationship to deteriorate, and in any case the probability of this outcome was limited by the West's likely ability to ‘seduce’ the Pakistanis away from the Chinese and by the fact that an Islamic country was unlikely to bind itself permanently to a communist one. All told, London should ‘carefully and radically reassess’ its policies towards India and Pakistan on the all-important Kashmir question.68

As with Freeman, James's outlook reflected his diplomatic vantage point. Emphatically he did not support Freeman's views, believing that, while Pakistani policies might eventually force a more pro-Indian approach, it would be wrong and premature for Britain to take the initiative. The Pakistanis would not, certainly in the short term, be willing to accept a settlement in Kashmir that did not involve India vacating the Vale. Above all, Pakistan wanted a plebiscite over Kashmir's future. Britain's capacity to give aid to Pakistan and the Pakistani friendship with Washington would do little to mitigate the ‘violence’ of the subsequent anti-British reaction if London changed its policy to a pro-Indian one. Britain's influence in Pakistan would soon be ‘eclipsed’ and its ‘material assets … harried out of existence’. While the ‘powers of seduction’ of the United States might be enough to stop the Pakistanis from drifting inextricably into the Chinese camp, even American influence would soon expire if Washington refused, as would be a likelihood, to extend to Pakistan any further military aid. If Pakistan turned wholeheartedly to the Chinese, it would be more or less impossible to protect India and its open society if the communists gained a secure foothold in Pakistan.69

James maintained that Britain, along with the United States, should, first, try to keep Pakistan within the western sphere of influence by seeking a Kashmir settlement acceptable to both Pakistan and India. This was, evidently, a tall order, but it demonstrated James's determination that there should be no pro-Indian tilt in British policy. Second, Britain

should resume military aid to Pakistan as well as to India in a way that would placate those governments and preserve their ties with Britain but at the same time minimise the firepower available to each country. If pursued with ‘tact and skill’ this policy would not impair Britain's relationship with the former.70 Both Freeman and James, then, were advocating policies based on ‘balance of power’ considerations—Freeman understood that India was materially the most valuable ally and if there had to be a split with Pakistan then so be it, while James wanted to promote a stable military balance. But it was the arguments of James, which were essentially those of continuity, that seemed to find more favour in London than the views of Freeman—there was a reluctance to rule out the possibility of India and Pakistan coming to an agreement over Kashmir. As late as May 1967, Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi took the line that it was ‘British policy to build up Pakistan as a threat and a counterbalance to developing India’.71 This was a crude statement, but it did confirm the absence of a significant pro-Indian turn in British policy.

III

In 1964 Harold Wilson boasted that Britain's international status was such that the country's frontier was in the Himalayas, but according to his defence secretary, Denis Healey, the claim was ‘exposed as an embarrassing farce when India and Pakistan chose the Soviet Union rather than their Commonwealth partner, Britain, as mediator to end the war with them in 1965’. Later, when Wilson offered India and Pakistan nuclear protection, they ‘just ignored him’.72 To be sure, there is no shortage of evidence of British ‘decline’ in this period. Britain was unable to prevent the white supremacist government in Rhodesia from announcing an illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965 and could do little to shape subsequent developments in that country. Economic pressure led to the announcement of plans in July 1967 to withdraw from bases East of Suez, undermining the traditional position as a global military power. The Arab-Israeli War and the Nigerian Civil War reduced Britain's oil supplies and contributed to the devaluation of sterling in November 1967. In December that year, France under de Gaulle rejected Britain's second application to join the European Economic Community, depriving the country of a viable

international role. Continued economic debility led to the announcement in January 1968 of accelerated plans to pull out from bases in Asia. All these developments, noted Saki Dockrill, amounted to an ‘ironic reversal of Labour's election manifesto in 1964 which had called for a “New Britain” … reversing the decline of thirteen wasted years’.73

Yet it would be going too far to accept Denis Healey's arguments and to present Britain's limited influence over the Indo-Pakistani clashes of 1965 as an example of particular weakness. One might suggest that British success in mediating the Rann of Kutch dispute was, although creditable, in large part fortuitous in that both sides were ready to make peace and they were both happy with British intervention on an issue that generated less fervour than did Kashmir. The failure to moderate the war over Kashmir should not be seen as a symbol of international decline. Although the Labour Party had historic ties with the subcontinent, Britain was not an Asian policeman anyway; and, in this case, the United Nations, with Soviet support, performed in the way that its founders had envisaged during the Second World War. There was a sense among some diplomats in London that British involvement in a search for peace over Kashmir would ‘lead to us burning our fingers’ because Britain was ‘suspect by both sides’.74 Therefore, despite Cold War rivalries, the role of the Soviet Union in bringing peace between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, while not something to be enthused over, was satisfactory to London. The Labour government was keen to improve its ties with Moscow, and Wilson, for one, characterised the Soviet Union as an essentially ‘conservative’ power.75 It is notable, too, that the influence of the United States, which had much greater resources and a longer reach than Britain, over the Kashmir conflict in 1965 was at best marginal. Dean Rusk, for example, indicated on 6 September, the same day that Wilson made his controversial statement, that neither he nor President Johnson felt much confidence that a major US intervention would have much of an effect.76 So, beyond ending arms supplies and making some low-key representations to the Indian and Pakistani leaders, the United States did not affect what was happening on the subcontinent.

The Indians were of course incensed by the terms British statement of 6 September, somehow feeling that the Labour government had violated an

unspoken, special obligation to them. They were unrealistic in this view, but their accusations of partisanship in British policy on the Kashmir question were quite justified. An underlying tilt in British policy had emerged from, as Freeman pointed out, a number of factors:

disgust at the squalid method of the Maharajah's original accession to India and a general feeling that a state with such a substantial Muslim population would be better accommodated in Pakistan; a … belief in the principle of self-determination, coupled with the assumption that the overwhelming majority of Kashmiris want to go to Pakistan … the fact that throughout the 'fifties Pakistan was a staunch ally of the West, while India's fellow-travelling non-alignment was a perpetual embarrassment and challenge to our interests.77

So, the Foreign Office and CRO were sympathetic to Rawalpindi's case over Kashmir mainly on the grounds of ethnic and religious self-determination.78 Cledwyn Hughes' comments in a discussion with US Undersecretary of State George W. Ball on 8 September do express a particular sympathy with the Pakistani case: 'the latest news of Indian bombing of Pakistan [*sic*] cities and of the opening by India of a new front in Rajastan indicated that the Indians had wider objectives … .We could be sure that President Ayub was a very worried man.'79

There is an additional argument to be made that, despite his efforts to disassociate himself from its effects, Wilson's 6 September statement was more beneficial than it seemed at the time. According to Joe Garner, the permanent under-secretary of the CRO, the prime minister's contribution

achieved its purpose of bringing home to both parties the seriousness of the situation they were heading for and was one of the factors which helped in the negotiation of the armistice; it certainly made it easier for Pakistan who would have otherwise smarted under a sense of defeat.80

It is worth noting that, in James's words, Britain was not 'popular' in Pakistan either, 'being regarded as insufficiently pro-Pakistan'.81 Clearly, neither party was pleased with the British. What developed after

1965 was a more realistic Anglo-Indian relationship, one in which New Delhi had modified its expectations of a Labour government. Freeman described this development as representing ‘a clean break with the sort of associations that India wistfully held for the Labour Party of the thirties and forties’. It meant that Britain could ‘no longer depend on warm feelings from the past and we must look forward to a pragmatic relation of mutual benefit in the future’.82 The emergence of these more mature ties was a favourable, if unanticipated, effect of British policy towards the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir in 1965.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank John Callaghan, Paul McGarr, John W. Young and the anonymous referee for their valuable help with this article.

Notes

See Cheema, *Pakistan's Defence Policy*; Singh, *The Limits of British Influence*; Nanda, *Indian Foreign Policy*.

Lamb, *Kashmir*, 255–56; Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict*; Ponting, *Breach of Promise*; Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*; Young, *The Labour Governments*, 63–66.

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Freeman to Wright, 25 May 1965, PREM 13/392, TNA.

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Freeman to Bottomley, ‘India: The Rann of Kutch Dispute’, 30 July 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

Sykes to Bottomley, ‘Pakistan: The Rann of Kutch Dispute’, 3 Aug. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Quoted in Young, *The Labour Governments*, 65.

Ibid., FO to Washington, 5 July 1965, PREM 13/392, TNA. On US policy towards the subcontinent, see Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*; Kux, *Estranged Democracies*; McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*.

Freeman to Bottomley, ‘India: The Rann of Kutch Dispute’, 30 July 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

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Young, *Twentieth Century Diplomacy*, 69.

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Lamb, *Kashmir*, 255–56.

Ibid., 2; Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict*, xiii–xiv. See also Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, 121–28, 136–39, for his reflections on Indo-Pakistani relations and the Kashmir issue. He has little to say about the war of 1965, perhaps because Pakistan came off worse.

‘Pakistan and Kashmir: A Tragic Misadventure’, 25 Oct. 1965, DO 196/388, TNA.

Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict*, 107.

‘Pakistan and Kashmir: A Tragic Misadventure’, 25 Oct. 1965, DO 196/388, TNA.

‘India: India and Pakistan: The Three Weeks’ War', 19 Oct. 1965, DO 196/387, TNA.

Rumbold to Secretary of State, India/Pakistan (draft), 10 Sept. 1965, DO 196/384, TNA.

Wilson, *The Labour Government*, 133–34.

Jha, *From Bandung to Tashkent*, 213.

Shastri to Wilson, 6 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

Freeman to CRO, 16 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/394.

Wilson, *The Labour Government*, 133–34.

Freeman to CRO, 16 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/394, TNA.

‘Talking Points’ for foreign affairs debate of 6 Feb. 1966, F1041/16 FO 371/186952, TNA.

Ibid.

Wilson, *The Labour Government*, 133–34. Wilson added that the ‘faction did not remain there for long’. Presumably he had in mind Hughes' move to the post of secretary of state for Wales in 1966. It is notable that some years later Wilson recanted his comment about being ‘misled’. Young, *The Labour Governments*, 66.

James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, 138. James also noted that the same team of CRO officials had managed from London the successful mediation over the Rann of Kutch—yet Wilson had been ‘happy to take the credit’ for that.

Hughes to Wilson, 6 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA; also cited in Young, *The Labour Governments*, 66.

Wright to Bundy, 6 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA; Young, *The Labour Governments*, 66.

‘British Attitude to the Indo-Pakistani Dispute’, P. H. Gore-Booth, 8 Sept. 1965, DO 196/385, TNA.

Rumbold to Freeman, 30 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/395, TNA.

‘India: India and Pakistan: The Three Weeks’ War', 19 Oct. 1965, DO 196/387, TNA.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Gupta, *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement*.

‘Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Implications for the Ministry of Defence’, memorandum for OPD meeting, 15 Sept. 1965, DO 133/178, TNA.

‘India: India and Pakistan: The Three Weeks’ War', 19 Oct. 1965, DO 196/387, TNA.

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Gore-Booth-Haksar (deputy Indian High Commissioner) conversation, 7 Dec. 1965, F1051/45, FO371/180965, TNA.

‘India: India and Pakistan: The Three Weeks’ War', 19 Oct. 1965, DO 196/387, TNA.

FO and CRO to Certain Missions, 29 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/395, TNA. Chinese aggression was a particular worry in the light of the fact that China had detonated an atomic bomb late in 1964. H. A. F. Rumbold of the CRO suggested that if the Chinese got involved in the war, on the Pakistani side, then the Americans might well be pulled in support of the Indians, with the danger of ‘full scale nuclear war’ developing. Rumbold to Freeman, 30 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/395.

Wilson-Freeman conversation, 7 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

Rumbold (CRO) to Wright, 6 Oct. 1965, PREM 13/395, TNA.

FO and CRO to Certain Missions, 29 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/395, TNA.

‘Future British Policy towards India and Pakistan’, undated, F1051/37A, FO 371/180965. TNA. James suggested that President Ayub may have flown to Beijing at one point during the war to urge the Chinese not to intervene. James, *Pakistan Chronicle*, 144–48.

‘Future British Policy towards India and Pakistan’, undated, F1051/37A, FO 371/180965, TNA; FO to Moscow, 8 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

‘India: India and Pakistan: The Three Weeks’ War', 19 Oct. 1965, DO 196/387, TNA.

‘The Tashkent Meeting’, undated, F1042/19, FO 371/186953, TNA.

Ibid.

Washington to FO, 12 Jan. 1965, F1042/12, FO 371/186953, TNA.

Dunbabin, *The Post-Imperial Age*, 46–47.

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Ibid.

‘Pakistan and Kashmir: A Tragic Misadventure’, 25 Oct. 1965, DO 196/388, TNA.

Ibid.

Freeman to Bowden (CRO), 25 May 1967, PREM 13/1574, TNA.

Healey, *The Time of My Life*, 280. On the question of ‘nuclear protection’, see Young, *The Labour Governments*, 64–65.

Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez*, 2–3.

Hughes to Wilson, 6 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

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Conversation between Hughes, Ball et al. 8 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/393, TNA.

Garner, *The Commonwealth Office*, 404.

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